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ABSTRACT: 
This thesis aims to provide an investigation into how revolutionary transformation 
aimed to affect the international legal order itself, rather than what the 
international order might have to say about a revolution. This study also hopes to  
illuminate the potential limits that the legal form offers to revolutionary praxis. 
Revolutionary praxis is taken to constitute action taken in pursuit of the social 
aspirations first born in the modern era alongside the expansion of the capitalist 
mode of production that envisaged a world free of the exploitation of man by man 
and the relentless pursuit of profit. This thesis takes as a central concern the deep 
connection between the form of law and capitalism, which implies that law as it is 
currently recognised would not survive the demise of capitalism, and that therefore 
revolutionary legal praxis would have as its ultimate aim the overthrowing of the 
current system of international legal relations. Such practice would simultaneously 
aim to reveal the law as complicit in and constitutive of capitalist oppression, 
thereby disenchanting the liberal legalist aspirations of the progressively inclined 
members of the profession. In order to examine this basic thesis, Soviet and Third 
World relationships to international law are considered. The Soviet relationship 
was explicitly couched as revolutionary praxis, although it did not see law as the 
prime location of such activity. The Third World also aimed at radically overhauling 
international relations, but did so with a far greater investment in the form of law as 
a vehicle for this aim. The thesis concludes that although the prime reason for the 
failure of both Soviet and Third World’s international legal engagement could be 
considered in some sense as ‘force of arms’, that this was entwined with and 
supported by the ‘force of law’. The law’s internal logic proved inimical to 
revolutionary praxis, which offers a substantial caution to any attempt to ‘use’ 
international law to pursue anti-capitalist activity. 
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Introduction 
It is a strange world that confronts the discipline of international law today. The number 
of collective international resolutions aspiring to noble activities such as ending world 
poverty has expanded seemingly exponentially, alongside a plethora of international 
organisations fighting to implement various human rights norms in various places. The 
NGO human rights worker has become the star of Hollywood movies, embodied most 
recently by Brad Pitt in World War Z. In both Hollywood and popular academic 
discourse, international law has become the beleaguered victim of state power in need 
of saving, or vigilante-style enforcement. It appears that we live in a time in which the 
best aspirations of humanity are embodied in international law; that the noblest of our 
species work in NGOs; that their allies are international lawyers, and that the only 
barrier to realised utopia is someone with the muscle to back it all up. We need these 
heroes, of course, because there are still bad guys out there who for some reason do 
not respect the law, do not like human rights, and cannot resist the opportunity to 
make a profit by nefarious means. These bad guys seem familiar from our historical 
cautionary tales – they reside East of Greenwich and hold strange religious 
fundamentalisms or ancient ethnic hatreds and attachments to outdated visions of 
Empire.  
This might sound like a flippant caricature, but this vision has surprising purchase today. 
An intellectual caution against this legal optimism forms part of the inspiration for this 
thesis. It is a similar caution that has inspired substantial critical work within 
international law, and it is to this scholarship that this thesis makes a contribution. The 
lure of this redemptive image of law remains a powerful one even within this body of 
work and therefore that progressive potential calls for further investigation. However, 
there is a second impulse founded in the particularities of contemporary times 
caricatured above. For the past fifteen or so years, this same valiant legal narrative has 
incorporated a surprising change. Over most of the past two centuries this white-
washed image of international law has been associated with the developed, 
industrialised ‘West’ (in both cultural and ethnic terms in line with 19th and 20th Century 
European attitudes to race), against which was posed the chaos of the law’s opposite – 
barbarism, unruliness, and revolution. Yet suddenly this same heroic Western position, 
wielding the scales of international justice like a bludgeon, has appropriated for itself 
the revolutionary label and thereby formed a fascinating conceptual pairing of 
international law and revolution. This coupling provides the second basic impulse 
behind the thesis – what is the relationship between international law and revolution, 
and what is their respective content? Is there any way in which the content of the two 
would make such a pairing incompatible? 
10 
 
Foreground: Revolutionary Times? 
In popular discourse both the particular content of revolution and of international law 
serve as placeholders for political change considered favourable to Western interests 
and the necessary commitment to the legal arguments used to support them. However 
such shifts in language are important and can be indicative of deeper political change. In 
this instance the claiming of the language of ‘revolution’ points to the collapse of the 
supposed alternative of communism represented by the Soviet Bloc and the 
concomitant loss of any hope for an emancipated non-capitalist form of social life. The 
linguistic shift is embodied in the recent example of Ukraine. According to the majority 
of the Western press, Russia has just recently ‘invaded’ Crimea, thereby violating 
Ukrainian Sovereignty. In response, ‘Cold War’ antagonisms have resurfaced and a 
collective breath is being held as Western Europe and America ponder the possible 
collapse of fifteen years of collaborative international social construction.1  Russia’s 
actions have supposedly been conducted in support of the ‘neo-Soviets’ in the Ukraine, 
against the ‘pro-revolutionaries’ pushing for closer ties with Europe.2 For the sake of 
argument, let us put to one side the details of events in Ukraine. The neo-Soviets, 
supported by Russia, face off against the pro-revolutionaries. This is an interesting 
reversal. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
‘West’, broadly defined as that which opposed the Soviet Bloc, has appropriated the 
term revolution for itself. However, for the vast majority of the twentieth century this 
same Western bloc supported counter-revolutionary forces across the globe, brutally 
repressed revolutionaries at home and abroad, and deposed democratically elected 
leaders who adopted revolutionary positions.3 
Ukraine is only the latest example of this rhetorical pose, and of the requisitioning of 
the term revolution by those same interests that were previously  vehemently opposed 
to the ideals associated with it. Forces allied to Western interests attracted the label of 
revolutionaries in Syria, Tahrir Square in Egypt, and Libya. The ‘colour’ and ‘velvet’ 
revolutions of post-Soviet Eastern Europe were also conceived in the same vein. 
Challenging this narrative does not involve adopting a position in which the old Soviet 
Union, Communist China, North Korea or any other liberal bogey-man is considered to 
be representative of ‘the revolution’. But there was definitely a time, and should still be 
a sense, in which a revolution meant more than the changing of one set of elites for 
another; certainly more than opening up a country to neo-liberal economic 
restructuring in the form of massive public sector sell-offs at deflated prices for vast 
private and corporate profit, in addition to enabling multinational corporations to move 
in and exploit low paid wage labourers.4 Certainly if it had anything at all to do with the 
                                                          
1
 Henry A. Kissinger, “How the Ukraine Crisis Ends,” The Washington Post, March 7, 2014, sec. 
Opinions, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-
crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html. 
2
 James Meeks, “Putin’s Counter-Revolution,” London Review of Books 36, no. 6 (March 20, 
2014): 3–9. 
3
 See the background sections in Chapters 3 and 4. 
4
 See discussion, particularly involving the Czech example, in Hilary Wainwright, Arguments for a 
New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right (Wiley, 1994); Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, 
The Velvet Revolution: Czechoslovakia, 1988-1991 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). 
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latter there would have been no need for a consistent counter-revolutionary policy by 
advanced industrial states for at least the past century, if not the past two.  
The new-found revolutionary fervour of the West has created some interesting myopias 
toward elements that are supposedly opposed to the liberal dream. In Libya, Egypt, 
Syria and now Ukraine, blind eyes were turned to the conservative, racist and fascist 
tendencies within the so-called revolutionary movements. As perceptive commentators 
have noted specifically in relation to Ukraine, ‘[t]he inclination to dismiss [this] rising 
tide of extremism as a natural occurrence in any radical political transformation… is 
puzzling.’5 It is less puzzling when considered in a longer historical perspective. Those 
same Western powers favoured fascist elements against socialist forces in their own 
countries and abroad in the interwar period and following the Second World War.6 This 
doesn’t mean that the alternative to Ukrainian nationalism is Russian-socialism. Such 
binaries are also the territory of this reified and empty discourse. The Ukrainian 
situation is dire. There are many reasons for those of a socialist mind-set to despair, just 
as there are many reasons for those in Crimea of a pragmatic or idealistic ilk to favour 
incorporation into the Russian Federation. The details are sadly beside the point; what 
is notable is that there is no trace of the old sense of revolution opposed by the West 
(and incidentally, the later Soviet Union). The content of these Western-backed 
revolutions that makes them such is entirely obscure; other than the fact that they 
contain insurrectionary movements supported politically by factions within the 
European Union or the United States.  
Alongside the irrelevance of the content of revolution as long as its politics are pro-
Western this newly-incorporated revolutionary fervour comes with a further blind spot. 
The international legal arguments that oppose the so-called revolution disappear from 
sight. Ukraine again serves as an illustrative example, although very similar arguments 
can be posed in relation to Syria and Libya.7 Russia’s legal arguments for intervention in 
Ukraine are straightforward, focusing on the illegitimacy of power resulting from what 
they see as an armed coup; the coup’s forceful deposition of a democratically elected 
leader; and the need to protect minorities against the visible escalation of violence.8 
Against this, Western supporters of ‘pro-revolution’ Ukraine deny the right of either the 
elected President Yanukovic or the regional government of Crimea to invite Russian aid, 
as well as claiming Russia to be illegally annexing Crimea, and using force without prior 
authorization from the Security Council or a plausible claim to self-defence or a pressing 
need to protect vulnerable minorities. On a basic level, this is a demonstration of the 
                                                          
5
 Boris N. Mamlyuk, “Ukraine Insta-Symposium: Intervention and Colonialism as Responses to 
Alleged Fascism,” Opinio Juris, accessed March 20, 2014, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/17/ukraine-insta-symposium-intervention-colonialism-
responses-alleged-fascism/. 
6
 See background in Chapter 3 
7
 Of course there was no Syrian ‘intervention’ – if we ignore the fact that this elides the myriad 
ways in which ‘intervention’ was already occurring – but it would be naïve and counter-historical 
to put this down to the strength of opposing legal arguments. 
8
 For an extended list and discussion see Mamlyuk, “Opinio Juris » Blog Archive Ukraine Insta-
Symposium.” Mamlyuk summarizes Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin’s position, see 
http://www.rusembassy.ca/node/843 
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indeterminate nature of international legal argument. Such arguments are never 
deployed in isolation from political concerns. Yet what is novel about this conjuncture is 
the alliance of ‘revolutionary’ action with international ‘legality’ in Western argument. 
In essence, both the term revolution and the binary of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ have been 
deployed here as partisan concepts for a broadly Western neo-liberal agenda (just as 
Russia’s legal arguments serve the same purpose). Their specific content, much like the 
potential for fascist violence in the Ukraine, seems largely irrelevant so long as there is 
the possibility that vaguely defined Western interests will be served.9 It does raise an 
interesting question though. If the concept of revolution actually had any content, and if 
that content bore any resemblance to the content it has born historically since the 
meaningful birth of the concept, would its pairing with international legality be as 
comfortable? This opens up a further interesting question. What does international 
legality mean in this context? Despite the desire of European and American politicians 
to ignore them10 Russia’s legal arguments in relation to Ukraine do not push the bounds 
of plausibility; neither did those arguments that questioned British recognition of an 
insurgent government in Libya. In the interests of balance, very high profile legal figures 
found legal arguments to support the coalition invasion of Iraq. Of course these 
discussions simply emphasize the indeterminate nature of international legal argument, 
and its persistent and necessary connection to politics. Yet if international law is as 
open and malleable as this implies, then there should be no problem for international 
legal argument to serve multiple contemporary interests, including those of a more 
meaningful ‘revolutionary’ nature. 
Critical Times; Critical Scholarship 
This is the central question of this thesis. With international legal argument understood 
as basically indeterminate, how compatible would it be to the meaning that was 
associated with revolution before its contemporary appropriation discussed above. As 
this thesis will argue, that older meaning referred to deeply emancipatory social 
changes against production for profit and the commodification of human labour. Does 
the legal form offer any opposition to this revolutionary goal? This is not merely an 
academic question. These are not times in which one can be casual or non-partisan 
about international affairs, if such times ever existed. There are very few commentators 
today in any discipline that consider contemporary times to be anything other than 
borderline catastrophic – and this from a relatively comfortable academic position in 
the (post)industrial heartlands. One may say it is in the nature of every generation to 
                                                          
9
 Rodric Braithwaite has been highly critical of the haphazard European approach to the Ukraine, 
Rodric Braithwaite, “Ukraine Crisis: No Wonder Vladimir Putin Says Crimea Is Russian,” The 
Independent, March 1, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/ukraine-crisis-no-
wonder-vladimir-putin-says-crimea-is-russian-9162734.html. For a similar line of argument see 
Chris Floyd, “Oligarchs Triumphant: Ukraine, Omidyar and the Neo-Liberal Agenda,” 
CounterPunch, March 4, 2014. 
10
 This seems to be a desire shared by various ‘critical’ international legal academics, arising in 
personal communications of late. 
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conceive of itself as the last, but it is not in the nature of every generation to have 
access to vast amounts of empirical data to support such a thesis.11  
There have been a wide variety of scholarly projects that note the imbrication of 
international legal structures with this contemporary malaise. However there are some 
problems with this work to which this thesis addresses itself. Firstly, and perhaps most 
importantly, this critical work is often followed up by solutions couched in the language 
and form of international law. In other words, these critical discourses seek salvation to 
problems that are created in part by international law in that very same international 
law.12 This is not necessarily as immediately laughable as it seems, but it certainly begs a 
few questions. Specifically, it spurs thought on what those solutions might be, and in 
the vein of this opening discussion, if they could be considered as revolutionary in any 
meaningful way. This question is particularly pertinent because this is an area of overlap 
between some contemporary critical academic discourse on international law and 
blatantly partisan imperialist rhetoric justifying overt intervention in the politics of 
foreign states. Both consider international law to be supportive of their idea of 
revolution. Presumably they do not share the same concept of revolution.  
Frustratingly this is not limited to international legal academia. A large proportion of 
mainstream left political organisations have adopted ‘international legality’ as their 
standard of acceptability and the horizon of their political imagination. This has been 
the case, most notably, in the UK since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 by the ‘coalition of 
the willing’, leading to the long-running Stop the War movement.13 However this 
perspective on international law has long been held by groups opposing Israeli 
settlement of Palestinian land, the exploitation and murder of Palestinian citizens, and 
the construction of the ‘partition’ wall. The supposedly incontrovertible ‘illegality’ of all 
of these activities is seen to offer clear indication that if international law were applied 
uniformly and had unbiased enforcement mechanisms the world would be a better 
place. The latter may be true – at least in their perception of what the law should do. 
But this is not what the law does in any jurisdiction, domestic or international.  The fact 
that critical voices within the discipline of international law collapse back into this same 
vision of international law in their work when confronted politically demonstrates that 
such scholarship cannot even communicate its initial critique to this constituency.14  
                                                          
11
 Even NASA sponsored studies have found computer models to replicate some of the basic 
insights of 19
th
 Century critics of political economy, see Nafeez Ahmed, “Nasa-Funded Study: 
Industrial Civilisation Headed for ‘Irreversible Collapse’?,” The Guardian, March 14, 2014, sec. 
Environment, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/mar/14/nasa-
civilisation-irreversible-collapse-study-scientists. 
12
 See discussion in Owen Taylor, “Reclaiming Revolution,” The Finnish Yearbook of International 
Law 22, no. 1 (2011): 259–92. 
13
 For an excellent critical engagement with this strand, see Akbar Rasulov, “Writing about 
Empire: Remarks on the Logic of a Discourse,” Leiden Journal of International Law 23, no. 2 (June 
2010): 449. 
14
 See the collaborative letter offering an opinion on the Iraq war published in the Guardian:  
Various, “War Would Be Illegal,” The Guardian, March 7, 2003, sec. Politics, 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/07/highereducation.iraq., and Knox’s argument 
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Whither the Critic? 
There is a second problem with this critical scholarship in international law, which 
relates closely to the above point. It is a problem of purpose. Much of this critical 
project has taken the form of an essentially ideological struggle, in the sense that 
international law forms a legitimating discourse that obscures the nature of its origins in 
political conflict. As Chris Arthur has noted, ‘[t]he struggle against ideology… helps to 
deprive it of the capacity to mystify the social relationships out of which it grew, and to 
make possible a scientific politics’.15 In many senses this is correct, but there is also the 
danger here that the process of demystification becomes a goal in its own right. In some 
senses this can be seen in the critical engagements with international law. Many have 
aimed to deprive international law of its legitimating ideology, challenging foundational 
narratives and revealing complicity with oppression, but then have no way of 
connecting this with a ‘scientific politics’. As a result these studies often collapse back 
into an unqualified assertion of the emancipatory potential of the very object of their 
critique – the legal form. This is far from a process restricted to the field of international 
law, but something that pervades a variety of academic studies that shy away from the 
political implications of their own analyses. In fact, part of the problem lies in scholars’ 
lack of recognition that the empirical work of demystification has been done, and that 
the subsequent task for progressive scholars lies in a different, and more challenging, 
direction.  
David Harvey encapsulates this brilliantly, describing the necessity of revolutionary 
theory in geography. Such an approach  
does not entail yet another empirical investigation of the social conditions in 
the ghettos. We have enough information already and it is a waste of energy 
and resources to spend our time on such work. In fact, mapping even more 
evidence of man’s patent inhumanity to man is counter-revolutionary in the 
sense that it allows the bleeding-heart liberal to pretend he is contributing to 
the solution when in fact he is not.16  
Acknowledging this within the labour of an academic discipline appears to be 
particularly difficult, yet it need not prove so. In essence, it would require recognition of 
the essentially politically conservative nature of academic intellectual production. The 
nature of the academy requires the sequential development of theory within the 
disciplinary mainstream. It is in the nature of liberal pluralism and intellectual 
consumerism to value a certain level of diversity, and critical approaches can continue 
to produce work ‘demystifying’ the mainstream that fills this niche. In some ways 
recognising that it is remarkably difficult to do anything more within the disciplined 
labour of academic production should not shock the politically aware academic. Yet it 
                                                                                                                                                              
in Robert Knox, “Strategy and Tactics,” The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 21, no. 1 
(2010): 193–229. 
15
 Chris Arthur’s introduction in Evgeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: a General Theory 
(London: Ink Links, 1978), 12. 
16
 David Harvey, “Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory in Geography and the 
Problem of Ghetto Formation,” Antipode 4, no. 2 (1972): 10. 
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would lead toward the somewhat depressing realisation that the majority of ones 
labour time is devoted towards a wholly non-emancipatory, even potentially counter-
revolutionary, activity. However, acknowledging this would foreground the need for 
political activity, and a scientifically informed one at that, to occur elsewhere. 
A Note on Methodology 
The aim of this thesis raises a series of methodological points, on sources, subjects and 
general approach. These can be divided into theoretical influences and chosen source 
material. The theoretical influences form the basis of Chapters One and Two, and 
Chapters Three and Four present the bulk of the ‘source material’ of the thesis. As will 
be evident in Chapter One, the thesis draws heavily on a Marxian approach, both to 
history and to the contemporary international political economy. However, this is not a 
thesis on Marxism, and therefore does not engage directly in an examination of classical 
Marxist texts. Rather Marxism informs this thesis in three ways. Firstly a Marxian 
approach draws attention to the interconnections between economics, politics and law 
in a way that is indispensable to analysing the relationship between the political and 
economic struggle of revolution and the formation and practice of international law. 
Secondly, as is argued in Chapter One, the modern concept of revolution is inextricable 
from Marxist theory. Thirdly, Marxism formed the necessary foundation of the critique 
of law that this thesis takes forward – the commodity form theory of law discussed in 
Chapter Two.  
The second theoretical frame of the thesis revolves around the idea of revolution, and 
how to encapsulate this and subsequently understand its effects in the world. There are 
a variety of ways in which this could be done. For example, one could turn to a series of 
historical events that have been labelled as ‘revolutions’ and examine their content. As 
will be discussed in Chapter One, a variety of engagements have taken this approach. 
This thesis is more concerned with the concept of revolution – both as a referent for a 
certain kind of political project and as an animating force in the lives of groups that 
consider themselves revolutionary. It is for this reason that the methodology of 
‘conceptual history’ is adopted in the first Chapter, in order to explore the historical 
context of the term revolution and to get a sense of its effect upon collective social 
consciousness.   
Conceptual history is ‘a methodology of historical studies that focuses on the invention 
and development of the fundamental concepts (Begrijfe) underlying and informing a 
distinctively historical (geschichtliche) manner of being in the world.’17 It is adopted 
here as the purpose is to understand how the concept of revolution simultaneously 
enabled and embodied a particular historical consciousness; a particular ‘manner of 
being in the world’. Conceptual history specifically aims to capture this historical 
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sensibility, and in this way is differentiated from a more general ‘history of ideas’.18 In 
this vein, the concept of revolution is intimately tied to the particular way of 
understanding history – both of these provide a ‘manner of being in the world’ which 
Chapter One argues is reasonably distinct to the modern era and of which the concept 
of revolution is a constituent part. Therefore it is with this manner of being (and 
approaching the world) that this thesis is concerned, rather than the outcome of 
particular revolutionaries’ concrete struggles.  
However, just as the thesis is not a thesis on Marxism, it is also not predominately a 
work of conceptual history. That historical perspective is simply necessary in order to 
understand what kind of ‘revolution’ the thesis is referring to. Chapter One does this 
through a combination of Marxian intellectual history (in the sense of the developing 
idea of revolution with Socialist thought), and conceptual history (in the sense of a 
developing sense of history and collective social endeavour linked to the concept of 
revolution).  
Finally there is the subject of the source material of the thesis, particularly pertaining to 
international law. There are two areas to clarify here. Firstly the source material is 
unabashedly more ‘political’ than it is ‘legal’ in nature. However, the argument here 
depends on this division being resisted. Chapter Two engages indirectly with this 
division through legal theory, and Chapters Three and Four examine material that is not 
traditionally focused on in doctrinal studies of international law. However this material 
is both framed by the institutions and discourses of international law – as well as being 
formative of that same law. Only by examining the less explicitly ‘legal’ side of these 
historical moments is it possible to assess the impact of revolutionary movements on 
international law – rather than simply saying it had no effect on the doctrine.  
As will be clear in the discussion in Chapter Three and Four, it is also a function of power 
and authority as to what can be said to be law, one against which the Soviet Union and 
the Third World both struggled. The Soviet Union was treated as outside of the law for 
much of the first decade of its existence, in the face of treaties being signed between it 
and other member states. The Soviet state was spoken for at conferences, its 
government not recognised, and its territory invaded. Similarly as newly decolonized 
states engaged in coordinated action in international fora they found their ability to 
contribute to the body of international law severely restricted.  
With these caveats made, the actual content under examination within this thesis falls 
within Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ’s standard definition of the sources of 
international law, namely ‘international conventions’ linked to state recognition, 
international custom ‘as evidence of general practice accepted as law’, and as 
subsidiary means, the writings of highly qualified jurists. Yet a basic assumption at work 
is that the process of agreement behind ‘general practice accepted as law’ is uneven 
and political. Chapters Three and Four deal with this issue in a tangential manner. The 
reason that this is not the central concern of this thesis is that it was already a given for 
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both the Soviet and the Third World struggles that the definition of international law 
was dominated by capitalist and colonial powers, in their interests. Therefore it is how 
those engaged in the struggle – legal theorists and the states themselves – related to 
the body of international law that becomes the central focus. This has two 
consequences in terms of material. Firstly that the ‘political’ situation surrounding these 
moments of international legal contestation take on prime importance, as expressed in 
the background sections to Chapters Three and Four. Secondly it means that the subject 
material under consideration – a variety of comments from theorists, politicians, the 
statements of Third World leaders and the institutions in which they organised – 
becomes the prime source for understanding how this would relate to legal doctrine. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
It is with a mind to informing contemporary political struggle that this thesis aims to 
explore the relationship and compatibility between revolutionary activity and 
international law. Broadly speaking this means attempting to offer a more ‘scientifically’ 
informed interpretation of international law for a more radical, emancipatory politics 
that might lay some meaningful claim to the term revolutionary. It means providing 
possible answers to whether or not the ‘practice’ of international law might have 
anything to offer the aspiring revolutionary, and how in any case they should relate to 
law as an all-encompassing and dominant discourse that structures the oppressive 
world against which revolutionaries pit themselves. The first two Chapters of this thesis 
aim to address in detail both the concept of revolution and this body of critical 
scholarship on international law. They are concerned with giving more concrete content 
to the concept of revolution. As Chapter One discusses, this is a content that is actually 
more faithful to the historical development of the concept of revolution itself. This 
Chapter explores this conceptual development, demonstrating that the concept of 
revolution was born with the modern era and is essentially tied to the emancipation of 
all people from oppression and exploitation. At its heart it is an anti-capitalist creed, 
forged in the early flames of capitalist oppression and tempered over the years of 
intensified exploitation of humanity and its surrounding environment.  
Chapter One will also explore how the concept of revolution is tied to a vision of 
humanity consciously engaged in the historical process. A process of becoming where 
women and men move from being William Morris’s 'ever baffled and ever-resurgent 
agents of unmastered history' to the early stages of mastering that process. It is this 
element of revolution that ties it to the Marxist concept of ‘praxis’. Although the 
concept of praxis has a complex academic history, in this thesis it simply refers to the 
conscious connection between theoretical reflection and knowledge, and the practical 
activity undertaken in light of such contemplation. As Marcuse noted, 'to engage in 
praxis is not to tread on alien ground, external to… theory' - '[revolutionary theory] 
itself is already a practical one; praxis does not only come at the end but is already 
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present in the beginning’.19 Praxis also takes place in different areas of social life, and 
with different aims in mind. It is in this way that the Chapter outlines both the idea of 
‘revolutionary praxis’ and creates the conditions for Chapter Two to elaborate on 
‘international legal praxis’. Chapter One stresses the intimate connection between the 
concept of revolution and scientific knowledge of this kind; of theory and practice 
combined and directed towards a particular goal – the emancipation of all people. The 
concept of revolution is as simple and complex as this. What this means concretely is 
that most contemporary invocations and discussions of revolution of the kind 
mentioned in the opening section of this introduction have absolutely no meaningful 
connection to the concept of revolution discussed here.20 
Chapter Two engages closely with critical theory in international law. This is the target 
audience of this thesis: those same critical international lawyers who hold on to an 
image of the law as somehow solving the problems in which they find it complicit. This 
Chapter examines how their own critical roots offer fertile ground for this contradictory 
position in relation to international law. Mainstream scholarship and practice in 
international law tends towards a highly positivist and formalist theoretical position, in 
which the law is seen as exogenously given, objective and determinate, and that the 
role of the lawyer is to find logical legal arguments, and the role of the international 
adjudicator to choose the ‘correct’ interpretation. In international law the critical 
challenge to this position was to expose this as false: there was no ultimately correct 
interpretation for international law. Every international legal case involved legitimate 
arguments from either the perspective of the social collective (of states) or the 
individual legal entity of the state. These arguments were always contradictory and 
invoking one always led necessarily to the invocation of the other. This was the basis of 
the indeterminacy thesis that has formed the lynchpin of much critical scholarship in 
international law, and has also been accepted by the mainstream as an accurate 
description of international adjudication. It is not actually a position that would surprise 
any practicing lawyer, but it is an important component of the ideological justification 
of international law and therefore such critical work made a valuable contribution.  
This Chapter also differentiates the concern of this thesis from other excellent critical 
work that has built on the indeterminacy thesis. Such work has sought the determining 
influence on international law in other locations such as patriarchal, racist or imperialist 
forces, and has produced invaluable insights into the function of these elements in both 
the history and contemporary practice of international law. However, this thesis is 
aimed at the form of law itself. This other critical scholarship, although admirable, 
focused its attention elsewhere and in doing so left the form of law open as a point of 
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return for potential solutions to the problems they traced, in the vein of the foregoing 
discussion in this introduction. The aim of this thesis is to assess if the form of law itself 
offers any limitation to revolutionary praxis as discussed in Chapter One. Therefore it 
poses the question of the compatibility between ‘revolutionary’ praxis and 
‘international legal’ praxis directly.  
Chapters Three and Four offer two historical examples of particular types of 
revolutionary praxis and international legal praxis in order to provide some basis for 
assessing the central question of this thesis. These are the only clear examples where 
the international order as a whole faced a systematic challenge. Chapter Three 
addresses the Soviet relationship to international law, focusing on the early years of the 
state in which both theory and practice had an explicit revolutionary content. The 
Soviet example represents the first serious challenge to the dominance of 
interpretation held by European states and their successor white colonies once those 
colonies had finished in the genocidal labour of part-clearing their ‘own’ lands. The 
Soviet approach to law was self-consciously ‘revolutionary’, although there was a 
variation of degree between legal commentators. The Soviet example holds further 
value in that the reception of their position abroad stressed the difference of the Soviet 
‘approach’ to law in contrast to ‘standard’ approaches. This Chapter critically assesses 
this interpretation and explores potential reasons for that position. However the central 
focus of this chapter is how this overt perception of difference elided a high level of 
commonality between the Soviet ‘approach’ and the standard legal practice to which it 
was being compared. This common practice conducted by such an overtly revolutionary 
actor as the early Soviet state hints towards the form of law offering some form of 
constraint to revolutionary praxis. However the Soviet revolutionaries did not consider 
the main target of their practice to be the legal arena; it was one location among many 
in which the struggle must be fought, but for them the revolution would be won 
elsewhere. Therefore the Soviet example provides a case of overt revolutionary activity 
coupled with a limited investment of this activity in the form of law. 
Chapter Four engages with an example that sought victory and transformative potential 
more explicitly through the form of international law. It addresses the formation of the 
Third World and the targeting by this group of international law and international 
institutions as a key locus of their struggle for emancipation from oppression. This 
grouping encompasses a wide variety of localised revolutionary movements, but in their 
collective confrontation of the international order. Although this movement was less 
uniformly anti-capitalist in its rhetoric, many of the legal principles advanced by the 
Third World could not be squared with the effective functioning of global capitalism and 
in this sense offered some further revolutionary potential. The key arguments of this 
Chapter are that the more radical provisions of the Third World’s engagement with 
international law were vehemently opposed by wealthier countries, and in any case 
held limited radical potential. Many of the Third World’s proposals for a ‘New 
International Economic Order’ comprised relatively minor market interventions with the 
aspired aim of improving the position of developing countries in world trade. Those 
radical elements that encountered fierce opposition were never articulated with 
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mechanisms for enacting them, and were never successfully pushed as principles of 
international law. 
Both of these cases present failed attempts to radically transform the international 
system. In general the prime cause for this remains an evident lack of ‘power’, however 
conceived, to implement these revolutionary ideals. But the question of this thesis is 
the compatibility between revolutionary praxis and legal praxis. In other words, to 
discover if, in the face of its indeterminate argumentative structure, the form of law 
offers any limits to revolutionary praxis. The failure of the more radical initiatives of the 
Soviets and the Third World hints that this may be the case, not simply because they 
were ‘outgunned’ but because the law as a locus of argument was in some way 
inhospitable to revolutionary challenges to its most basic elements.   
Why Law Anyway? 
In this world of globalized late capitalism, law is all around us. There is no option of 
whether or not to go by law, but only what to do with it. It is with this in mind that the 
possibilities of the law’s limits are a necessary area of exploration – even more so those 
of international law, considering the emancipatory potential perceived in it by many. 
However the nature of such exploration must not involve making a fetish of the law or 
legal struggle. To do so would be to approach the question with a prior commitment to 
the legal form. Yet just as Harvey’s emotive statement implies, some activity may not be 
revolutionary, and an investigation into the limits of the legal form has to entertain this 
possibility. This does not mean that law can be avoided. As the discussion in Chapter 
Two and Three will make clear, there is no use in avoiding the law out of some kind of 
revolutionary moralism. But this position raises a necessary caution. Between the path 
of necessity and idealism lies the vaguely defined ‘middle ground’ of our times. This 
platitudinous position haunts the juxtaposition of all such oppositions as revolution and 
the law. It is here where a deeper consideration of revolutionary praxis offers a possible 
palliative. Revolutionary praxis is defined by the ultimate goal, and it becomes the task 
of both theory and practice to map possible routes and to explicate obstacles to 
achieving this objective. Legal scholars have something to offer here, just as do legal 
advocates. But it is vital that such a position also remains aware of the limits of law, and 
can thereby direct revolutionary energy elsewhere when appropriate. 
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Chapter 1: Revolution and Revolutionary Praxis 
‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make 
it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given 
and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brains of the living.’ 
 Karl Marx , ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ 1852 
I: Introduction 
Marx wrote the above paragraph as a caution against the aspirations of utopian 
socialists; those who dreamed of a more cooperative and communally minded way of 
life, in contrast to growing liberal individualism. They were criticised as utopian because 
their vision of an alternate way of living was not coupled with a systematic 
understanding of why things were the way they were, why that liberal philosophy was 
achieving dominance, or how this meshed with the expanding capitalist mode of 
production. As a consequence, their analysis failed to offer a convincing method of 
transition from capitalism to a socialist alternative. Marx’s last line offers a poetic, if 
dark, summary of the dilemma facing all those who dream of a better human society. 
However much we may envisage a cooperative existence of social well-being, absent 
the fractious conflicts of the present world, each and every inhabitant of that future 
vision must be born, cradled and educated in the very mire from which escape is 
desired. How can such people, scarred by the vicissitudes of scarcity and competitive 
capitalist production, escape the nightmare of their experience and work to create a 
different future? Furthermore, if one was a committed materialist, which meant 
recognising the power of the environment to shape the individual and constrain their 
actions, how could a political programme of action be drawn up and elucidated that did 
not contradict the basic tenets of their theory? Finally, if one was opposed politically to 
the seductions of liberalism, which advocated the free power and action of the 
individual, where could emancipatory potential be located? How would one speak to 
the people in a way that empowered them to create change, yet recognised the 
significant constraints upon their lives, and the fallacy of a doctrine of self-
emancipation? 
The concept of revolution attempted to provide an answer these problems. The study 
of revolution and the attempt to enact it provided a theoretical frame in which people 
socialized by their historical conditions could be understood to actively transform those 
conditions for future generations. This, it will be argued in this chapter, is the essence of 
the concept of revolution in its modern form. There are three key components to this 
interpretation of revolution which will be stressed throughout this Chapter. Firstly, the 
modern concept of revolution is rooted in a systematic historical and political analysis 
that recognised human beings as the prime subjects and objects of history. As Marx's 
quote makes clear, people were both actors in historical processes and yet were also 
formed by these processes; as such they were both – in dialectical fashion – the subject 
and object of history. 
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Secondly, this analysis formed part of the shifting consciousness associated with the 
birth of modernism. This shift involved a move from understanding history as a cyclical 
process to one of historical development that included the possibility of meaningful 
progress. This vision was an integral part of the development of capitalism (and the 
vision of those who benefitted most), but it was also a component of the immediate 
corollary of capitalism and its critique, socialism – that true human emancipation and 
progress would involve the abolition of capitalist exploitation. It is this latter element 
that this chapter argues is central to the modern concept of revolution.  
The third component of this argument is that the modern concept was a politically 
mobilizing one. It linked theoretical analysis to the direct participation of human agents. 
In other words, it tied an examination of the structural conditions ‘transmitted’ from 
the past to the potential agency of groups to transform them in the future.21 This 
component is crucially concerned with the participation of people in history, their 
historical agency, and the structural conditions in which they act. Closely linked to these 
points, this Chapter argues that it is actually impossible to understand the emergence 
and consolidation of revolution as a concept without linking it to the historically 
significant role of the socialist movement and the politics associated with it. For it was 
in the context of this movement’s theoretical and practical political engagement that 
the concept and its component elements were developed. Without this context, as shall 
be argued, revolution loses purchase as an analytical concept and becomes meaningless 
as a political project.  
This Chapter will address these components in the following way. In the first instance, 
Section II will engage with the place and role of revolution in a broader historical 
perspective. The historiographical arguments here are not essential to the modern 
function of revolution as a mobilizing concept discussed above, but they offer insight 
into the interpretive work that is ever present in conceptual formation. The meanings of 
concepts are always unstable and open to contestation, and more generally accepted 
interpretations will change across different points in time. Such contestation does not 
occur in an apolitical academic sphere – as Robert Cox made explicit, theory always 
serves a particular purpose and a particular group of people.22 As such a critical 
approach to conceptual interpretation must recognise that attaching meaning to a 
concept is a process that has particular political and social stakes in addition to semantic 
ones. That is to say that there are direct theoretical and material consequences 
attached to different interpretations of a concept as particular interpretations of 
concepts serve different purposes and social alliances. Of course this does not mean 
that different theories and interpretations cannot be assessed against their own 
internal coherence and measured against some form of empirical observation. What it 
means is that this process is never a neutral or objective one, especially in social terms. 
Part of the purpose of this Chapter then is to stress that the particular meaning 
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attached to revolution articulated above is not only historically and conceptually 
sensical, but is politically necessary to progressive academic and popular engagement 
with international law and global political life more generally.  
Closely related to these insights, Section III of this Chapter will present a historical 
perspective designed to foreground the practice of revolution, rather than the labelling 
of historical events as revolutions. The central aim here being that in addition to 
highlighting the political stakes in labelling and interpretation, there also exists a 
concrete historical record of the development of revolution as a concept. This record 
serves to emphasize that the early formations of the modern concept of revolution 
rooted in the critique of capitalism differed from pre-modern ideas of both revolution 
and historical change, and were deeply embedded in an actual political movement 
aimed at overthrowing capitalist oppression. Yet, as both Sections II and III will show, 
there is a contemporary trend that elides elements of this narrative, driven by 
scepticism towards the possibility of alternative social organisations to capitalism. If this 
is not considered as a possibility, then the modern concept of revolution can only 
collapse into an empty and meaningless term.  
The following Section IV will introduce the Chapter’s third related but distinct historical 
analysis of the specific elements of the modern concept of revolution, by focusing on 
the manner in which they were initially formulated by Marx and Engels, alongside the 
contrast provided by pre-modern concepts of political change and of revolution. This 
section is designed to offer a historical and historiographical context to the key 
components of the modern concept of revolution. 
The final Section V, building on the insights developed throughout the Chapterfocuses 
on revolutionary agency and praxis; i.e. the politically mobilizing aspects of revolution 
outlined above. This section stresses the function of revolution as an active process 
rather than a descriptor, and clarifies the idea of revolutionary praxis against which it 
would be possible to assess legal praxis. The key components are human agency in the 
historical process, and the connection of this to scientific knowledge – that is materialist 
analysis of the structural conditions that influence revolutionary agency. This 
necessarily involves constant reflection on the simultaneous position of the agents of 
history as both subjects and objects of history – an ambivalence that is present in the 
very word ‘agent’ itself. Perry Anderson’s exposition on E. P. Thompson’s The Poverty of 
Theory offers a series of productive considerations of historically structured human 
agency, and this will be addressed in Section V i. The final part of that section, V ii, then 
unites these components under the concept of praxis, which describes the unity of 
practical engagement with theoretical reflection. Such activity necessarily occurs in 
different areas of social life, each with their own particular characteristics yet part of a 
complex whole. Therefore this approach provides a way of thinking about both 
revolutionary praxis as argued for within this Chapter, and international legal praxis, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Two, thus providing the frame for assessing the later 
examples of the Soviet Union and the Third World. 
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II: Revolution: Meaning; Concepts; History 
How do we arrive at the interpretation of revolution in its modern form? In much of the 
existing literature that uses the concept of ‘revolution’, it is treated as a term with an 
open meaning – ‘one of the looser words’.23 In a broad sense, it can be used to describe 
anything from grand historical events like the French Revolution to innovations in 
industrial or intellectual sectors, such as the Industrial or Digital Revolutions. In 
common usage it can seem little more than a way of encapsulating change of a certain 
scale, especially times when such transition is particularly sudden or striking. In some 
cases revolution may be understood to be restricted in its reference to change of a 
complete and fundamental nature, in order to add some specificity to the term. But 
these are clearly inexact terms in themselves, and the attempt to achieve precision 
therefore merely relocates the indeterminacy. There is no external source of arbitration 
to determine definitively between the numerous criteria that could define something as 
fundamental, or complete. The point is simply that any interpretation over 
revolutionary criteria is personal, subjective, and political as well as empirical. It is 
possible, for example, to describe the rapid transition of a series of geographical regions 
from Colonial to Self-rule and recognised internationally in the Colonial Declaration of 
1960 as an international revolution of some kind.24 Conversely, the maintenance of neo-
Colonial forms of relationships and a lack of economic autonomy can be considered to 
render these changes merely those of a surface nature. Similarly, for many scholars, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union presented a revolutionary transformation in international 
affairs, as much as did the Bolshevik Revolution that established it. But for others, such 
a ‘change’ barely registered on the key dynamics of American imperialism that they 
understood to dominate global politics.25 From different perspectives, these kinds of 
transitions, or lack thereof, will often appear radically different.  
The above examples offer a variety of problems beyond that of ‘extent’. They also 
include typologies of change. But in either case, discussion around them does not offer 
a particularly conclusive way of assessing whether the concept of revolution offers any 
determinate content. To a large extent this discussion’s interminable nature could be 
dismissed as linguistically determined; it is inherent in the nature of a concept that it 
maintains a certain ambiguity in its use.26 As such it is difficult to make an argument 
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that one particular interpretation of revolution offers the most faithful reflection of the 
accepted conceptual definition at this present moment. There will always be competing 
understandings vying for the popular imagination. Nevertheless the argument put 
forward here is that the conceptual history of the concept of revolution reveals some 
basic, but quite specific, characteristics that distinguish its modern characteristics from 
both earlier usages and certain contemporary (re)interpretations. Indeed, as will be 
made clear below in Part III, the changing uses over time indicate that, following the 
industrial revolution in England and the maturation of what we can think of as 
modernist thought, revolution’s meaning solidified around the broadly socialist idea of 
progressive change towards non- or post-capitalist forms of productive life. 
However, before engaging in this analysis of the place and role of revolution in its 
broader historical context, sections II i and II ii below prefigure this discussion by 
highlighting how different interpretations of revolution as a concept open us up to 
different imaginative possibilities, and therefore different orientations for organised 
political activity. Considering that theory and interpretation always serve a political 
purpose, explicit or otherwise,27 it is worth assessing the political stakes involved in 
differing interpretations of revolution, most especially what they offer by way of 
opening up collective imaginative horizons. In this sense the concept of revolution 
offers a uniquely self-reflexive position. It is a concept that focuses on the role of 
human agency in shaping history, but also one that draws attention to conflict within 
that historical process – conflict over both material and ideological terrain. Therefore, 
within its own conceptual makeup, revolution offers a way of understanding its own 
position as a concept subject to contesting interpretations and invocations that relate 
directly to differing political stances. This political awareness also offers up an 
explanation for contemporary conceptions of revolution that ignore the modern 
specificity of the concept. 
i) Concepts and History: 
There has been no small measure of hostility among historians to efforts to explore 
revolutions throughout history in the sense outlined at the opening of this chapter. 
Over the past thirty or so years, revisionist work has attempted to re-examine the most 
prominent historical examples of ‘revolution’ and to re-interpret them outside of the 
framework of the modern concept developed here.28 These criticisms vary in content. 
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Some, like Francois Furet’s work, aim to reinterpret events like that of the French 
Revolution, aiming to correct both the historical narrative and the privileged position 
the event holds in progressive imaginations.29 It is not the focus of this work to engage 
with debate on the historical record. However, it is important to recognise that Furet’s 
work can also be read to serve a political function, and forms part of a particular 
revisionist agenda. The challenge is the asserted demise of an alternative to capitalism, 
and work like Furet’s is intended to reinforce this by reinterpreting the historical record. 
It is also noteworthy that such challenges tend to specify particular characteristics of a 
revolution, to which the historical events under their concern then are not considered 
to approximate. While it will be discussed in more detail in section III part ii, it is 
immediately clear that such a focus threatens to descend into an interminable debate 
over the appropriate criteria for a ‘revolutionary’ event. It also overshadows the 
animating purpose of those engaged in revolutionary activity, and the necessary 
political content that was a component part of the concept’s modern development.  
However, there are certain theoretical positions that accompany these criticisms, and 
they are worth responding to separately. They represent differing positions on historical 
interpretation. Firstly there is a resistance to what is claimed to be the retrospective 
imposition of ideas of revolution onto a historical period.  This is a component of the 
broader demand to treat history according to the criteria of the period, and to avoid 
where possible the application of contemporary forms of understanding onto the past. 
Clark, for example, insists that the historian pay ‘attention to religion as religion and not 
as a sublimation of something else.’30 This charge of prolepsis is then expanded to 
encompass discussions of revolution.31  
There is a second theoretical position within revisionist work, closely linked to this 
point. It is a conceptual point, claiming that revolutionary actions cannot take place 
without specific reference to revolutionary ideas. This is not a position that cuts cleanly 
along political lines. For example, the Marxist historian John Pocock noted that ‘[m]en 
cannot do what they have no means of saying they have done’, ‘and what they do must 
in part be what they can say and conceive that it is’32. The discussion in Section V will 
highlight how such a position might accurately describe the concept of praxis, which as 
the conscious unity of theory and practice could be limited in this way. But for the 
discussion at hand, Pocock’s statement does not serve as an effective description of a 
general relationship between concepts and the material world. Concepts help people to 
interpret and assess their actions in the world, and as such also offer a way of 
understanding past actions, as well as framing future activity around particular 
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imaginative vision. Therefore in any period people may continually reinterpret their 
own understanding of their activity using different and new concepts. New concepts 
can serve to provide a window of understanding onto past activity which has already 
taken place.33 Such a process certainly doesn’t invalidate the original activity in the way 
Pocock was suggesting. 
Such criticisms then merge both a disagreement about the appropriate criteria by which 
to judge the contemporary relevance of past events, and over how people in general 
conceptualize their own actions. In regard to the first point, it is clear that what Clark 
considers to be ‘religion as religion’ equally represents a form of potential prolepsis. 
Interpreting the past within expectations of the period presents the same problems as 
attempting to trace nascent or unarticulated elements of a politically mobilizing concept 
like that of revolution. What one historian considers to be the standards of the past is 
also a matter of historical interpretation. Against Clark’s criticism cited above, Neil 
Davidson notes that it would be easy to read events like the Lutheran protests against 
the Catholic Church as purely ‘religious’ complaints, and therefore modern readings of 
this in a political light as prolepsis.34 However, to do so forces modern conceptual 
separations between ‘religious’ and ‘political’ issues that struggle to be persuasive even 
today, let alone to offer a persuasive account of a period when organised religion 
pervaded all aspects of social and political life. As James Holstun writes, ‘can one 
imagine any phrase more alien to William Laud, or William Prynne, or William Walwyn, 
or any seventeenth-century person, than ‘religion as religion’?’35 To make a powerful 
intervention in religious terms in such periods was unavoidably political, just as political 
activity would often be framed religiously. 
In regard to the second point, it seems simply a matter of intuition that, contra Pocock, 
people can experience things prior to (or even without)  naming them, in addition to 
taking existing words and concepts and investing them with new meanings and 
significance.36 Concepts can also, and perhaps always do, refer to imaginative 
possibilities, and in this way create paths for both their own evolution and material 
social transformation. Often both of these processes will only be understandable 
retrospectively. Attempting to understand this process is also necessarily an attempt to 
construct meaning for those past events. When account is given to the fact that 
contemporary interpretations of concepts are themselves contested, then the 
argument is no longer about the danger of prolepsis;37 in other words, it is no longer an 
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attempt to understand the past as it was for those experiencing it, but about where and 
how the heritage of modern concepts can be located. 
There are persuasive arguments that certain modern concepts require certain material 
preconditions for their development, for example that of the modern State.38 However, 
it doesn’t follow that it is unproductive to trace the nascent forms of such organisation 
to the point at which it is considered to meet the historian’s criteria. Firstly, because 
this is a fundamental component of the work required to develop contemporary 
understanding of different concepts. Thus, despite claims that no concept of revolution 
was possible before the existence of the modern state,39 earlier examples and usages of 
‘revolution’ can help to elucidate the layers of meaning present in the modern concept, 
most particularly via their contrast with pre-modern ideas about political change.  
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this whole process also offers a challenge to 
the strict lines drawn between historical categories like those of the era of the modern 
state. Indeed, it pushes towards an acknowledgement that the historical manifestation 
of particular forms takes place gradually, dialectically formed out of different 
conceptual frames that are equally in the processes of formation and transformation. 
What these observations tell us is that the modern concept of revolution was both 
enabled by material preconditions, but also developed and grew dialectically out of the 
myriad meanings embodied by the term historically. The next section will provide a 
short narrative of the changing usages of the term revolution across time to elucidate 
this conceptual heritage. Historical work conducted in this vein has been coined 
‘conceptual history’40, although it is important that this isn’t read as a departure from a 
more ‘concrete’ or ‘material’ history. Although the work of conceptual history focuses 
on the concept and its changing meanings, such a process is always situated in the 
totality of historical relations. As the foregoing discussion in this chapter makes clear, 
concepts are situated within material history, offering both a window onto concrete 
relations and onto the collective consciousness of the time. As mentioned above, 
concepts both open up towards an unknown and imagined future, but are also enabled 
by the changing material conditions of the people that conceive them.  
There is one final point that has to be clarified before outlining the conceptual history of 
revolution. Part of the concept’s contemporary usage is tied to particular adjectives that 
qualify the ‘type’ of revolution being referred to. These can range from the more to less 
specialised. A ‘technological’ revolution is relatively straightforward (and decidedly 
modern), whereas a ‘bourgeois’ revolution both further nuances and straddles the 
concepts of ‘political’ and ‘social’ revolution.41 The decision to remain with a broader 
concept of ‘revolution’ in this thesis is based upon some basic reactions to this. Firstly, 
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as will become clear in discussing the conceptual history of revolution, these 
distinctions are in fact part of the contested terrain of the concept of revolution itself. If 
attention is to be drawn to these broader struggles and the stakes involved, one cannot 
specify a particular kind of revolution. Section IV also clarifies not only the reasons for a 
transition from conceiving of ‘political’ and ‘social’ revolutions separately (alongside the 
idea of ‘bourgeois’ revolution), to revolution as a single term used to refer to the 
struggle against the oppressive structures of capitalism – essentially a ‘socialist’ 
revolution. 
However, conceding the addition of the ‘socialist’ adjective has a couple of problematic 
consequences. Firstly, it allows for a very open conception of revolution in general (as 
ones particular stance can always be qualified by the requisite adjective), whereas the 
argument put forward here is that the conceptual history of revolution points towards 
one particular persuasive meaning of revolution irrespective of what it is paired with, 
and that fighting for this has important political ramifications in terms of maintaining an 
anti-capitalist vision. Secondly, it disables an analysis of revolution from effectively 
coupling itself with the broad totality of international relations. These relations are at 
once economic, political, social, and legal. Concepts such as ‘social’ or ‘political’ 
revolutions already feed into the hermetic perception of these categories and are 
therefore counterproductive for critical scholarship that foregrounds the 
interrelationships between them.  
III: Revolution as Modernity/Progress/History 
Bearing in mind the foregoing discussion on the politics of historical and conceptual 
interpretation, this Section presents the historical context and the defining features of 
the modern concept of revolution. As mentioned, these are tied to a general shift in the 
social conception of history associated with the modern period.42 These in turn are 
intimately linked to Enlightenment scientific principles and methods, such that people 
(with the liberty to do so) began to see in their endeavours the signs of the progressive 
development of society. Francis Bacon’s reflections provide the perfect example of this 
turn of thought:  
it is reasonable that greater things be expected from our age than from old 
times (if it only knew its strength and was willing to exert it); seeing that our age 
is the older age of the world enriched and studded with countless experiences 
and observations.43 
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There are two aspects of this that are of interest, especially in relation to earlier 
European conceptions of history and social change. Firstly this new position was a 
reversal of the dominant prior mode of thinking. In general, educated thought reflected 
on the great empires and achievements of the past and wondered if contemporary 
society would ever reach such heights of civilisation. What was old was considered to 
be imbued with authority and power, and therefore with respect and admiration. It was 
then an aspiration to emulate past greatness. In this new formulation, it was the new 
that would exceed the limits of the old. However, the second aspect recognises the dual 
nature of this reversal – for it was in the passage of time accruing experience that 
generated both the wisdom of the old, but also, in this new formulation, the superiority 
of future generations.  
This shifting modernist mind-set involved ‘a new way of looking at human history that 
recognized the existence of secular progress’.44 The secular nature of this conception is 
an important aspect of the modernist mind set, and also serves as a link to prior 
visualisations of the trajectory of human existence. Christian doctrine was generally 
understood as positing a grim earthly life, in comparison to the eternity of heavenly 
bliss that awaited those who had lived appropriately pious lives. Although the 
theocratic debates of the Protestant Reformation challenged traditional conceptions of 
how the human soul achieved salvation, this did not challenge the basic assumption 
that an earthly life was miserable and short, to be followed by an eternal and complete 
happiness. The secularisation of this shifted both the direction of earthly human life, 
and the purpose of earthly activity – in a sense, it framed the possibility  of creating 
‘heaven’ on earth. Koselleck has coined this shift the 'secularization of eschatalogical 
expectation', which forms an important component of the modernist mindset that 
embraced revolution in the sense we are concerned with.45 
Eric Hobsbawm offers an excellent summary of the conceptual components of this 
earthly progress narrative. In the Age of Revolution, he lists a series of 'English words 
which were invented, or gained their modern meanings, substantially in the period of 
sixty years [between 1789 and 1848]'.46 Consider the transformations involved to 
enable words such as 'industry', 'industrialist', 'factory', 'middle class', 'working class', 
'capitalism' and 'socialism; along with 'liberal' and 'conservative' as political terms, 
'nationality', 'railway', 'scientist', 'engineer', 'utilitarian', 'statistics' and 'sociology', 
alongside 'ideology', 'strike' and 'pauperism'.47 In this period of relatively rapid and 
radical change, previous conceptions of human history as a cyclical process, or one 
overshadowed by the great achievements of the past appeared inapt.. 
It is in this context that the idea of revolution began to animate both this progressive 
narrative and how it was shaped by human participation. For Koselleck it was during 
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this period that revolution became a 'metahistorical concept'; encompassing all 
revolutions and functioning to capture a particular kind of progressive transformation.48 
In the context of the aforementioned historical acceleration and messianism, delinked 
in some way from prior religious contexts, Koselleck noted the complex coterminality of 
reform, revolution and evolution.49 Although a note of caution must be made in taking 
this point from Koselleck, it is an element that carries a grain of truth. The modern 
concept of revolution was embedded in the same social transformations that enabled 
reform to have its particular connotations, as well as influencing the concept of 
evolution.50 It was only to be expected that a variety of concepts would attempt to 
capture the spread of contemporary developments. For Koselleck,  
the repeated contamination of revolution and evolution since the nineteenth 
century does not only indicate linguistic carelessness or political 
accommodation; the extensive interchangeability of both concepts indicates 
structural dislocations in the entire social structure which provoke answers 
differentiated only on a political plane. Evolution and Revolution become, as 
antithesis, partisan concepts; their similar usage denotes the general expansion 
of a movement for social emancipation driven by industrialisation.51 
There are two central components to this point that are worth highlighting. Firstly, as 
noted above via Davidson's account, the partisan nature of revolution as a concept is 
only fully enabled within the context of secular social emancipation - and reinforced by 
the terminological ambiguity that Koselleck noted. But the idea that universal social 
emancipation was the essence of revolutionary activity cut across this divide. That the 
ultimate goal of revolution was the emancipation of all men meant that the concept 
took on a 'spatially universal connotation', both as world revolution and as a 
progressive process that would be permanent.52 Coupled with the notion that 
revolution was a man-made event there arose a concurrent duty to activism.  
The coterminality that Koselleck noted then takes on a different hue, particularly 
between reform and revolution. Although in some senses understood as a way of 
differentiating between the peaceful or bloody nature of progressive transformation, it 
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would come to encapsulate significantly different theoretical positions.53 However, at 
this stage it is important simply to note the array of coordinates within which the 
concept of revolution acquired meaning alongside the development of modern thought 
and industrial production. The few examples of previous usages of the term revolution 
will help to further elucidate this frame. 
i) The Contrast of Pre-Modern Revolution 
Studies of the conceptual history of revolution demonstrate, in the main, the distinction 
between earlier usage and the modern concept deployed and clarified in this thesis.54 
To reiterate, the modern concept of revolution is considered as a particular historical 
process, involving in some sense the participation of human beings in moulding a 
transformation of their society in a way that is fundamentally different in some key 
aspects to how it was before. We can think of this as a transcendental conception of 
revolution, in that the conceptual implication is of departure from one position to 
something new. This does not mean that the process has no element of continuity, or 
that the historical transformation could not be read ‘dialectically’; that is formed from 
within a complex of different historical factors and comprised of them in the new social 
formation. But it is a way of capturing both an empirical and a conceptual fact about the 
collective interpretation of history. The extent of the change required is less important 
than the fact that it is understood to exist, that this is an argument deployed politically 
and imbued with social meaning, and that it has some basis in empirical 
transformation.55 These are the combined elements of revolution in its modern sense.  
Prior to the development of this modern concept of revolution, it was deployed to 
capture cyclical, non-transcendental change. This usage lies much closer to the 
mechanical motion associated with ‘revolution’ and the root of revolution in circular 
motion (from the Late Latin revolutionem) which encompassed both the circular 
revolution of objects, but also the return to prior states of being along such a trajectory. 
This is the key defining difference between different historical usages of the concept of 
revolution and it locates itself within differing conceptions of both the process of 
history itself and the function of humanity within it. The transformation of these 
perceptions is commonly understood to form a fundamental part of what is conceived 
of as the modernist mentality. If we dispense with the cognitive associations of 
primitivism that might accompany the term, the older cyclical and non-transcendental 
concept can be referred to as the pre-modern concept of revolution.  
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The earliest example of this usage is generally traced to Aristotle, along with early 
treatments of ‘politics’ in a systematic manner.56 Despite the popular appeal of this 
early contact point, there is a cautionary note that must be made. This is a connection 
made both across languages and across time, and in a sense in which the translation to 
‘revolution’ could equally be ‘political change’ from the Greek metabolê. Although this 
process helps us to understand the distinctiveness of the modern concept through 
contrast, it is also partly a problematic exercise as it simultaneously hints at a 
commonality which may be absent – both in terms of linguistic and historical 
translation.  
Despite this caveat there is a certain utility to contrasting these early engagements with 
political change to modern concepts. They are useful in charting both the shifting 
horizons of possible political change, but also the roots of political instability, and in 
some sense the legitimacy of politically destabilising social dissatisfaction. In Aristotle, 
we see a description of political transformation, translated as ‘revolution’ by Jowett, as 
referring to the transformation of and transition between established configurations of 
political rule for Greek city-states.57 Aristotle made a distinction between two types of 
revolution: the transfer of power within a constitutional frame that remained 
unchanged, and the ‘complete change from one constitution to another.’58 These would 
occur between set forms of government, and so describe either the transfer of 
administrative power from one group to another, or a transformation between an 
aristocratic or constitutional government, or between democratic or oligarchic political 
configurations. There is no sense here of the modern concept of revolution, but rather a 
cyclical change between established coordinates. Discussions of human agency in the 
process are limited to the possible dissatisfactions of the city-based populations 
concerned.  
This can easily be understood as a product of the social environment in which Aristotle’s 
thought was articulated. The potential horizons of political change were limited in the 
sense that a radical transformation of productive relations, which would create the 
conditions for a more fundamental transformation of political life, was wholly absent 
from his schema. We can read this as Marx did, noting Athenian society’s slave-based 
productive relations and the absence of the transformative powers of the industrial 
revolution and capitalist growth and accumulation. 59 
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This is supported by the fact that, until the emergence of capitalism as an increasingly 
dominant mode of production, revolution remains largely absent from Western political 
thought, which remains within this Aristotelian frame60 – although political discussion 
becomes increasingly concerned with the right of resistance accrued to those subject to 
earthly authority, and formulated in reference to divine rule.61 In this sense early 
Christian political philosophy posited the likelihood of rebellion if a ruler breached the 
trust placed in him by his people – although this was formulated in the context of the 
supreme power of the papacy in reference to Catholic princes.62 Once again, the kind of 
political agency envisaged was purely grievance based, for example against tyrannical 
rule, and the avenue of expression was support for an insurgent challenging the 
particular tyrant rather than any mass social uprising.63 
This absence of the concept of revolution persisted through Western political thought 
at least until the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688. This is generally noted as the first 
contemporaneous use of the term Revolution, deployed in its pre-modern sense to 
capture the cyclical return to monarchical order and authority.64 Raymond Williams has 
done similar work to that of Koselleck on the historical development of concepts and 
language, and contextualised the nascent usage of the term in the following way. He 
noted its initial association with the literal 'revolution' of physical bodies, particularly 
the celestial components of our solar system, in this way serving as a metaphor for the 
cyclical turn of history and the 'restoration of lawful authority'.65 At this time terms such 
as 'revolt' or 'rebellion' were more common, and stood for 'action against an 
established order', and served to describe historical events such as the English Civil 
War.66 Events in this line would later be considered as certain antecedents to or forms 
of bourgeois revolutions.67  
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It is in this restorative and cyclical manner that the so called ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 
1688 could be described at the time as a revolution – considered as the final 
consolidation of parliamentary supremacy over the crown and the defeat of Catholicism 
within the British monarchy.68 In this sense it holds none of the content of the modern 
concept. Although there are those who contend that the events of 1688 are better 
understood as an invasion by the Dutch rather than an internal ‘revolution’, this is not a 
central concern here.69 This particular event could be read as both the cyclical return of 
Monarchical power, and as one focal point of many in Britain’s transition to an 
industrial capitalist power. This latter aspect could fit with the modern concept of 
revolution as encompassing a transition through capitalist development toward a social 
system that might enable a more socialist and egalitarian way of life.70 The latter 
component of this final point – the necessity of revolution as referring to a transition 
from capitalism – will be discussed further in section IV, as it was central to the 
development of revolution as a concept through the nineteenth century and the work 
of scholars and political movements in the socialist tradition.  
ii) The Contemporary Return to Pre-modern Revolution 
Before this, however, it is important to address the ways in which some contemporary 
engagements with revolution return to the pre-modern concept discussed above, 
eliding historical agency and the possibility of alternative social formations to 
capitalism. In order to do so, it is necessary to summarise and reiterate the distinction 
stressed in this Chapter between pre-modern and modern conceptions of political 
change and thereby revolution; a distinction heavily emphasised by historians like 
Koselleck, Williams and Hobsbawm. In many ways, the modern concept of revolution 
can be understood as a constituent part of the dynamic of modernity, encapsulating the 
type and pace of change associated with the period. Previous uses serve to 
demonstrate the absence of such a concept in prior political thought, at least in the 
secular context we associate with modernism. Talking about revolution in this light 
draws attention to two different aspects that could be a choice of focus: the ‘fact’ of 
revolutionary events; and the practice of revolution itself. Of course there is significant 
space for overlap between these two, and indeed the separation can be argued to be of 
limited utility. Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge, primarily because the 
majority of contemporary engagements with the concept of revolution stress the 
empirical ‘fact’ of its occurrence without foregrounding the ‘practice’ involved – namely 
the agents of revolution and their own understanding of their activity.71 
Such scholarship demonstrates that it is a still a matter of some debate among scholars 
of revolution as to whether this conscious aspect is a necessary component of 
                                                          
68
 Edward Vallance, The Glorious Revolution: 1688, Britain’s Fight for Liberty (London: Abacus, 
2007). 
69
 Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland’s Glory (London: Harper Perennial, 
2009). 
70
 For example, see E. P Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1964). 
71
 See discussion in Taylor, “Reclaiming Revolution.” 
36 
 
revolution considered as an empirical fact.72 However, there are several problems with 
approaching revolution as fact rather than practice. Firstly it drives debate into an 
interminable discussion over which events qualify as revolutions, when it is particularly 
unclear as to what any resolution to such a discussion would actually offer.73 If one 
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were able to resolve the debate, for example, over whether or not the Meiji Restoration 
qualified as a revolution, what light would this shed on the concept or historical 
interpretation? Those scholars who do argue for such an interpretation are able to posit 
only qualified ‘types’ of revolution – in this particular instance the idea of a ‘top down’ 
revolution.74 These debates feed into ‘generations’ of scholarship on revolutions that 
supposedly offer incremental advances on the precision of the term,75 
There are two primary consequences of this work that then characterise the sub-
discipline (generally within the discipline of International Relations) of scholarship 
focused on revolution. The first is an oscillation between under-inclusive and over-
inclusive categories.76 Each temporary settlement over definition will be confronted 
with either the rise of new social forces articulating their struggle using the language of 
revolution, or the collapse of previously revolutionary moments into conservative 
regression - for example what looked like a revolution according to common parlance, 
becomes instead a de facto military coup. Closely related to this point, the actions and 
articulations of those engaged in revolutionary activity become components of 
qualifying criteria for the ‘fact’ of revolution, and are subsequently elided alongside the 
plurality of other potential factors. The drive, under the auspices of delineating the 
empirical facts of revolution, to seek quantitative data to support such claims also leads 
to the exclusion of the conscious, theoretically-driven activities of revolutionary groups, 
due simply to the fact that these are far less amenable to the quantitative methods of 
social inquiry.  
The second primary consequence of this empiricism relates to what such scholarship 
then offers politically (or in market terms). Considering that when most broadly framed 
revolution involves a basic level of social disruption and change, empirical work 
engaged in that field then offers an analysis of social breakdown, and consequently can 
make a basic claim towards predicting such events. Policy makers, corporate investors, 
and banking and insurance companies analysing risk then become significant potential 
consumers of and contractors for such empirical work.77 There then evolves a cyclical 
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market dynamic that further marginalises scholarship concerned with those elements of 
revolution less amenable to empirical study, and contributes instead to the superficial 
specificity involved in the contemplation of revolution as a component of broader 
‘security studies’. Under such pressures the concept of revolution can swiftly collapse 
back into the essence of its pre-modern understanding – social and political upheaval of 
some sufficiently extreme level, with the agency and goal of the participants relatively 
unimportant. 
This thesis does not aim to conduct work of this nature. As previously mentioned, not 
only is It arguable that revolution can only sensibly be understood in the modernist 
terms articulated here – under the conditions of which there have been no successful 
‘empirical’ examples of revolution, only attempts to pursue it as a goal – but as 
mentioned this work seems to offer little by way of theoretical depth. Whilst overly 
concerned with the ‘fact’ of revolution, the mobilization of people under the modern 
concept’s emancipatory promise is elided – to analytical and political detriment. Rather, 
the focus of this thesis is on what was distinctive about the modern concept of 
revolution. That is revolution as goal-orientated historical practice – the mobilization of 
people under the auspices of revolutionary transformation. This involves both empirical 
activity that can be near universally recognised as revolution, but crucially it is also 
comprised of theoretical components deployed on behalf of the agents involved.  
IV: Modern Revolution – Political and Social; Bourgeois and Proletarian 
Here we return to the position outlined in the beginning of this chapter, and the 
concept of revolution serving as a bridge between the historically determined present 
and the contingent future. As explained above, it is the practice of revolution that is the 
central concern of this work, rather than finding some criteria by which to label any 
particular event as a revolution. It is, therefore, of central concern how this practice can 
be understood. In this sense practice is more or less synonymous with historical agency. 
However, when we are focused on the intent and the theoretical frame that is defined 
by revolutionary practice, then it this animus behind the activity that becomes crucial; 
the practice is cognisable as revolutionary by the dreams and expectations of those 
participating.  
Therefore, in historical terms, the concept of revolution only really takes shape, in the 
sense we are concerned with, through the interpretation of the French Revolution, and 
the attempt to mobilize social forces in Europe under the banner of revolution itself. In 
some sense, the consolidation of this idea is mirrored by the process in which Marx and 
Engels articulated their gradual critique of capitalism, and of revolutionary socialism 
connected to historical materialism.78 There is no need to repeat the wealth of material 
on their early thought here, but what is important to note is the way in which the 
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concept of revolution shifted in their theory to encompass the way in which it is being 
discussed in this thesis. This offers an elaboration of how and why a general concept of 
revolution as explained at the beginning of this Chapter is both politically necessary and 
historically informed, rather than the turn to any qualifying adjectives. 
Specifically, their engagement with revolution offers a way of understanding the 
possible distinctions between ‘political’ and ‘social’ revolutions, and their own 
trajectory towards a general concept of revolution around which the Communist 
Manifesto could be formed. Marx’s thinking on the nature of a political revolution is 
worth noting at length:  
What is the basis of a partial and merely political revolution? Its basis is the fact 
that one part of civil society emancipates itself and attains universal 
domination, that one particular class undertakes from its particular situation 
the universal emancipation of society. This class liberates the whole of society, 
but only on condition that the whole of society finds itself in the same situation 
as this class, e.g., possesses or can easily acquire money and education. No class 
of civil society can play this role without awakening a moment of enthusiasm in 
itself and the masses… If the revolution of a people and the emancipation of a 
particular class of civil society are to coincide, if one class is to stand for the 
whole of society, then all the deficiencies of society must be concentrated in 
another class, one particular class must be the class which gives universal 
offence, the embodiment of a general limitation; one particular sphere of 
society must appear as the notorious crime of the whole society, so that the 
liberation of this sphere appears as universal self-liberation… The negative 
general significance of the French nobility and the French clergy determined the 
positive general significance of the class which stood nearest to and opposed to 
them—the bourgeoisie.79  
This passage makes explicit the connections between political revolution and bourgeois 
revolution. Yet Marx also outlines the nascent elements of the universality that the 
concept of revolution was open to; those highlighted earlier as being central to the 
modern concept of revolution. For Marx, it was the proletariat that would be able to 
truly occupy the position hinted at above, in terms of a truly universal revolutionary 
movement. ‘[The proletariat] cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the 
conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without 
abolishing all the inhuman conditions of society today which are summed up in its own 
situation.’80 In the language that opens this chapter, the proletariat can 'only in a 
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revolution succeed in ridding itself anew of the muck of ages and become fitted to 
found society anew.'81 
Marx initially worked on distinguishing political revolutions made by the legislature 
from those by the executive. The former adhered to the constitution as representative 
of the general will, and instead attacked a particular antiquated version of it; one that is 
considered to represent particular not general interests. The latter, on the other hand, 
‘[made] all the petty revolutions, the retrograde revolutions, the reactions.'82 Davidson 
notes the lack of purchase as a concept that revolution has here, encompassing coup 
d’états or counterrevolutions.83 However, it was precisely through this process of 
identifying social revolution with the aims of the proletariat that Marx and Engels 
extended the concept of revolution backwards and developed an increasingly precise 
understanding of the general concept of revolution. It was also in this way that social 
revolution was first distinguished from political or bourgeois revolution. Davidson notes 
that Engels led Marx in this regard, claiming early on that ‘[t]he only true revolution 
[was] a social revolution, to which political and philosophical revolution must lead.'84 
Through this distinction, socialist contemporaries of Marx such as Bronterre O’Brien 
read events like the English Civil War, the Dutch Revolt and arguably the French 
Revolution’s Thermidorian Reaction as ‘only political revolutions’, as they failed to live 
up to any proletarian potential.85 Conservative reaction was not blind to this shift, with 
Lorenz von Stein in essence recognising the 'spectre' Marx described in the Communist 
Manifesto: 'political reform and revolution are at an end; social revolution has taken 
their place and towers over all movements of the peoples with its terrible power and 
serious doubts.'86 
Marx summed up this relationship between political and social revolutions thus: 
Every revolution dissolves the old order of society; to that extent it is social. 
Every revolution brings down the old ruling power; to that extent it is political… 
All revolution – the overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dissolution 
of the old order – is a political act. But without revolution, socialism cannot be 
made possible. It stands in need of this political act just as it stands in need of 
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destruction and dissolution. But as soon as its organizing functions begin and its 
goal, its soul emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside.87 
Combined, the above analysis demonstrates a necessary connection between socialism 
and social revolution - 'the only genuinely social revolution would be socialist.'88 As the 
concept of social revolution is consolidated, the concept of political revolution is 
incorporated as a component. It is for this reason that a singular use of the term 
revolution to incorporate a broadly socialist and social revolution becomes analytically 
preferable. Using the term political revolution to describe unfinished or neutered social 
revolutions in the vein of O’brien may have helped to stress the particular nature of the 
proletarian revolution, but in the current world of globalized capitalism the concept of 
bourgeois revolution holds little analytical purchase.89 The concept of counter-
revolution serves excellently to capture those elements that stymie otherwise 
revolutionary events.  
There are also political problems with such a position.  There is little to be gained for 
the contemporary left in attributing to the bourgeoisie revolutionary agency, and thus a 
positive image, when their consolidation involved a necessary alliance with landed 
aristocracy, in the case of the English Civil War, or resulted in the Thermidorean 
reaction as a way of avoiding the consequences of broader emancipation.90 Davidson 
also notes that, despite the opposition that absolutists states presented to the interests 
of the bourgeoisie, ‘[the bourgeoisie] were, to varying degrees, unwilling to play a 
revolutionary role and might even play a counterrevolutionary one out of fear of the 
working class, meaning that the working class, and the popular masses more generally, 
constituted the only force that could consistently be relied upon to seek the overthrow 
of absolutism.'91 
There is a further caution against taking the line of according social transformations that 
consolidated the power of the bourgeoisie status as ‘revolutionary’. Doing so aligns the 
progressive nature of revolution, in terms of an aspiration towards universal 
emancipation, with the development and consolidation of capitalism. This can easily 
lead to support for the spread of capitalism and bourgeois interests as a path towards 
socialism. In other words, this position lends itself to a support of imperialism, and 
aligns with a series of racist attitudes, as well as contradicting the basic tenants of 
historical materialism. Rosdolsky made this point excellently with regard to Engels' 
understanding of the reactionary nature of remnant nationalist groups within the 
European states of his era.92 These groups were reactionary solely due to the historical 
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circumstances of their position, and under different circumstances the exact same 
position could be progressive (Davidson mentions the Basques as an example, 
comparing their resistance to Franco to their position in 1848).93 Internally to Europe 
this is an important point; externally it is absolutely vital. Understanding the process of 
revolution as an attempt to engage with oppressive relations broadly, for broader 
emancipation, rather than as a particular step along a set historical path is an essential 
part of both a materialist approach to history and a progressive approach to humanity 
in general; one that refuses to assign agency based on characteristics inherent to any 
particular group. The 'proletariat' are so only based on their position within the social 
relations of production - not due to their being French, German or English. Furthermore 
there is nothing that guarantees their success within the social relations in which they 
are embedded as against the failure of a group fighting oppression elsewhere. 
As a final component of the above point, it must be recognised that theoretical rigour 
would recall the political point that unearthing the birth of capitalism within its 
revolutionary crucible was a useful tool in countering conservative assertions that 
revolutions are doomed to fail. However, this is not incompatible with the position just 
outlined. In ‘bourgeois revolution’ the central components are not concrete 
emancipation for a people - they are the shifting means of exploitation to that of 
generalized capitalism, involving an alliance between sections of the old ruling class, 
and the new bourgeoisie. This can be recognised, and stressed, without ignoring the 
fact that capitalism may contain useful seeds in terms of expanding productive capacity. 
There is no necessity to slip into either apologetics or utopianism. The latter would be 
to imagine a socialist revolution without comparable productive capacities to 
capitalism, and the former to seek capitalism in order to acquire those productive 
capacities.94 
V: Revolutionary Agency 
Having discussed the theoretical and political stakes involved in historical 
interpretation, distinguished the modern concept of revolution from its pre-modern 
counterpart, and questioned the utility and purposes of the return of this pre-modern 
form, this Section turns to the key aspects of revolution in its modern form: the aimed 
for supersession of capitalist relations, the agency of humanity in that process, and the 
necessity of structural analysis in enabling informed revolutionary practice. There are 
two focal points which will be addressed in turn: agency and praxis. Firstly this section 
will address historical agency at a more general level. This draws attention to the 
position of historical agency within the development of modern thought and the 
reconceptualization of history that accompanied it. This reconceptualization of history 
involved the perception of historical progress brought about via human activity. This 
foregrounds such activity taking part in a non-cyclical historical process. These are 
preconditions for revolutionary agency and praxis, but they are not equivalent to it.  
Revolutionary praxis, in particular, demands at least some level of revolutionary 
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consciousness – that is, to reiterate, the aimed overthrow of capitalism (because 
revolutionary consciousness is a product of capitalist relations), and the need to 
organise and mobilize human agents around that goal in a unity of structural analysis 
and practical activity. Again, it is important to stress that this does not mean there are 
clear historical lines that are crossed at which point such agency or praxis becomes 
clearly visible and possible, but that the components appear unevenly and in nascent 
forms prior to their more uniform manifestation.  
Perry Anderson’s thoughts on historical agency provide an excellent summary of the 
issue at hand. The context for Anderson’s exposition is a response to the debate 
between Luis Althusser and E. P. Thompson.95 This section will not cover this argument 
in great detail, but the parameters are important for any discussion of revolution. The 
debate turned on the agency of the human subject within history – broadly speaking 
Althusser considered that history was a structurally determined process, and Thompson 
wished to rescue human agency from the scrapheap to which Althusser was consigning 
it. These positions are summed up by Althusser’s depiction of history as a ‘natural-
human process without a subject’;96 and Thompson’s adoption of William Morris’ 
declaration that Men and women are the ‘ever-baffled and ever-resurgent agents of an 
unmastered history.’97  
The opposition between Althusser and Thompson throws up a series of ways in which 
human agency continually appears and disappears in analyses of the historical process, 
which also relates to the foregoing discussions on the concept of revolution. There are 
two aspects to consider. Firstly, revolutionary agency as defined by its goal, or the 
possible outcome. Thompson’s agents of ‘unmastered’ history fit this category, 
representing a move to foreground the agency of people in the historical process even 
absent their own fully conscious and willed engagement. It is possible to retrospectively 
understand this as having revolutionary content, not for the participants at the time, 
but in the (unconscious) construction of structural conditions favourable to the 
supersession of capitalist relations. As per the foregoing discussion on the concept of 
‘bourgeois revolution’, it is only in this sense in which capitalist development can be 
considered revolutionary in the modern sense of the concept which referred to 
universal emancipation.  
The second part of this section will address praxis. This foregrounds the conscious 
element of historical agency. This follows on closely from Anderson’s discussion on 
agency, but the connection between knowledge (theory) and action (practice) are 
foregrounded to stress praxis as a particular type of historical agency. This is then 
connected to the idea of revolution as targeted towards universal emancipatory goals, 
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which when connected to structural analysis necessarily become anti-capitalist. This is 
because as capitalism achieves dominance in social relations, capitalist dynamics 
become the most powerful structural determinants of human life. One does not have to 
accept this conclusion of the critique of capitalism to recognise that this was a defining 
condition of modern revolutionary thought. To be a revolutionary meant to have 
recognised the political consequences of the structural analysis of capitalism. Although 
other forms of activity could certainly be described as praxis, uniting theory and 
practice, it would not be meaningfully revolutionary praxis without collapsing revolution 
into an empty category. Similarly, human agency could be directed towards the 
incidental overthrow of capitalism and thereby have revolutionary content, but this 
would not meaningfully be revolutionary praxis.  
i) Agency and Structure 
Anderson’s take on Althusser and Thompson’s opposition foregrounds the ambivalence 
between structurally determined life and the freedom of humanity to shape its own 
future. This same dichotomy is embedded in Marx’s formulation at the beginning of this 
chapter: humanity makes its own history, but it does so within existing circumstances, 
‘given and transmitted from the past.’ This nightmare that ‘weighs on the brains’ of the 
living represents both the material configuration of the world – the fact that some 
people have vast wealth and others do not – and the ways in which our very capacity to 
think and imagine alternative ways of life is imbricated in the unequal conditions into 
which we are born. As stated at the outset of this Chapter, the concept of revolution 
served to describe the possibility of dreaming of a radically different future and of 
bringing that about through conscious engaged action in the historical process. In 
Marx’s formulation, a truly universal revolutionary class would arise in the proletariat, 
through the specific conditions of oppression that applied to them. In order to liberate 
themselves from wage labour, they would have to abolish those conditions completely. 
Marx’s analysis was, in this sense, simultaneously a structural examination and at the 
same time a call to political mobilization.  
This aside, Anderson’s perspective on Thompson’s The Poverty of Theory provides an 
appealing formula for understanding the basics of revolutionary agency. Considering 
the proclivity for contemporary studies of revolution to seek definition based on results, 
Anderson offers a useful perspective for the practice-orientated approach: ‘[b]y 
definition, it is intentional reach rather than involuntary result that distinguishes one 
form of agency from another.’98 This then gives Anderson the space to offer up a 
hypothetical set of typologies for human agency based upon the intentional reach of 
these social movements. It is his final category that is of interest when it comes to 
revolution, yet for comparative purposes it is worth recounting the set. This approach 
also offers an important corrective to the endless cycle of debate insinuated by the 
opposition between Althusser and Thompson: as Anderson himself notes, ‘the two 
antagonistic formulae of a 'natural-human process without a subject' and ‘ever-baffled, 
ever-resurgent agents of an unmastered practice’ are both claims of an essentially 
apodictic and speculative character – eternal axioms that in no way help us to trace the 
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actual, variable roles of different types of deliberate venture, personal or collective, in 
history.’99 
Against this open debate Anderson breaks the potential goals of human agents down 
into private goals, personal goals, and collective goals. He makes the claim that for the 
vast majority of people for the vast majority of the time their goals have been ‘private’ 
goals. ‘These personal projects are inscribed within existing social relations, and 
typically reproduce them.’100 Within a similar vein lie those ‘collective and individual 
projects whose goals were ‘public’ in character.’101 There are less of these, although 
they comprise grander historical projects for the historian than the minutiae of the 
contrasting private activity. ‘However, these agendas too in their overwhelming 
majority have not aimed to transform social relations as such – to create new societies 
or master old ones: for the most part they were much more limited in their (voluntary) 
scope.’102 Anderson then lists a variety of historical events, noting that ‘most familiar 
historical events or processes of this kind, whatever their misery or grandeur, have been 
marked by the pursuit of local objectives within an accepted order over-arching 
them.’103 
Finally, [and most importantly for this discussion,] there are those collective 
projects which have sought to render their initiators authors of their collective 
mode of existence as a whole, in a conscious programme aimed at creating or 
remodelling whole social structures. There are isolated premonitions of this 
phenomenon, in political colonization, religious heterodoxy or literary utopia, in 
earlier centuries: but essentially this kind of agency is very recent indeed. On a 
major scale, the very notion of it scarcely predates the Enlightenment.104 
The last line captures the connection between modernism and the concept of 
revolution. He cites the French and American Revolutions as ‘the first historical 
figurations of collective agency in this, decisive sense’, but goes on to clarify that these 
‘still remain a great distance from the manifestation of full popular agency desiring and 
creating new social conditions of life itself.’105 As an aside, it is also possible to read 
these as unsuccessful revolutionary struggles and that it was this failure that 
emphasized their distance from the ‘manifestation of full popular agency’. The 
American Revolution presents a far less persuasive case, but the French revolution 
certainly contained strong proletarian aspirations for broader emancipation than a new 
imperialist state and the subjection to intensified capitalist exploitation. As a result 
although the revolutionary impulse could be argued to be present the outcome was 
either conservative reaction, counter-revolution, or a differently orientated process 
overall. This draws attention to the revolutionary struggle as a process rather than a 
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static event, highlighting the counter-revolution in the Thermidorean reaction and the 
ways in which the revolutionary struggle continued across Europe until 1848. In any 
event, Anderson’s depiction helps to elucidate the location of the concept of revolution 
and the historical agency associated with it within the modern period. 
This point also highlights the ways in which political defeat, in this example of the sans-
culottes, can be read as the dominance of ‘historical forces’. It is important to recognise 
that acknowledging the structurally determined nature of any moment is to 
simultaneously recognise the ambivalence present in any concept of human agency. 
This ambivalence is evident in the ‘nightmare’ that Marx noted to weigh on the minds 
of the living, and in Althusser’s absent historical subject. Thompson’s concession here is 
that whatever the nature of historical determinism, it is vital to think oneself free.106 
This maps very closely with Freud’s conception of ‘useful’ illusions that one might desire 
to hold against therapeutic intervention.107 Although the response of ‘dialectics’ is often 
seen as an easy answer to these kind of dilemmas, in this instance it is clear that one 
need not resolve the debate either way (it seems doubtful that such a resolution is 
possible with the parameters of social-scientific debate) in order to recognise that 
without organising to achieve political goals when these goals are opposed by other 
social groups that do organise, the prospects of success seem rather slim.108  
What counters the potential idealism in this aspiration toward human agency in the 
face of determining historical structures is the ‘scientific’ politics mentioned by Arthur 
in the introduction to this thesis. As has been mentioned, the ‘science’ of this process is 
rooted in constant analysis of the structural constraints on political action, with a mind 
to strategizing effectively. Anderson describes this as the aspiration for deep knowledge 
and willed engagement (conscious, goal-directed activity) as the root of socialist 
revolution, embedded in Marx’s notion of a transition from the realm of necessity to 
that of freedom. However, even this focus on knowledge and conscious engagement 
can run into concerns about the structurally conditioned nature of human activity. 
These concerns riddled even concerted attempts like Thompson’s to counter Althusser’s 
charge of structural determinism. 
Expressing one such concern, Thompson speculated that in previous history social being 
determined social consciousness, and that this might not be the case in a socialist 
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society, where the determining process of social being was broken by the absence of 
capitalism. For Thompson this opened up the possibility of  
a long protraction of tyranny. So long as any ruling group, perhaps fortuitously 
established in power at the moment of revolution, [could] reproduce itself and 
control or manufacture social consciousness there [would] be no inherent logic 
of process within the system which, as social being, [would] work powerfully 
enough to bring its overthrow.109  
In part this is revealing as to the ways in which a scholar might attempt to come to 
terms with and conceptualise the nature of the USSR, and is in that sense insightful. 
However it also opens up further ambiguities within conceptions of agency.  
Here Thompson was perhaps making too much of the ‘conscious’, ‘willed’, aspect of 
socialist revolution. In this frame the ability of a ruling clique to then shape the social 
conscious would present a problem for agency. However, this mirrors the problematic 
which underpinned Althusser’s structural determinism and the short quote by Marx 
that opens this chapter. The ruling clique in Thompson’s formulation can be read as 
simply another form of the structural determination of Althusser and the conditions 
given not made noted by Marx. They do not invalidate historical agency, but they do 
qualify it. The crucial transformative influence is the knowledge of these historical 
processes and the structure they represent. 
Anderson develops this point noting that the critically constrained historical agency 
Thompson was describing had no significant differentiation from the agency of any 
group oppressed by various ruling classes ‘since the dawn of the division of labour’.110 
Indeed, Thompson’s fear of control by the political elite, rooted in the strained example 
(because it was in no deep sense socialist) of the Soviet state, actually captures a deep 
truth about the agency of the ruling classes themselves. It is in their historical agency to 
attempt to control and create social consciousness in this manner, whether or not they 
are wholly cognisant of this process. The way in which a variety of political texts, from 
Machiavelli’s Prince to Locke’s Treatise on Government, bear such close resemblance to 
sketchy ruler’s instruction manuals in how to pacify the masses bears testament to how 
theory can serve these objectives. 
Indeed, if we return to the latest iterations of scholarship on revolution, we have 
powerful instances of the same thing: scholarship offering ways of assessing the 
likelihood of, and thereby methods of forestalling, revolution (understood as political 
instability and therefore a threat to certain kinds of business activity).111  The kind of 
knowledge Anderson is stressing refers to a deeper grasp of the mechanics of historical 
change, coupled with the kind of agency involved in aiding radical transformation. In 
many senses this knowledge is maintained as an aspiration, with Anderson claiming that 
‘it is safe to say that no social formation short of full socialist democracy is likely to 
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generate accurate knowledge of its own deepest laws of motion’.112 Such a concession 
threatens to collapse agency back into its structural determinates, but only because it 
sets the bar on ‘accurate knowledge’ too high. There is no reason per se that incomplete 
knowledge incapacities historical agency, whilst acknowledging that effective 
engagement requires the crossing of some threshold on the spectrum of understanding.  
In addition to stressing analytical knowledge as offering a break from structural 
determinism, Anderson recalls Marx’s founding of the realm of necessity (and structural 
determinism) on scarcity. This is a commonly adopted response to anyone positing the 
Soviet Union as a cautionary example of socialism.113 Anderson’s point is to stress that 
the Soviet state was still haunted by poverty and shortage, ‘in an economy whose 
productivity of labour remain[ed] half that of West Germany.’114 As such, even putting 
to one side the utopian aspect of ‘perfect’ knowledge linked to action noted above, the 
material conditions of life are hereby foregrounded as an essential component of a truly 
liberated social consciousness. As Anderson notes, ‘even common aspiration fused with 
real cognition, in a post-revolutionary worker’s democracy, would not suffice to cross 
the frontiers of necessity.’115  
This is a valid point, but it doesn’t have to be the primary base of response, especially if 
we accept that scarcity is often constructed through social (and within that market-
based) means.116 This is not to deny the basic premise that production within a social 
group has to reach a certain level in order to provide for the basic necessities of life, but 
rather to recognise that assessment on this level is a problematic exercise (who defines 
necessity, who carries out the analysis and on what basis), and that distribution of 
goods and access to means of production such as land remain key issues. This connects 
directly to the need for critical analysis of the structural conditions of possibility when it 
comes to human agency. Indeed, as mentioned in the introduction, the concept of 
revolution served precisely to bridge the gap between overt structural determination 
(in this example rooted in necessity) and the collective agency aimed at dismantling 
those conditions for future generations. 
Such activity would simply be a specifically revolutionary variant of Anderson’s earlier 
formulations of novel collective agency ‘aimed at creating or remodelling whole social 
structures’. The key novel component here is the collective and conscious engagement 
with this particular goal in mind, not necessarily the effects of full-blown socialism on 
collective consciousness and social being. If we return to the role of consciousness in 
Marx’s theory we capture the basic function of this kind of knowledge that Anderson 
discusses, without the need to fall into an overt focus on production, in the vein of the 
Menshevik/Bolshevik split over the economic backwardness of pre-1917 Russian 
society. As Overy has argued, Marx operated with a Hegelian conception of 
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consciousness – Vernunft – which ‘was not mere understanding (Verstand), but a 
deeper appreciation of the existing reality of the material world whose actual 
conditions would determine the possibility of revolutionary transformation.’117  
This would coalesce into revolutionary activity ‘aimed at creating or remodelling whole 
social structures’, but endlessly informed by immanent social analysis. This is where the 
necessary link between revolutionary agency and the structural conditions in which it 
operates reasserts itself – without such a link, any number of random activities hold the 
potential to serve the revolutionary agenda. As a general statement, absent the kind of 
structural analysis that would offer reasons for why any particular activity could serve 
this aim, this is unpersuasive. Yet we see that this perspective replicates itself within 
critical scholarship, particularly that of international law.118 
ii) Praxis 
The concept of praxis serves to consolidate the idea of revolutionary practice tied to the 
kind of vernunft described above. The legal side of this approach has been tied to 
Gramsci’s ‘rearticulation of Marxist thought as the philosophy of praxis.’119 Claire Cutler, 
for example, takes Gramsci’s insights to provide material on the dual nature of law as 
‘both the coercive arm of the state and the consensual domain of civil society.’120 This is 
partly a materialist rejection of the idealist or formalist conception of law as rooted in 
‘transcendent and universal characteristics or principles’, conceived instead in ‘practice 
and lived experience.’121 This will be developed further through other Marxist legal 
theorists, particularly Evgeny Pashukanis, in the next Chapter, but at this stage the 
concept of praxis serves to tie law to practical experience, or law as an ‘historical 
force’.122  
Leaving the legal aspect for later consideration, the essence of this thought aims to 
capture the possibility for collective and conscious intervention in the historical process. 
Cutler notes that ‘the philosophy of praxis ‘is realised through the concrete study of 
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past history and through present activity to construct new history’.’123 Although it is 
evident that everything is formed in a historical process, the awareness of formation 
through history combined with conscious activity conceiving of itself as intervening in 
that process offers a marked difference – praxis is then both a philosophy of 
examination and a philosophy of practice; observing and changing the world. This is 
basically a rearticulation of the points addressed through Anderson’s exposition above, 
but this re-emphasising adds an important focus. 
Gramsci articulated a transition from the immediate struggle of specific professional 
groups united by their proximity to one another and the immediacy of their common 
cause to more expansive collective cause and action.124 The more immediate forms of 
struggle are more limited in scope. For example, specific professional groups will find 
common cause in their proximity to one another and common social experience and 
subsequently fight for those common interests. But a more expansive struggle, or 
practice, necessitates an equally broader theoretical understanding of the connections 
between these more isolated struggles. That theory guiding practice is revolutionary 
when it recognises the need to transcend capitalist social relations in order to achieve 
the common interests of subordinated groups. It is this crucial distinction that defines 
increasingly radical, and then revolutionary practice.125 Lenin captured this necessary 
connection between theory and practice most succinctly, noting that revolutionary 
practice demanded revolutionary theory.126  
It is sustained theoretical reflection and development that enables the transition from 
immediate experience of oppression to an understanding of its root causes. Robert 
Knox captures this well, noting that  
[o]ne’s immediate experience of oppression or exploitation is powerful, but it is 
unable to locate that experience within a broader ensemble of social relations. 
It is only through theoretical reflection that one can understand the ways in 
which broader logics produce and sustain particular instances of oppression and 
exploitation. And it is only by understanding these logics that one might 
formulate practices which could overcome them.127 
This is a necessary connection – and in this sense should be both immanent in the 
theory and the practice. Marx captured this process in his critique of Feuerbach. Marx 
stressed the fact that after Feuerbach made his criticism of the duplication of the world 
into a ‘religious, imagined one and a real one’ and thereby making the materialist 
emphasis that the real world was the concrete base there still remained a crucial step. 
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This secular, material social world must then be subjected to critical analysis and 
transformed through practice. Marx offers the following example: ‘once the earthly 
family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be 
criticized in theory and revolutionized in practice.’128 In the context of structure and 
agency and revolutionary praxis, comprehending the structural determinates of human 
activity is the first step towards enabling revolutionizing practice – that is practice 
designed to transform those determining conditions based on a critical understanding 
of their nature. For the case of the broad concept of revolution discussed in this 
Chapter, the structurally determining conditions exposed by theoretical analysis were 
capitalist social relations, which subsequently had to continue to be criticised in theory 
and revolutionized in practice. 
Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach offers a companion quote to that which opens this 
Chapter, against the materialist focus on structurally determining conditions, the 
‘nightmare’ that weighs so heavily on human agents. 
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and 
upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other 
circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that men themselves change 
circumstances and that the educator himself must be educated… The 
coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be 
conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice.129 
This is the early function of the modern concept of revolution – re-engaging human 
agency in the historical process, and pairing it with the structural analysis of the kind 
Marx deployed in Capital, gives this direction of the kind that emerges in the class 
struggles referred to by Gramsci above. The unity of these two, and the target for 
transformation, provides the constituent elements of the modern concept of 
revolution; a concept rooted in the socialist historical movement, and a political project 
that endures with capitalist exploitation. 
VI: Conclusion: 
This chapter has aimed to explain and defend the modern concept of revolution, with a 
mind to developing the idea of revolutionary praxis and subsequently considering the 
possible limitations on this praxis that might be posed by the form of law. There are 
several strands that intersect in the concept of revolution that demonstrate a symbiotic 
relationship between the concepts of revolution, human agency in history, and the idea 
of praxis as the unity of historical consciousness and practice. Together these build to 
form a particular understanding of how revolutionary praxis is defined by the aims 
involved, and how these are historically formed alongside the development of 
modernism and the capitalist mode of production.  
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In a sense both the concept of revolution and that of praxis open themselves up to two 
forms of criticism. That of ‘forcing’ an interpretation onto history, and that of reading 
‘consciousness’ into human activity that may be extremely difficult to substantiate 
empirically. There are two simple defences to be made against these charges at this 
stage. Firstly all ‘history’ involves a degree of interpretive ‘force’ between the scholarly 
‘subject’ and the ‘object’ of their enquiry.130 What matters more than the fact of this, is 
how that interpretation can maintain coherence with itself, and how persuasively this 
relates to whatever empirical material is utilized in the process of argumentative 
formulation (and, of course, that material which is left out). Secondly, and relatedly, 
empirical ‘proof’ maintains its power through its position within an interpretive 
framework; facts, especially those of the historical kind, do not leap out at observers of 
their own accord.  Added to this, historical actors of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries explicitly wrote about their own actions as ‘revolutionary’ and considered 
themselves engaged in a historical process. As has been discussed, when considering 
revolutionary practice in terms of historical agency, it is this intent which is a vital 
factor, not the historical outcome. Therefore the concept of revolution demands this 
particular kind of historical attention. What is noteworthy about the concept of 
revolution is that, as movements began to conceive of themselves as revolutionary in 
the modern sense described above, historical figures who considered themselves 
actively engaged in historical processes became more numerous (or rather became 
easier to spot because of their self-conception).  
The above concept of revolution, including the revolutionaries who gather under its 
banner, remains inextricable from Marxism. Many of those historical figures who 
considered themselves explicitly engaged in conscious historical construction also 
considered themselves Marxists of some description. However, Marxism itself 
encompasses a wide range of divergent positions, with fractious debates over both 
theory and practice. Thus despite the temptation to add the caveat that revolution in 
the sense described here and Marxism’s notion of revolution are not precisely 
coterminous, to do so capitulates to a narrow and essentialising view of Marxism itself. 
Such capitulation is not without its material cause; as has been extensively noted 
Marxism has suffered greatly within academic circles along with the demise of active 
socialist political parties.131 The result is that concepts seen as explicitly Marxist suffer 
the possibility of being dismissed on political and ideological grounds before their merit 
is assessed empirically and theoretically. As should be clear from the foregoing 
discussion, this has characterised much discussion over the concept of revolution 
among historians. However, the fact that the concept of revolution raised here aligns 
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with Marxist theory is not solely a reflection of a political and ideological affiliation to 
Marxism. Section IV demonstrates that a clear case can be made that Marxism sprung 
from the particular coalescence of historical factors that also enabled the concept of 
revolution to be interpreted in its modern (and Marxist) form. 
There are several important elements to re-emphasize at this stage. Firstly the 
elaboration of the concept of revolution undertaken here has two elements. Most 
importantly, the concept clearly has historical roots that map closely with the early 
development of capitalist industry and the humanitarian ideals of the enlightenment. 
They form a significant part of a secularizing move within the nascent social sciences 
towards an understanding of human history and agency as a material process within 
which development of humanity’s potential was a worthy social aspiration. This 
emancipatory mind-set also applied, at least in theory, to all of humanity.  
The conceptual history of revolution demonstrates its emergence as a coherent and 
distinguishable concept in and around the social upheavals in Europe that constituted 
the French Revolution and the following half-century of political struggle, the subject of 
Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Revolution. Before this, the concept itself, or translations 
of it, was closely associated with cyclic change, alongside a general conception of 
human history as also operating in a circular manner. It is useful to draw attention to 
this for two reasons. Firstly the concept continues to be deployed today in academic 
and more mainstream media as referring simply to large scale social upheaval. There 
are other words that can serve that purpose, and such invocation runs at stark odds to 
the meaning of revolution for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Secondly, drawing attention to this heritage foregrounds the relationship between 
revolution and the exploitation of human labour by those seeking to accumulate profit 
and privilege. It reiterates the birth of the concept of revolution in the crucible of 
capitalist oppression and the vision that animated revolutionaries of a society that 
surpassed the depravities of both capitalism and previous exploitative social systems.  
This Chapter also stressed the deep connection between history (or empirical study 
more broadly), theory, and political activity. Foregrounding the fact that theory always 
serves a particular political purposes – that it is always for something and for someone – 
this chapter has aimed to bring to the surface both the political stakes in reclaiming 
revolution’s conceptual history, and the political ends that are served by eliding it. The 
blurring of the lines around the concept of revolution did not spring simply from the 
well of academic knowledge; this process was enabled and strengthened by the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union and the supposed debunking of socialist alternatives to 
capitalism. It happens to be that such a purpose requires a certain level of ‘forgetting’ 
when it comes to historical engagement, but the empirical element to this is not the 
only feature of the discussion at hand here. The very concept of revolution helps us to 
understand how the forces of political commitment feed into research and colour the 
processes at work. This is not only necessary as a general caution to academic ivory-
towerism, but it is absolutely essential when it comes to legal theory, which will be the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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There is a final element to this chapter, one that is generally more positive. That is to 
stress the role of human agency in the historical process, which can at times be elided 
by powerfully materialist accounts of historical change. There are two elements to this. 
Firstly, following Thompson, it is important to acknowledge that in simple terms, it is 
vital to ‘think’ ourselves free; that is to think of ourselves as crucially engaged in a 
process of historical construction, informed by the sense of history that imbues the 
present. However, the concept of revolution helps to stress the connection between 
this agency and the structures which determine our lives; most particularly those 
structures that prevent the realisation of our deeper visions of emancipated life. This is 
the counterpoint to revolutionary positivity – the task at hand can seem too extreme, 
especially in times of counter-revolutionary resurgence like those that characterise the 
current period. Under a generalized neo-liberal assault and the dearth of transformative 
political vision in official circles, the concept of revolution cautions us against clutching 
at straws that may, in the end, form crucial elements of the oppressive apparatus that 
confronts us.  
The concept of praxis unites these elements of conscious historical awareness and 
human agency. Although there is a long history of debate that surrounds the concept 
and its place within Marxism more broadly, the concept serves a simple purpose here. It 
is a way of capturing the unity between theory and practice inherent in the concept of 
revolution. Understanding revolutionary agency as referring to a particular 
transformative vision, the combination of revolutionary praxis provides a frame through 
which progressively inclined action can be approached. We then encounter the basic 
idea that this kind of praxis can occur in different areas of social life, and that these may 
be more or less receptive to revolutionary objectives. This will require a different way of 
engaging, or tactical arrangement, for different areas of life – whilst remaining 
cognisant, as always, of the interconnected nature of things. Understanding the law as 
an arena of praxis, which will be elaborated on in the following chapter, we can assess 
the potential limits that the legal form may place on revolutionary praxis.   
There is one final note of caution to be made here, that will become clearer throughout 
the next Chapter and then the later parts of this thesis. That is not to fetishize the 
concept of revolution in any way. There are a wide variety of ways in which activity 
could be considered revolutionary –there is no rigid blueprint of what such activity 
constitutes. But with the kind of framing developed here, rooted in its conceptual 
development, there is a sufficiently concrete basis to assert that revolutionary 
objectives have in mind broad emancipatory projects, encompassing as much of 
humanity as possible, and have as their target the exploitative global capitalist system. 
Again, these objectives could have a variety of activities articulated under their rubric, 
but the objective here is not to provide an exhaustive list of revolutionary activity – 
rather it is to assess two moments in time when objectives that can be read as 
revolutionary where channelled into the arena of international law, and to assess the 
consequences. The next Chapter will clarify the legal theory required to engage in this 
process, and the subsequent two Chapters will analyse the early Soviet engagement 
with international law, and that of the Third World movement of the late sixties and 
early seventies.  
55 
 
Chapter 2: International Law and International Legal Praxis 
 
‘In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg in 
the streets, and steal loaves of bread.’ 
Anatole France, ‘The Red Lily’ 1894 
I: Introduction 
Anatole France’s famous literary description of the law, quoted above, evokes the 
tragedy of the noble aspirations of the French revolutionary. The Poet Choulette 
laments the Revolution’s egalitarian ideals, enacted by ‘fools’ and ‘imbeciles’, that 
enabled only the empire of the wealthy.132 It was under these continued conditions of 
inequality that the new legal equality of citizens appeared so discordant. The passage 
offers a basic caution against seeking formal equality in the face of substantive material 
inequalities. For the purposes of this thesis, the context of the French Revolution also 
foregrounds a caution against the merger of revolutionary socialist goals and the form 
of law rooted in abstract equivalence. But the quote also suggests a level of disconnect 
between the law’s ‘majestic equality’ and the concrete brutality of day to day life that 
open up space for the law to escape complicity in cause and to maintain promise as 
remedy. This Chapter is concerned most directly with this apparent ambiguity in the 
role of the law, and its question of its consequent capacity to accommodate the 
revolutionary goals elucidated in Chapter One. 
In order to grasp the this relationship and the potential limits that the law may offer to 
such revolutionary praxis, it is necessary to unpack both the function of the legal form, 
how that form structures legal praxis, and finally how open such praxis would be to 
forms of revolutionary praxis. From the discussion in Chapter One, it is a simple step to 
recognise that specific forms of praxis occur in different structurally conditioned areas 
of social life. These could be the particular political, social and economic conditions 
pertaining to any one state, or to the particular social arena in which that practice is 
being articulated – social struggle on the streets; political struggle in Parliament or at 
the ballot box; or economic struggle through Unions, worker’s cooperatives or general 
strike mobilization represent just a few of the potential options.  
Foregrounding the law as praxis draws attention to the fact of its formation within a 
series of social relations. This foregrounds the function law and the articulation of 
doctrine as practice, whilst acknowledging the way in which that practice is shaped by 
doctrinal structures. This is the lived, changing experience of law, as a flexible social 
tool, responsive to and formative of changing social needs. Taking this approach offers a 
more direct way of conceiving of the openness of law as practice, yet connected to the 
possible boundaries exerted by the form of law. The form of law represents the basic 
essence, or logic, that defines and structures law. Without this ‘theory of the legal form, 
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the specificity of the law is impenetrable.’133 This understanding of the law offers the 
basic structure to practice conducted within it. Foregrounding this as praxis highlights 
the ways in which legal scholars and practitioners engage in a process of construction 
when consciously merging theoretical and practical activity. This is not a case of 
‘imagining’ international law as praxis, but rather recognising the interconnections 
between theory and practice present in the function of law.134 It is already a body 
formative of and formed by moments of praxis. Prefacing the pre-existence of the law 
as praxis thereby cautions against the optimism present in ‘imaging’ international law as 
praxis and thereby thinking this move creates emancipatory possibilities.  
In highlighting legal praxis in this manner it is also essential to maintain a background 
awareness of the connections between distinct ‘fields’ as we consider them for the 
purposes of analysis; different forms of praxis necessarily blend into one another and 
are mutually constitutive. It is necessary then, firstly to avoid the reification of any 
particular field of study and to recognise the ‘totality’ formed by social relations, but 
more importantly because without this it is possible to overlook activity outside of field 
of analysis and thereby subconsciously disable radical critiques of activity within the 
field. Legal struggle is so ubiquitous that it seems naively nihilistic to dismiss its 
progressive potential. But the point is not to deny the necessity of law, but through 
rigorous critique to assess its limits. Again, this is not to deny the importance of legal 
struggle today, but to recognise that there are concrete reasons for the division in the 
social relations that are formed by and embody the law as a field, and to recognise that 
this does not result in law being a hermetically sealed category of separate social 
relations. Rather, the thrust of the thesis is to stress that it is only under certain 
historical conditions, and under certain types of social relations, that law takes on this 
significance and apparent separation. The result is that, under those historical 
conditions, law becomes a significant arena of praxis for precisely the same reasons that 
it achieves a certain level of reification, and that as a consequence it becomes even 
more important to understand the limits that law might place upon activity within its 
purview. 
The inevitability of the law just described, coupled with the apparent ambiguity in the 
law’s relationship to capitalist inequality, exploitation and oppression, constitute the 
basic frame of this Chapter. It is necessary to interrogate this ambiguity, to acquire a 
deeper grasp of the form of law, and to see how that form offers potential constraints 
to law as praxis in the way described above. The bulk of this Chapter is devoted to 
elucidating the nature of the legal form and its consequent limits, with the last section 
assessing the possibility of revolutionary legal praxis. Section II will examine the basic 
positive promise in the law; a hopeful legal vision rooted in the absence of any necessity 
to complicity of law in oppression. As long as there is no reason of legal principle for the 
law to act in the way of France’s opening quote, then the law may hold emancipatory 
and possibly even revolutionary potential. The second part of this opening section 
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briefly notes some conventional accounts of this legal ambiguity in relation to 
international law. These have read this ambiguity as product of law in the early stages 
of its social development, and see it as something that is gradually erased as the 
international legal system develops in sophistication and becomes ever more objective 
and predictable. 
This vision of law has been subjected to a large amount of critical examination, and 
Section III addresses this. These critical accounts assert the inevitability of politics in 
international law, and the basic indeterminacy of international legal argument. 
However, in stressing the indeterminacy of international legal argument, and the 
politics within law, these critical challenges did not offer any definitive insight into the 
nature of the form of law. Legal indeterminacy simply meant analysis shifted elsewhere 
to find the reasons for the very determined looking structure of international society. 
Third World and Feminist approaches to international law made essential contributions 
to this labour, examining the patriarchal, gendered and racist underpinnings of 
international law, alongside its historical and contemporary complicity with colonialism. 
However, these approaches have not taken the form of law itself as their main point of 
critique, and therefore they do not offer sufficient insight to analyse the potential limits 
of law for revolutionary praxis as discussed in Chapter One. 
Section IV turns to the commodity form theory of law as that which has offered the 
most persuasive critical account of the form of law itself. First espoused by Evgeny 
Pashukanis, the commodity form theory describes the law as inextricably bound with 
exchange relations, and therefore legal relations take on a particular significance under 
capitalism as a system of generalized commodity production. This section will explore 
this close relationship between capitalism and the law, examining the implications of 
the commodity form theory and some of the challenges put to the theory that focused 
on public and administrative law’s apparent distance from the legal relations that 
constitute exchange – property and contract. Proponents of the theory have presented 
a substantial defence of the commodity form against these criticisms, and reinforced 
the commodity form theory as a persuasive explanation of both the function of law and 
the ubiquity of law within capitalist social relations. The commodity form reveals the 
brutal heart of law in both the dull compulsion of capitalist economic relations and the 
ultimate coercion that lies behind them. However, reductions of law to coercion elide 
the ways in which capitalist relations entrench certain exploitative conditions as extra-
legal facts. Section V argues that coercion, although central to the legal form, does not 
capture the entirety of its function due to capitalism’s dependence on passive economic 
coercion in the form of established property relations and the nature of the use value of 
commodities as sustaining life.  
The final Section VI assesses the potential for revolutionary legal praxis, in the light of 
the form of law exposed by the commodity form theory of law. Considering the nature 
of revolutionary praxis discussed in Chapter One as orientated towards the 
overthrowing of capitalist social relations, and the law’s inextricable relationship to 
those relations, it would seem that revolutionary legal praxis would be a contradiction 
in terms. Yet there are components of critical theory that hint at the semblance of its 
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possibility. Pashukanis noted that the role of the revolutionary was to ‘struggle to 
overthrow and unmask the legalistic fetish’ of capitalism. Although a significant amount 
of critical work has been devoted to the ‘unmasking’ of law, in the vein of that covered 
in Section III, its overthrow is a different matter. This final section explores the 
possibility of this in two ways: firstly, the challenging within legal argument of the most 
essential legal relations. Legal arguments that radically question the basis of property 
ownership or the validity of contracts offer some potential in this vein. Secondly legal 
arguments that threaten to promote social relations inimical to capitalism – for example 
the decommodification of labour power or the invalidity of returns on investment also 
offer similar potential. Against these, however, there remains a cautionary element in 
the function of law. Both the law and capitalism are open to exceptional moments that 
do not advance the interests of capitalists; such is the nature of social and legal 
struggle. It is only if such occurrences were generalized and became the norm that the 
broader system could no longer function.  
II: The Ambiguous Promise of International Law 
The ambiguous promise of law is arguably rooted in the very idea of law itself. All social 
life has normative behaviour, so jurisprudence is always seeking a definitive element 
that makes law special. There are two possible ways of doing this which capture the 
dichotomy of law touched on in the introduction to this chapter. Law can be conceived 
of as norms that derive from a concept of ‘right’, ‘justice’, or the ‘ought’ of social life. 
Such conceptions form the basis of divine or natural law. But the need for the ‘earthly’ 
enforcement and practice of such law leads to the correlative possibility that law has 
something to do with whoever happens to wield the most social power; in other words 
that might makes right. This basic opposition between idealism and cynicism leaves the 
social progressive uncertain about how to relate to law in something of a quandary. 
There are two reasons to investigate how this relates to international law. Firstly, as 
mentioned in the introduction, a variety of left political organisations have adopted 
international legality as a measure by which they oppose international intervention, or 
judge the actions of Western leaders.135 This is problematic if, as this thesis argues, the 
law does not serve the interests they support. For those concerned with the political 
project of international revolution, how this kind of activity relates to the forces and 
doctrines of international law will be of immediate interest in formulating effective 
strategies and tactics for engaging with that system. As the oft repeated adage goes, if 
you do not do the law, the law will do you; there is no avoiding it.  
But the field of international law is also populated with progressively minded critical 
scholars who also see in international law the potential for revolutionary upheaval.136 
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There is therefore a second purpose behind the analysis of this thesis. That is to help 
such scholarship in formulating a more rigorous understanding of the revolutionary 
potential, or lack thereof, of the legal form, in order to help those with legal training but 
progressive politics situate themselves in relation to their current profession and their 
social vision. In theoretical terms, the process of examining the relationship between 
legal and revolutionary praxis will also help elucidate the content of both forms of 
praxis.  
In this way, although this entire investigation is directed towards an audience on the 
more critical edge of international legal academia and those most keenly opposed to 
the current configuration of global power and the operation of late capitalism, it 
presents a theoretical position that speaks to the broader discipline of international 
law. The positive hope for law that informs the radical legalism of the political left also 
supports the basic liberal legalism of more mainstream international lawyers.137 This is a 
position that is increasingly dominant in public discourse over Western intervention 
internationally, from the invasion of Iraq in 2003, to the interventions in Libya in 2011, 
the debates over Syria of late 2013, and again over the Ukraine in 2014.  
These positions oscillate between the vision of law as a restraint upon powerful states, 
as a protector of vulnerable populations (in need of a defending agent), and as a tool 
easily manipulated by Machiavellian international actors. The debates over Syria 
encompassed the full spectrum in this regard: victims of chemical weapons attacks lay 
in supposed need of avenging (if we ignore for a moment the many tens of thousands 
killed via more conventional means); international law and the decisions of the UN 
Security Council offered restraint upon otherwise unchecked responses by the United 
States and its potential allies; and that same institutional embodiment of law could be 
read as paralysed by the differing political positions of the US, Western Europe, Russia 
and China, over which kind of despotic leadership most suited their interests in ruling 
Syria.138 For what concerns us here, there remains an overriding ambiguity about 
whether or not any of this had something to do with law itself, rather than the complex 
machinations of international politics 
As this Chapter addresses the legal form directly, it offers only an indirect reference to 
the non-legally minded revolutionary – albeit, as pointed out, an important one, 
considering the ubiquity of law in current times. It is more directly concerned with 
those legal scholars who see revolutionary potential in the law. This same position 
translates into a more general position on law and social change, which sees in the 
former the capacity to bring about emancipatory and socially progressive 
transformations. Examples abound, but the basic theoretical points are outlined in the 
following two positions. Claire Cutler, in a generally excellent piece of analysis on 
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private power and global authority, notes that new areas of law, especially war crimes 
and developing human rights doctrines, are ‘potentially disruptive of, if not 
revolutionary for, statist orthodoxy’.139 Cutler goes on to note that the ‘revolutionary 
potential of emerging practice’ is only frustrated due to the conservative nature of 
other elements of the international legal regime.140 In these instances Cutler presents a 
remnant faith in the revolutionary potential of international law (and in essence the law 
in general) in the face of conservative strands, be they existing legal norms or simply the 
power of statist orthodoxy. 
i) No Reason of Principle 
Coupled with this vision of subversive potential, comes the basic theoretical assumption 
that there is no necessity in the conservative function of law. The fact that despite some 
subversive potential law may operate in a manner particularly supportive of the status 
quo is not seen as a consequence of law, but of something external to it. This position 
usually emerges when rights discourse is used to support a particular progressive 
political agenda. For example, principles of ‘social responsibility’, and ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’, at least doctrinally have the same legal standing as the sanctity of private 
property or the right of an investor to their guaranteed returns. David Renton deployed 
this argument in the Socialist Lawyer, against the inalienable right of a property owner 
to do as they wished, postulating that there ‘was no reason of principle why there 
should not equally be an overriding principle of “social responsibility”’.141  
Both of these positions represented by Cutler and Renton, interrelated as they are, 
offer up a series of ways in which they could be challenged within the frame of legal 
argument. There exist extensive criticisms of a rights based approach in general, which 
neatly encompass both domestic rights based struggles, and international human rights 
regimes.142 These can also be effectively coupled with standard criticisms of 
international law made by theorists of international relations that see the regime as 
ultimately dependent on forms of state power.143 These two criticisms often dovetail, as 
criticisms of rights-based approaches generally turn on the politics ‘behind’ the law that 
tips the nominally equal scales in favour of the more politically or materially powerful 
litigant.  
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However, these criticisms do not quite fully answer the aspiration present in the kinds 
of positions represented by Cutler and Renton. Renton’s claim is that there is no reason 
‘of principle’ (that is internally to legal argument) why social responsibility cannot trump 
other legal rights. Cutler’s claim is that evolving legal norms can hold ‘revolutionary 
potential’ irrespective of the fact that this may be outweighed by a presently more 
powerful counter-force. If we take these claims at face value, then they are entirely 
compatible with the typical criticisms made above. As statements about the nature of 
law, they are often repeated and pervade much critical discourse on both domestic and 
international legal regimes.144 It is therefore very important to try and assess these on 
their own terms, which requires an effective theory of law against which we can 
measure the relationship between revolutionary praxis outlined above, and 
international law as a field in which such praxis may be conducted.  
ii) Conventional Accounts of Ambiguity 
Conventional responses to this ambivalence of law have tended to approach 
international law through a series of common assumptions, all of which serve in some 
way to reinforce that ambiguity present in law that enables the simultaneous vision of it 
as both progressive and emancipatory and yet conservative and oppressive. Firstly 
international law is understood via an analogy with domestic law. In this frame 
domestic law is considered as a relatively stable, predictable system with certain 
outcomes and clear formative procedures. The classic formulation of this would be 
Weber’s legal typologies, of which the Western legal system broadly defined serves to 
provide an example of law in its most mature form.145 By contrast, international law 
lacks the overarching authority of domestic law that gives it that certainty. Despite this, 
international law offers a degree of normative power, increasing over time as these 
norms are increasingly accepted, yet still lacking the effective enforcement mechanisms 
of its domestic counterpart. These approaches also tend towards a highly formalist 
conception of the sources and subjects of law, and couple this with a conception of law 
as an external, relatively autonomous, neutral and objective order.146  
The domestic analogy, the formalism over law’s construction and subjects, and the 
vision of law as an external, neutral and objective order, enable the ambiguity present 
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in international law to be understood in a particular way. The basic ambiguity of law is 
constructed as something to be gradually removed during the evolution of the social 
system that the law regulates. Therefore as long as international law lacks the 
comparative certainty and enforcement mechanisms of domestic law it can be 
understood as a more primitive legal system.147 As institutions proliferate, alongside the 
pluralisation of the subjects and authors of law via decolonization, the international 
system evolves into a more complex organism, with a more advanced legal system to 
reflect this state of affairs. This is coupled with a more nuanced appreciation of 
international legal obligation arising through social concerns like reputation, reciprocity, 
perceptions of legitimacy, trust and the like, rather than immediate coercive 
measures.148 
III: The Politics of Law and Fundamental Legal Indeterminacy 
Challenges to this vision of law as a neutral, objective and external order have 
attempted to emphasize the nature of law as socially constructed, subjective, and to 
note its relative indeterminacy as inherent to law.149 There is a dual movement here. 
Firstly the apolitical, neutral, objective and external nature of law is challenged. This 
aims to dispel the ideological façade of law that serves to present the particular and 
contingent as universal and necessary. The second movement is to offer explanations 
for the determinate consequences of law – that is to explain how the law relates to a 
social environment characterised by inequality, oppression and exploitation. The first 
move could thus be said to focus on the discursive reality of law, and the second on its 
concrete material function. 
i) Critiques of Legal Discourse 
The first movement noted above was one of the key early components in the ‘New 
Stream’ of international legal theory.150 The discursive focus of this critical drive placed 
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it in close theoretical alignment with ‘post-modern’ theory in general,151 although this 
must be considered alongside the fact that critical work within the legal field has, of 
necessity, been highly interdisciplinary.152 Much of this is imbricated with Marxism as a 
tradition of scholarship that continued to offer one of the most persuasive accounts of 
capitalist society. Yet its influence within the early critical discourses on international 
law in the late 1980s was very limited. This can perhaps be understood as a direct 
consequence of the broader relationship of American Critical Legal Studies (CLS) to 
Marxism in general. As Alan Hunt has noted it was in some ways a consequence of the 
particular historical juncture that as critical scholars looked for a way of understanding 
law outside of its own disciplinary self-identity the Marxist tradition was itself 
undergoing a period of radical upheaval.153 As a result ‘[t]he period in which critical legal 
studies [came] into existence [was] one in which its radical political perspective 
encounter[ed] a bewildering variety of internal variation, differentiation and 
sectarianism within contemporary Marxism.’154 Hunt went on to note that not only did 
this make the adoption of a materialist paradigm unlikely, but that the particular strand 
of Marxism to have the greatest effect focused on the processes of legitimacy and 
hegemony. 
A consequence of this can be seen in the kind of focus adopted compared to the dual 
possibilities opened up by the thrust of an ideological critique of the function of law. 
Critical Legal Studies in the United States approached legal discourse from a particular 
angle:  
The peculiarity of legal discourse is that it tends to constrain the political 
imagination and to induce belief that our evolving social arrangements and 
institutions are just and rational, or at least inevitable, and therefore legitimate. 
The modus operandi of law as legitimating ideology is to make the historically 
contingent appear necessary. The function of legal discourse in our culture is to 
deny us access to new modes of conceiving of democratic self-governance, of 
our capacity for and experience of freedom.155 
This opens up both an awareness of the function of law as a discourse, but also its 
relation to a set of social and political arrangements that are rendered natural, 
inevitable, rational, or in some way legitimate. The corollary of this move is, of course, 
that such arrangements may not be any of those things; that they may in fact reflect 
particular interests or power structures and that they are, as a consequence, open to 
challenge and reformulation. Yet early critiques within international legal scholarship 
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foregrounded the rhetorical function of the law, rather than the nature of the social and 
political milieu that it naturalised.  
This involved a significantly progressive step in itself, examining ‘the hidden ideologies, 
attitudes and structures which lie behind discourse, rather than the subject matter of 
legal talk’.156 Yet this position matured into analyses of the legal form itself as being 
primarily a rhetorical tool – for David Kennedy the law’s role as simultaneously 
empowering the state and acting as regulator and critic of state action revealed the 
nature of international legal discourse as a rhetorical move between these points with 
no certain outcome.157 This reinserted the earlier ambiguity into law, as opposed to 
other accounts that attempted to see this as a lack of maturity of a legal system. Yet, in 
essence, this position embraced the ambiguity of law as an inherently progressive (and 
liberal) ideal – it enabled law to encompass all positions, and within this flexibility lay 
both its utility and its beauty.158 Kennedy demonstrated this in his view of the 
International Court of Justice’s Nuclear Tests case decision, which for him ‘illustrate[d] 
one way in which the hard and soft strands of sources argumentation [could] be 
blended and stabilized. The elegance of the Court’s opinion reside[d] in its management 
of the relationship between the two approaches… which [had] the potential to 
contradict each other in important ways.’159 Although there remains an important 
critical edge in Kennedy’s perspective, it is hard to avoid Anthony Carty’s conclusion 
that ‘he at least appears to treat international legal discourse as an aesthetic 
achievement… [whose] very aimlessness is the mark of its perfection: international law 
for the sake of international law, a beautiful exercise in perpetual and ‘successful’ 
evasion’.160 
ii) The Indeterminacy of International Legal Argument 
Arguably one of the ‘most complete book-length synthes[es] of CLS and international 
law’161 was Martti Koskenniemi’s From Apology to Utopia.162 Here the focus was, once 
again, upon the oscillation of international law between mutually valid yet opposing 
argumentative poles. International legal argument was seen to operate within the basic 
dichotomy of public order and sovereign will. For Koskenniemi, the indeterminacy of 
international law was ‘ultimately explained by the contradictory nature of the liberal 
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doctrine of politics.’163 Liberalism posed the fundamental freedom and equality of 
individuals, yet if this were the only principle upon which to base the political theory, 
there would be no way of reconciling those moments when ‘individual ends differ, 
indeed conflict’; ‘[i]n the absence of overriding principles civil war seem[ed] a constant 
threat’.164 It was in response to this that liberalism demand[ed] a counterweight to 
these private rights, such as fundamental rights,165 a concept of ‘objective interests’,166 
or a conception of the ‘public sphere’.167  
For Koskenniemi the irreconcilable nature of these opposing positions replicates itself in 
international legal argument in the form of ‘ascending’ and ‘descending’ arguments. 
Ascending arguments take as their origin the sovereign interest of the state, whereas 
descending arguments work down from general principles of international order or 
collective interest. The most essential point to the indeterminacy thesis is that neither 
can stand without invoking the other, and that as a consequence any international legal 
argument is always open to criticism from the obverse position. Purvis notes that the 
practice of international law then becomes the pursuit of an ‘unachievable resolution of 
the dichotomy between sovereign will and world order.’168  
As Koskenniemi reiterates, the basic opposition stemming from the liberal doctrine of 
politics offers positions that ‘continually threaten each other’.169  
The ascending strand legitimizes political order by reference to individual ends… 
Individuals can be constrained only to prevent ‘harm to others’. But any 
constraint seems a violation of individual freedom as what counts as ‘harm’ can 
only be subjectively determined. The descending strand fares no better. It 
assumes that a set of fundamental rights or a natural distinction between 
private and public spheres exist to guarantee that liberty is not violated. But this 
blocks any collective action as the content of those freedoms… can be justifiably 
established only by reference to an individual’s views thereof.170 
At the international level, these dichotomies play out along familiar doctrinal lines: 
between positivism and naturalism, normative values and concrete reality, the world 
order and sovereign will.171 
Reconciliatory doctrines will reveal themselves as either incoherent or making a 
silent preference [to one side of the dichotomies.] In both cases they remain 
vulnerable to criticisms from an alternative perspective. But this perspective, 
once forced to defend itself, will fare no better. Consequently, doctrine is 
forced to maintain itself in constant movement from emphasizing concreteness 
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to emphasizing normativity and vice-versa without being able to establish itself 
permanently in either position.172  
Thus, for Koskenniemi, ‘indeterminacy follows as a structural property of the 
international legal language itself.'173 This position is similar to that of Kennedy in that it 
reinserts ambiguity into legal language as a fundamental characteristic, yet the 
conclusions Koskenniemi draws from this position are more severe than those of his 
contemporaries. He notes that  
international law is singularly useless as a means for justifying or criticizing 
international behaviour. Because it is based on contradictory premises it 
remains both over- and underlegitimizing: it is overlegitimizing as it can be 
ultimately invoked to justify any behaviour (apologism), it is underlegitimizing 
because incapable of providing a convincing argument on the legitimacy of any 
practices (utopianism).174 
For Koskenniemi, this does not render international law chimerical or a mere façade for 
power politics. Recognising international law  
as an argumentative language in which one could conduct international affairs 
in a method ‘open to professional analysis,’ meant that it shifted the locus of 
power in international relations from one of political strength versus legal 
restraint, to the importance of institutional bias in relation to legally contested 
international affairs.175 
This conclusion constitutes an interesting assertion with regards to the broader 
indeterminacy thesis. However, it also stresses the fact that legal argument is not 
inherently contradictory, senseless and to be avoided, but that its strength lies, as for 
Kennedy, in precisely the capacity to argue both sides of any particular confrontation, 
from equally valid legal positions. Therefore, although Kennedy and Koskenniemi 
present slightly different readings of the ambiguity of legal argument, both share the 
basic assumption that engaging in legal dialogue alters the nature of contest in a way 
that is essentially positive. For Kennedy, international legal argument is so amenable as 
to draw all parties into its dialogue, whilst providing elegant methods for mediating 
disputes. For Koskenniemi, the nature of legal contestation for international affairs 
presents one open to professional analysis which when coupled with an awareness of 
institutional bias should provide ways of navigating the legal arena to achieve objectives 
rather than potential recourse to violence. Both of these positions privilege the figure of 
the international lawyer as holder of the expertise required to access and successfully 
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navigate this arena – a position simultaneously exalted by the posited alternative of the 
raw exercise of power.176 
In relation to the general discussion of legal indeterminacy, there are two closely 
connected points to carry forward. Firstly, the possible resolution offered by 
Koskenniemi in the form of institutional bias, and secondly the nature of whatever 
social formation we consider to be ‘outside’ of the legal form. In some sense, the 
institutional bias raised by Koskenniemi offers a point at which one could seek the 
determinacy of international law. It also offers a potential locus of intervention, or 
reform, towards which political activity could be directed. However, it is worth coupling 
this with another observation made by Koskenniemi as to the appeal of international 
law, particularly regarding those advocating it as indicative of a progressive 
development of international life. Koskenniemi makes the claim that this project ‘has 
been a credible one because to strive for it implies no commitment regarding the norms 
thereby established or the character of the society advanced.’177 
This results in an interesting duality. Firstly the practice of international law draws one 
towards institutional bias in order to effect its determination, and secondly that, in 
general, the advocacy of international law has no concrete content. Together these 
emphasize the indeterminacy of both the legal form, and the social relations it both 
expresses and transforms. Yet this should remain an open question, in the following 
sense. Firstly, it is important to note that accepting the indeterminacy thesis as put 
forward by Koskenniemi does not take one to the margins of the international legal 
profession.178 In general, it provides a deep insight into the structure of international 
(and general) legal argument. It seems somewhat intuitive that this nature of legal 
indeterminacy would enable Koskenniemi’s following position that the legal form comes 
without concrete content. However, a perfunctory analysis of recent history does not 
create a picture of radical flux and indeterminacy.179 To take Koskenniemi’s position 
seriously would be to accept a radical disconnect between the form of law and its social 
setting and its outcomes, which seems deeply problematic. The basic thrust of this 
thesis is to push this doubt further – forcing the connections between the function of 
the legal form and various attempts to radically transform those social relations that it 
dialectically reflects and effects.  
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iii) Third World and Feminist takes on the Law 
It is in this way that this thesis distinguishes itself from other insightful critiques of 
international law that operate in a similar vein to Koskenniemi’s conclusion – 
attempting to understand the dark side of international law by reference to the social 
setting in which it is embedded. Such critiques have aimed to uncover the ways in which 
‘international law does not operate neutrally, but serves to promote particularistic 
interests and values’.180 Two of the most notable strands of this scholarship focus on the 
relationship between international law and patriarchy, and on the relationship between 
international law and colonialism. Of course, these two relationships are not exclusive 
and the two approaches can intersect in highly constructive ways. The former has 
focused on the ways in which the legal form relies upon gendered concepts that 
marginalise matters of greater concern to women,181 and in its practical function 
creates and relies upon institutions and professional settings that further exclude 
women. Approaches to law from this feminist perspective are numerous and form a 
broad church,182 yet can be seen to share a perspective that focuses on the socially 
constructed nature of law, and therefore allow for its ‘potentially emancipatory 
nature.’183 Even without this legal optimism, the location of legal oppression within the 
realm of patriarchy does not offer a theoretical focus on the legal form itself.  
In a similar vein, Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) have done 
excellent work in seeking to ‘disenchant international law by revealing its imperialist, 
gendered and racist underpinnings.’184 A similarly broad grouping of scholars, 185 TWAIL 
has tended to examine the ways in which the ‘international law enterprise… becomes a 
vehicle for Western cultural imperialism’.186 At its best, scholarship operating from this 
perspective has offered powerful insights into the relationship between the very origins 
of international law and the colonial enterprise,187 yet in a similar vein to the foregoing 
discussion the logic for the law’s problematic operation is consigned to factors external 
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to the law (for example a racial binary) thereby exonerating legal struggle as a means to 
transcend the same problems in which it was complicit. In a sense, such approaches 
have tended to shy away from some of their own critical insights, sharing ‘these very 
same liberal commitments [that their work noted] also lead international lawyers to 
adhere to ideas and practices that function[ed] to reproduce the very hierarchies and 
exclusions that they ostensibly [stood] against.’188 
These positions share a lot of common ground with more general work on the sociology 
of law, which may in turn attempt to unveil the gendered, class and racial demarcations 
that run through the legal profession and in particular the judicial system.189 Judges may 
come from a particular social and economic background, and have been predominantly 
educated in a particular way; when transposed to international law, attention could 
turn, as with Koskenniemi, to institutional bias. In either case we are not locating the 
resolution internally to the legal form. What this means is that even as one internalizes 
politics to law by revealing the law as political, the specificity of law as a terrain of 
contestation is obscured. If we are considering the implications of international law as a 
potential location for revolutionary praxis, this is inadequate. 
Bob Fine described the same situation eloquently: 
[A] sociological approach which looks to the economic and political interests 
behind specific legal and penal measures appears as a significant advance over… 
formalism. But here again there is disappointment. For exclusive attention is 
directed towards the class interests served or the economic functions 
performed by one or other measure of law or punishment; in other words, 
exclusive to the question of content. Why these interests or functions should 
have been served by the legal form or regulation, or by penal repression 
remains a question unaddressed… This exclusive focus on the content of law 
leaves the social and historical character of its form unexamined… 190 
There are important consequences to recognising this fact. The critical project of 
demystifying law’s obscured political content in the vein of Karl Klare noted above, and 
the ‘disenchantment’ aimed at by TWAIL, offer a significant critique of formalist 
perception of law as a neutral and objective arbitrator. Yet this process of 
demystification runs the risk of becoming the ultimate objective, rather than a 
component of a broader task. In essence revealing the political content of the law or its 
iniquitous function due to the social environment in which it is embedded does not 
address the ideal of the law itself, but rather the function of a particular content. This 
also tends towards a particular cyclical dynamic in which the law’s failure to live up to 
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its liberal promise spurs reform, and thus a supposed evolution of the law. In other 
words a process in which the law is brought closer to its ideal image. This then returns 
to the earlier visions of law discussed in this Chapter, where the ambiguity, which could 
be read as law’s susceptibility to abuse by socially powerful actors, is progressively 
reduced. This distinction also reinforces the image of international law as either 
primitive, or non-law, but progressing gradually in the direction of a sophisticated, 
‘civilised’ social system. 
It also remains obscure as to why law governs these social relations; why the 
contemporary period seems so saturated by legal relations and what the consequences 
might be for those with revolutionary praxis in mind. For those inclined to find an 
answer to such questions, a perspective is required that doesn’t operate with a radical 
distinction between domestic and international law and that is able to offer an analysis 
of the legal form itself.  That is, if we are to assess the law as an arena of revolutionary 
praxis, as opposed to any other area of social life. This is important as a question of the 
nature of the legal form, but there is more at stake here than an issue of legal 
philosophy. By understanding the nature of law, why particular interests and functions 
are served by legal means, we have a better idea of firstly why legal means dominate 
the imagination when it comes to agency,191 and secondly what the limits of legal 
means might be, drawn up by the nature of the legal form. Thus we have grounds to 
effectively assess the ‘revolutionary potential’ of the legal form. In the terms of 
ambiguity in which this chapter approaches legal theory, Fine’s question again forces 
consideration of the possible function of the law itself, and as a result its relationship to 
capitalist social relations more broadly. In seeking the answer to the potential limits the 
legal form may place on revolutionary praxis, this question must be addressed.  
IV: Pashukanis and the Commodity Form Theory of Law 
One of the most powerful engagements with this precise topic, and one that has 
recently undergone a revival in international legal theory, was that of Evgeny 
Pashukanis,192 who wrote the first comprehensive Marxist theory of Law, commonly 
described as the Commodity Form Theory of Law.193 Pashukanis’s work has received 
ample treatment since it was first discovered by Western scholars, such that it already 
has a significant body of supporters and opponents.194 The most sustained and effective 
introduction of this work to international legal theory is that by China Miéville, put most 
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comprehensively in Between Equal Rights.195 Miéville’s engagement is unparalleled, but 
for the purposes of exposition it is necessary to reproduce elements here alongside a 
brief introduction to Pashukanis’s work. The following sections will offer a perspective 
on Pashukanis informed by Miéville’s work, discuss some of the problems that other 
theorists have had with the theory, and explain how despite these Pashukanis presents 
us with the most comprehensive basic theoretical understanding of law under 
capitalism, and that as a result this theory is most useful for the purposes at hand. 
The commodity form theory of law simultaneously offers some essential insights for the 
perspective of potential revolutionary legal practice. Most importantly, it offers a theory 
of the legal form itself – and thereby the possible limits of legal praxis based on the 
legal form rather than something external to it. It is crucial to note at this early stage 
that this in itself has to remain a nuanced claim. Pashukanis noted the intimate and in 
some ways identical relationship between commodity exchange and the legal form. This 
also meant that these aspects of law – its fundamental nature – were essential to 
capitalism as a mode of production, understood as being constituted by conditions of 
generalized commodity production. There is therefore a sense in which this 
examination of the law appears to turn to something ‘outside’ of the law (capitalism), in 
order to understand its form. The discussion that follows will help elaborate on this 
point, but at this stage it is important to note that this would be a misreading of the 
commodity form theory. At all stages the relationship is described as one of mutual 
constitution – in essence two different perspectives on the same set of social relations. 
That very differentiation between the two perspectives, however, is absolutely essential 
to the contemporary lure of the legal form for progressively minded scholars. 
i) Exchange Relations and the Law 
As just stated, the commodity form theory postulates an intimate relationship between 
law as we currently understand it and capitalism as a system. It notes a close homology, 
or identity, between the legal form and the process of exchange. The premise is 
relatively straightforward. Mimicking Marx’s approach to his analysis of Capital, 
Pashukanis opens his analysis with the commodity as a central component of capitalist 
relations. The concept of the commodity requires a series of specifically legal 
characteristics – property, legal personality, and contract. Commodities are themselves 
abstractly equivalent (exchange values are all equivalent, by definition; the concrete 
form and use value of the commodity is irrelevant – on the surface – to the process of 
exchange), and commodity owners are equally merely the representative whose will 
resides in the commodity for the purposes of contractual exchange. Finally behind this 
process rests the possibility of violence – the enforcement of the contractual agreement 
of exchange. 
 The exchange of commodities assumes an atomized economy. A connection is 
maintained between private and isolated economies from transaction to 
transaction. The legal relationship between subjects is only the other side of the 
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relation between the products of labour which have become commodities. The 
legal relationship is the primary cell of the legal tissue through which law 
accomplishes its only real movement. In contrast, law as a totality of norms is 
no more than a lifeless abstraction.196 
The final line is an important corrective against legal formalism. As Miéville states, the 
legal rule cannot be the basis of the legal form: ‘The legal form is a particular kind of 
relationship. Rules can only be derived from that relationship. They are thus secondary, 
and in fundamental jurisprudential terms, their specific content is contingent.’197 This 
gives rise to an important, and recurring, point, taken up by a variety of legal theorists. 
The derivation of these rules appears to offer sufficient variability to reject the level of 
determinism suggested by Pashukanis’s theory. That same variability can be considered 
to reinforce the possibility that law holds revolutionary potential. However, the nature 
of that determination, which we could rephrase as a deeply rooted tendency, only 
becomes explicit in a careful consideration of the commodity form. Importantly, this is a 
relationship best demonstrated by the fact of international law.  
This becomes explicit in Pashukanis’s own brief comments on international law; 
considerations that reinforce his position against a formalist understanding of the law. 
Against the norm-driven argument, Pashukanis notes that an authoritative body may no 
doubt enforce and protect the legal relationship, but it does not (at least wholly) define 
it. It is in this way that international law becomes the ideal testing ground for legal 
theory. ‘[M]odern international law recognises no coercion organised from without. 
Such non-guaranteed legal relations are unfortunately not known for their stability, but 
this is not grounds for denying their existence.’198 Miéville notes forcefully that ‘the very 
existence of international law as law is evidence that it is in the relationship between 
legal subjects rather than in any ‘posited norm’ that the essence of the legal form 
lies.’199 
This basic relationship is one of commodity exchange. However, the precise meaning of 
this has created numerous problems in the reception of Pashukanis. Alternatively read 
as a further example of Marxist crude economic determinism,200 this basic point has 
often been interpreted as relegating law as contingent upon the economic, or as 
located within the ‘superstructure’ thrown up by the basic economic relations of 
capitalism.201 However, this fails to appreciate the essence of what Pashukanis is 
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arguing. His analysis closely follows Marx, whose following description of exchange is 
instructive: 
Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their 
own right. We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are the 
possessors of commodities. Commodities are things, and therefore lack the 
power to resist man… In order that these objects may enter into relation with 
each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in relation to 
one another as person whose will resides in those objects, and must behave in 
such a way that each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and 
alienate his own, except through an act to which both parties consent. The 
guardians must therefore recognize each other as owners of private property. 
This juridical relation, whose form is the contract, whether as part of a 
developed system or not, is a relation between two wills which mirrors the 
economic relation.202 
This passage from Marx can be read in the same light as Miéville, emphasising the 
economic aspect, which may encourage the kind of economic determinism that so 
alienated subsequent readings of Marxist theories of law.203 But this would be a 
mistake. Marx’s point is that commodity exchange is, at one and the same time, a 
juridical relation. They are inseparable. Miéville is also explicit about this, especially in 
relation to the base-superstructure analogy that causes so much controversy in the 
reception of Marxist insights. Miéville notes that ‘[i]t is clear that, according to 
Pashukanis, law cannot be relegated to the superstructure. In terms of Marx’s base-
superstructure analogy, the legal form under capitalism is an integral part of the 
relations that constitute the ‘base’.’204 
Mieville makes the claim that having to make this defence rests on a misreading of the 
purpose of the base-superstructure analogy itself.  
The distinction between base and superstructure is not a distinction between 
one set of institutions and another, with economic institutions on one side and 
political, judicial, ideological etc institutions on the other. It is a distinction 
between relations that are directly connected to production and those that are 
not. Many particular institutions include both.205  
Keeping this in mind, capitalism itself is not comprehensible except as a system rooted 
in legal relations. But it is only with the spread and dominance of this system that those 
relations can evolve into the rich complexity of law that confronts the legal theorist and 
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leaves them so uncomfortable with the commodity form theory. Of course, this is a 
process that also interacts with the ‘law’ of feudal relations, and social norms more 
generally, such that it may seem further alien to ascribe to this complex whole a basic 
and fundamental root in the way of Pashukanis. But again, to do so is to overlook the 
complexity of capitalism as a system in itself, and to elide one of its most basic 
characteristics – a generalized mode of commodity production.  
ii) Capitalism and the Gravity of Law 
Generalized commodity production means that, at a certain point in time, the dominant 
form of social production becomes the production of commodities. Exchange relations 
and legal relations, as a consequence of the social relations they enable and represent, 
then take on a new and unique level of importance. This will become clear throughout 
the following analysis, but it is important to note at this stage that it is through this 
process that the legal form interpenetrates social relations to the extent that it does 
today. Under conditions of capitalism as the dominant mode of production, that is 
generalized commodity production, the legal relation spreads with the exchange 
relation – and as Pashukanis notes, ‘[c]ommodity fetishism is complemented by legal 
fetishism.’206 
[B]ourgeois capitalist property ceases to be a weak, unstable and purely factual 
possession, which at any moment may be disputed and must be defended vi et 
armis. It turns into an absolute, immovable right which follows the object 
everywhere that chance carried it and which from the time that bourgeois 
civilization affirmed its authority over the whole globe, is protected in its every 
corner by laws, police, courts.207 
For those theorists who focus on the function of public law, these formulations may 
seem unpersuasive. But this is to focus on the legally concretised results of social 
struggle, rather than on the essence of the legal relation. Miéville describes this process 
thusly: ‘A complex legal system regulating all levels of social life can be thrown up which 
appears to differentiate itself from private law, but it ultimately derives from the clash 
of private interests.’208 Here we have direct echoes of the fundamental contradictions of 
liberalism that, for Koskenniemi, dominate the legal form and render its basic essence 
indeterminate.  
The frame Pashukanis uses to describe this process is highly apt. He notes that public 
law ‘can only be developed through its workings, in which it is continually repulsed by 
private law, so much that it attempts to define itself as the antithesis of private law, to 
which it returns, however, as to its centre of gravity.’209 The metaphor holds rich 
potential. It draws attention to the tensions between the broader social function of law 
and the basic relations of exchange and abstract equivalence that dominate the social 
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system. The result, much like that of a gravitational pull, is a constant, far reaching and 
very gradual tendency towards a particular centre or outcome. For the purposes at 
hand, it is this process that is likely to offer the limits to revolutionary legal praxis. 
This gravitational pull is rooted in private law and exchange relations. It is therefore 
crucial to tie the commodity form theory to a broader conception of capitalism as a 
system because it is this that imbues the private legal relation, or the actual legal form, 
with its power to generate conformity in other social relations. Miéville notes,  
where there are legal relations in a society not composed of generalized 
commodity production, they will be context-specific. But the generalizing of the 
legal form can only occur under conditions of generalized commodity exchange. 
The final universalisation of a commodity economy is, of course, capitalism. 
And, crucially and uniquely under capitalism, all social production is production 
for exchange.210  
It is these conditions that give us the dominance of the legal form, its ubiquity within 
social relations more broadly, and also the very features that define the legal relation in 
contrast to other forms of social relation. 
Of course, even if one accepts the above formula, one could have an understanding of 
contemporary capitalism as somehow different, and therefore the commodity form 
theory as outdated.211 Here, however, Miéville offers the most sophisticated defence 
(and development) of Pashukanis’s theory. Adopting the reasonable position that 
Pashukanis’s general theory was only the first sketch of a position that would require 
substantial development, Miéville confronts those criticisms that saw the commodity 
form theory as inadequate to later forms of capitalism, or otherwise unable to account 
for various specificities of law. It is undeniable that there are areas in the General 
Theory that lay the foundations for such criticism.212 But as Miéville does excellent work 
in demonstrating, these failures are simply failures to fully develop the theory, and do 
not offer invalidations of it.213  
iii) Capitalism and Public and Administrative Law 
On a basic level, many of these criticisms return to the myriad functions of the law in 
intervening in social life, which are seen to stretch far beyond the protection of private 
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property, free will and the processes of exchange. Miéville notes that such a criticism 
already misreads the law as protecting exchange rather than being ‘another way of 
seeing that relation,214 but is also able to provide a convincing elaboration of how the 
development of various legal forms, for example the corporation and the trade union, 
stem from the basic commodity form of law and its very particular relationship to 
labour power that occurs under capitalism.215 In general, these focus on elements of 
administrative (public) law, and the ways in which they continue to represent interests 
ostensibly outside of the terrain of exchange relations.  
Miéville makes use of the nature of labour-power as a commodity under capitalism, 
taken from Geoffrey Kay and James Mott, to elaborate upon Pashukanis’s work.216 He 
acknowledges that the focus on exchange creates space for the criticisms later levelled 
at Pashukanis, and that even for Pashukanis himself it leads him to a strange 
formulation of labour regulations as the feudal rule of the individual capitalist.217 It is 
not necessary to replicate Miéville’s argument here, but the following point can be 
made. It is the fundamental position of labour-power as a commodity within capitalism 
that shifts what would otherwise be more peripheral relations of exchange into the 
fundamental driving force of social relations more broadly. The consequences of this 
relationship are a political struggle between the interests of capital and the interests of 
labour that when consolidated into legal form become forms of public or administrative 
law. Kay and Mott describe administration as ‘working-class power post festum; 
working class-class political victories captured and formalised in their moment of 
triumph.’218 However, Miéville’s point, and the point to stress here, is that the broader 
nature of law rooted in abstract equivalence (commodity relations) then colours these 
legal manoeuvres.   
Miéville notes that ‘[a]dministration addresses a specific inequality through an attempt 
to formalise the marginalised group as equal. The attempt is therefore to solve a 
particular problem through the subsumption of a particular category… into a formal, 
abstract, juridical one, to insist upon its abstract equality.’219 Although these may 
appear to represent something fundamentally different from the basic commodity form 
of law that Pashukanis analyses,220 they are simply the function of the form of law as an 
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arena of social struggle, just as exchange relations become an arena of general social 
struggle once labour-power becomes fully commodified under capitalism – conditions 
of generalized production for exchange. This is a function of the interaction between 
the basic logic of capitalism with all its attendant social functions and the historical 
struggle of individuals within these structuring conditions. Pashukanis’s theory then 
offers key insights into understanding the dynamics of this process, and the potential 
limitations of the law as an arena of struggle. As Miéville notes, ‘it is only through the 
application of the commodity-form theory of law itself to that unique commodity 
[labour power] that we can see how the form of law itself must develop, on the basis of 
its own fundamental form, as capitalism ages.’221 
What this further offers is an explanation for the ubiquity of law under capitalism as a 
system – just as commodity relations expand and become generalized, so to do social 
relations increasingly take on legal form and expression. Again, Miéville reiterates this 
same point, claiming that ‘it is only the full application of the commodity-form theory of 
law in given historical conjunctures that allows us to understand the spread of 
administration.’222 In terms of the legal struggle, ‘it is the continuing and inevitable 
failure of existing laws to patch up all the holes in the social fabric that necessitates the 
extension of administration. Administration is law: it is somewhat removed from private 
law where the legal form exists in its ‘purest’ form, but administration – public law – is 
directly derived from that form.’223 
iv) The Dominance and the Force of Law 
It is under these conditions, as different areas of life take up legal expression, that the 
legal form itself comes to dominate the social imagination, and to dominate as an arena 
of social struggle. Yet, as we see above, this is coloured by the ‘gravitational pull’ 
described by Pashukanis. The basic elements of the legal form still point toward a 
particular social configuration – one structured by abstract formal equality, an 
assumption of private property, and the presence of violence to enforce contract. This 
has a very particular consequence in terms of the relationship between legal relations 
and concrete facts of the social world. However, this functions in a particular manner 
that is important to note. Firstly, as Miéville stresses, the exchange relation contains 
violence immanently. That is to say that there remains the assumption that there exists 
a force that will ensure contractual obligations are upheld, and that private property is 
respected (the very notion of private property also implies force and violence). This has 
a particular relationship to contemporary conceptions of politics, economics and the 
law, especially the oft insisted upon distinction between them relied upon by formalist 
accounts. Miéville notes a ‘fascinating circularity’.  
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Capitalism is based on commodity exchange, and… such exchange contains 
violence immanently. However, the universalisation of such exchange has 
tended to lead to the abstraction of the state as a ‘third force’ to stabilise the 
relations. Thus politics and economics have been separated. In the same 
moment, the flipside of that separation and the creation of a public political 
body was the investiture of that body – the state – as the subject of those legal 
relations which had long inhered between political entities, and which now 
became bourgeois international law. But that process itself necessitated the 
self-regulation of the legal relation internationally by its subjects; this self-help 
was a simultaneously ‘political’ and ‘economic’ function. This is, then, a 
manifestation of the collapse of the distinction between politics and economics 
inherent in the very dynamic which had separated them.224 
This highlights the most crucial areas of legal theory for this thesis. That is the 
relationship between that immanent violence rooted in the economic and the political 
collapsed into the legal form precisely through the same dynamic that ejects them. 
However, this is a violence that is at once legal and something else. It is undeniable that 
exchange relations contain an inherent violence – the violence of ‘mine not yours’, in 
addition to the implied enforcement of contractual obligation. However, there are other 
kinds of violence at work. In some ways this can map onto the ‘constituted’ and 
‘constitutive’ violence of the legal order.225 That initial violence in which the legal order 
is enshrined and hence monopolises and legitimizes constituted violence. However, this 
is to slip too far into a focus on particular authority, whereas the primary concern here 
is the legal relation alone. In the interaction between law and the material composition 
of society, there is an additional ingrained violence that rests outside of the immediacy 
of the exchange relation, and in a sense outside of the coercive pattern of the law.  
It is important to differentiate this from the most immediate and obvious consequential 
violence of the law – in the form of property. As capitalism has developed as an 
economic system, it has always been accompanied by legal measures that deprive 
people of access to the means of reproductive life, thereby forcing them into the selling 
of wage labour. In its most simple formulation, those without property in an industrial 
capitalist economy have no means of sustaining life, beyond that secured through 
political struggle.226 Once dispossessed of land and the means to produce goods, an 
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individual is then ‘free’ to take a job or starve, potentially sustained by the welfare 
provisions both fought for by the working class, and necessary for capital to secure its 
access to a reserve army of labour. This is violence evident in the moment of 
dispossession, but obscured in the later consolidation of ownership through legal title.  
Chris Arthur describes this very similar process: 
 [I]t is precisely one of the interesting features of bourgeois exploitation that it 
inheres in economic relations that do not achieve formal legal expression. 
Formally speaking, Pashukanis is correct to refer law only to social relationships 
based on commodity exchange… The monopolisation of the means of 
production by the capitalist class is an extra-legal fact (quite unlike the political-
economic domination of the feudal lord). The bourgeois legal order contents 
itself with safeguarding the right of a property owner to do as he wishes with 
his own property – whether it be the right of a worker to sell his labour power 
because that is all he owns, or that of the capitalist to purchase it and retain the 
product.227 
This further reinforces a crucial element of law under the conditions of capitalism. The 
surplus value extraction (exploitation) occurs ‘outside’ of the formal legal realm, and 
remains invisible to it; which in some sense might hint at the fate of those measures 
which attempt to ameliorate or mitigate this fact through legal intervention. Because 
the material conditions of exploitation remain external, unless the social upheaval is of 
sufficient extent, then it remains implied that those seeking profit (surplus value 
extraction) will be able to adjust the system to extract value elsewhere merely by 
nature of their superior material position (be it ownership and control of the means of 
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production, or the production chain, or distribution or consumption controls). The best 
examples here would be the intended measures of early Third World economic 
intervention, which will be addressed in Chapter Four. 
Many theorists have been tempted to offer ways in which advanced capitalist systems 
do not offer the same clear cut conditions as in classical Marxist formulations, for 
example, examining the legally structured ‘alternatives’ to wage labour such as social 
security.228 Again, at this stage it is worth noting two things – firstly that these remain 
administrative interventions into the social inequities of capitalism, and indeed in a 
form which is essential for its effective social function. It is, after all, vital to capitalism 
that a reserve army of unemployed labour be sustained in order to control wage 
inflation. Secondly, they offer no challenge to the broader systemic function of 
capitalism or of the legal system. That one may ‘choose’ the alternative of criminal 
activity, social security, independent petty commerce or ‘consultancy’ work’229 does not 
alter the dominant dynamic of the system, even accepting that these are not forms of 
‘wage labour’, which is itself rather unpersuasive.230 
V: The Brutal Heart of Law 
The recurrence of violence at the heart of the law gives it a brutal image, and feeds into 
a general tendency, especially in Miéville’s work concerning international law, to 
collapse law into coercion. It is in this vein that international law also offers the 
exemplar for the legal form more generally, in that it lacks the kind of consolidated 
organisation of coercive violence that exists to varying degrees within the state and 
apparently rests on a greater degree of euphemistically deployed ‘effectiveness’.231 For 
Miéville, the dominance of this fact at the international level leads to his oft-quoted 
conclusion: ‘[t]he chaotic and bloody world around us is the rule of law.’232 There is a 
level of truth to this that is undeniable – something that also applies to the domestic 
legal sphere. Internationally, although this is a point that also carries domestically, legal 
struggle entails a clash of forces between which the only determining influence can be 
force. Between equal rights force decides, and therefore the strongest will out.233 
Crucially this foregrounding of force elides the structural and legal dispossession that 
prefigures generalized commodity production in line with Arthur’s quote above. This is 
evident in considerations of the state form addressed in the course of Miéville’s 
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argument that depict it as ‘a force to guarantee the law, a force which [was termed] 
extra economic (coercive) force’.234  
 However, there is an important way in which this has to be qualified. Firstly, as 
constructive criticism of Miéville’s work has shown, Miéville’s conception of ‘force’ must 
be broadened for his account to remain persuasive. Robert Knox notes, for example, 
that ‘in emphasizing ‘war’ as the central form of coercion Mieville is elevating the 
‘political’ aspects of international society over the economic one, something one would 
not necessarily associate with a Marxist approach to international relations.’235 Knox 
then points out that ‘it is necessary to show that ‘economic coercion’ is also a force on 
the international stage.’236 This is very true, but there is a reason that this ‘economic 
coercion’ draws less attention on the international stage. It is part of the background 
conditions of exchange, and therefore it is difficult to label it even as ‘coercion’ at all. 
Although this will be addressed in Chapter Four, it is notable that in response to the 
Third World’s push to have precisely this recognised as an international delict, legal 
scholars were forced to consider the following rather obvious fact. 'Much of State 
economic activity is harmful to other States for the very obvious reason that State 
economies are competitive and that promoting one's own economy may well be 
injurous to others.'237 This foregrounds the fact that there is more to this than a 
broadening of the category of violence, or coercion. Or rather, it is how we conceive of 
violence and coercion that becomes the problem.  
i) The Dull Compulsion of Economic Relations 
Of course coercion is present in the background conditions of exchange, as well as in 
the enforcement of contract. It is present in the very concept of private property. But it 
does not suffice to refer to this as force, even in the expanded sense towards which 
Knox pushes Miéville. There are two reasons for this. Firstly the ‘force’ need never be 
applied. This is present in both the ideological way in which private property (and law) 
are naturalised, and in the fact that the basis of the ownership and subsequent 
exploitation is already an established fact. It is possible to concede that this is still 
proximate to force, but to conflate the two would miss an important nuance. Secondly, 
and perhaps more importantly, is the nature of the constellation of private property 
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and social relations in which any individual is embedded. This is important in the 
following ways. 
Firstly this expanded conception of coercion is still, in the above sense, rooted in the 
same structures as the law and commodity exchange. Reified individuals engaged in 
contractual processes.  Now to the extent that we are examining legal relations the 
fiction that this is the case remains an effective descriptor. Collective bargaining over 
labour contracts with a corporation need not, for legal purposes, recognise the 
multitude represented on either side, or their property and resources. However, an 
individual enters the world as part of a complex net of social relations – even if these 
are liberal capitalist relations which stress the individual’s monad like existence. It is to 
these relations that we must turn our interest, in examining the role of coercion in the 
actual moments of contract and existence of property. When an ‘individual’ moves to 
enter into a contractual legal relation, they do so from within their position in that web 
of social relations – and it is within this process that one can understand the ‘force’ of 
legislation that separates such an individual from the means of their own survival and 
forces them into the market to sell their labour. 
Now of course, as stated, there is a force that maintains these relations. But when we 
consider the concrete reality, especially with a mind to transforming it, there is another 
important element. That position of vulnerability and necessity associated with lacking 
access to the means to survive has a twofold element. Firstly it is present, initially, 
outside of the realm of law (although maintained by it). What this means in concrete 
terms is that the coercive element is passive, in an important way. Secondly, that lack of 
access is also social – no individual instantly reproduces their own material life. This 
reproduction occurs on a social basis for the individual while they are incapable (an 
infant, for example) and as part of a social whole. At some later point they will 
participate in that process in some way. Even access to land is useless if one has lost the 
skills, ability, and the requisite suitable ecological environment in which to use this to 
sustain life. Property is therefore, above all, also a social relation between groups.  
These are not novel points, but in relation to international law they serve to capture a 
particular aspect of the legal relation. The vast inequality in terms of access to 
technology, finance, and certain types of human and environmental resources is a 
background factor to the immediacy of the law. What this means, in practice, is that the 
‘force’ of this inequality need not be applied. Evidently it can be applied, for example 
through the freedom of any state to alter its trade policies in certain ways.238 However, 
such freedom is obviously framed by the background conditions referred to above. 
Marx describes this not as violence or coercion explicitly, but as the ‘dull compulsion of 
economic relations.’  
Direct force, outside economic conditions, is of course still used, but only 
exceptionally. In the ordinary run of things, the labourer can be left to his 
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dependence on capital, a dependence springing from, and guaranteed in 
perpetuity by, the conditions of production themselves.239 
This also takes on an ideological dimension. For Marx, ‘[t]he advance of capitalist 
production develops a working class, which by education, tradition, habit, looks upon 
the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of Nature’.240 These 
observations recall some of the earlier insights of CLS, which after all were themselves 
based on various readings of Marx and interpretations of the relationship between law 
and capitalism. It is important therefore, to acknowledge the ideological and economic 
dimensions of law that are imbued with the coercive implications of contract and 
property embedded in the exchange relation.  
However, there is a cyclical element to this process of observation and 
acknowledgement. Something that mirrors Miéville’s own fascinating observation with 
regards the uniting of politics and economics within the legal form at the international 
level. There is no need to resolve this process one way or another; to finally determine 
violence at the heart of law, or something else. Rather, we can note that these 
observations serve a particular purpose. They can be placed as part of the body of work 
that ‘disenchants’ the positive image of international law, or demystifies the 
relationship between law and oppression. Pashukanis also noted this process, and the 
danger such work holds for the bourgeoisie within capitalism. Foregrounding the 
violence in the law both can ‘compromise [the] peace and tranquillity needed even by a 
thief when he has had his fill and is digesting his spoils.’241  
ii) Brutal Law and Legal Nihilism 
The threat lies in revealing the theft subsumed within the law.  
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask nothing, legitimise 
nothing, contribute nothing to any class’s hegemony. The essential precondition 
for the effectiveness of law, in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an 
independence from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just.242  
Yet, the process of unveiling this injustice can also collapse into a nihilist critique of the 
law – especially common in critiques of international law that collapse it into a simplistic 
‘might makes right’. At the international level especially, this nihilism is enabled by an 
idealised vision of the law, generally supposed to exist to a greater extent at the 
domestic level. Pashukanis offered insightful reflection on this point:  
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The nihilist criticism of international law is in error since, while exposing 
fetishism in one area, it does so at the cost of consolidating it in others. The 
precarious, unstable and relative nature of international law is illustrated in 
comparison with the largely firm, steady and absolute nature of other types of 
law. In fact, we have here a difference in degree. For only in the imagination of 
jurists are all the legal relationships within a state dominated one hundred per 
cent by a single state "will". In fact, a major portion of civil law relationships are 
exercised under influence of pressures limited to the activities of subjects 
themselves.243 
Thereby dispensing with the differentiation between international law and domestic 
law that enables the aforementioned idealism, the nihilistic position threatens all law. 
However, there is still an element to this that is dependent on an idealised equation 
between law and justice. Without this there would be no reason for surprise at the 
‘unveiling’ of law as partial and unjust. In this vein then, the corollary of such legal 
nihilism can, with some irony, become the reform and strengthening of law in order to 
bring it back in line with that ideal of justice. This particular position clearly influenced 
the Third World engagement with international law addressed in Chapter Four, but for 
the purposes of this chapter it simply resurrects the indeterminacy of legal argument as 
open to all kinds of reformist measures. The argument of this thesis is that such a 
position would, in theory, make revolutionary praxis and legal praxis entirely 
compatible. Yet the commodity form theory of law implies that the kernel of law in 
exchange relations points to a ‘dull compulsion’ within the law that might constitute the 
limits of the legal form for praxis. The intimate relationship between the legal form, 
relations of exchange, and the background social conditions necessary for the function 
of capitalism foreground a direct contradiction between legal praxis and revolutionary 
praxis as discussed in Chapter One. 
This does not mean that revolutionary praxis necessarily collapses into a form of (non-
ideal based) legal nihilism. Knox’s critique of Mieville offers further constructive 
material here. Knox adopts Lenin’s pragmatic approach to the law, as a ‘principled 
opportunism’.244 This is also based upon further reading of Pashukanis. It is in part 
driven by theory, but also by the recognition that  
progressive forces often wield a great deal of economic power internal to the 
bourgeois state (and internationally). It is possible to imagine a situation in 
which a pattern of economic ‘sabotage’, strikes, and so on by these actors could 
force a state to adopt a particular ‘interpretation’ of the law. [Additionally], 
there is the argument that a concern with legitimacy and consistency might be 
manifested on the part of those interpreting the law.245 
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It is worth noting this primarily for the second observation. This stems from 
Pashukanis’s own practical and theoretical engagement with law in the early years of 
the Soviet experience. More of this will be addressed in Chapter Three of this thesis, but 
it is also essential to the argument being made here. Pashukanis is generally seen as 
holding to a position, misinterpreted as a kind of legal nihilism, in which the legal form 
must wither away with the passing of capitalist relations. Yet for Pashukanis this did not 
mean that the law was inimical to the revolutionary struggle. 
[F]or the petit bourgeois revolutionary the very denial of legality is turned into a 
kind of fetish, obedience to which supplants both the sober calculation of the 
forces and conditions of struggle and the ability to use and strengthen even the 
most inconsequential victories in preparing for the next assault. The 
revolutionary nature of Leninist tactics never degenerated into the fetishist 
denial of legality . . . On the contrary . . . he firmly appealed to use those ‘legal 
opportunities’ which the enemy . . . was forced to provide.246 
This frames Knox’s principled opportunism. Yet in Pashukanis’s work this quote is 
preceded by the following observation. ‘The struggle to overthrow and unmask the 
legalistic fetish of the system, against which the revolutionary struggle is conducted, is a 
quality of every revolutionary.’247 There are two components to this. The second, 
highlighted by the critical work of CLS and the New Stream in International Legal 
Theory, is the oft noted process of ‘unmasking’, ‘disenchanting’ or ‘demystifying’. The 
former tends to be either not be a shared political project, or is taken to have no direct 
relationship to the law beyond its pragmatic use at various junctures. 
VI: Revolutionary Praxis in Law  
However, if we are talking about revolutionary praxis and the law, then both elements 
of Pashukanis’s formulae are essential. This is simply another way of assessing the 
capability of law, structured by the foregoing discussion, to provide an arena for 
revolutionary praxis. Miéville’s take on Pashukanis does not leave much space for 
‘progressive’ visions of the law. In many cases it seems this has been at the root of 
critical responses to both Pashukanis’s original theory, and Miéville’s resurrection of it 
for modern day international law.248 The fact seems to remain, for some legal theorists, 
that the law at some various points either makes a progressive ruling or has a generally 
positive effect. Simultaneously, it remains open and accommodating to progressive 
arguments articulated in legal terms. However a deeper appreciation of the early 
sketches of Pashukanis’s theory and Miéville’s work gives cause for doubt. Pashukanis 
notes the ‘gravity’ within law that draws it back to its root in exchange relations. It is 
this gravitational pull that colours all public legislation with the hues of capitalist 
exploitation.  
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The specific form that this takes is precisely in the non-coercive coercive relations 
enabled by and elided by the law. Its abstract neutrality obscures material inequalities 
of substantive effect. This is far from a novel critique of the law, and it must be 
acknowledged that development of public law creates all kind of space for extenuating 
circumstances to alter the basic level playing field of legal reasoning. There is no arguing 
with the fact, in the vein that Kay and Mott note, that victories of the working class can 
at times be enshrined in law, and serve to tip the scales somewhat in the favour of 
labour at various points of negotiation. But what these victories do not radically 
transform are those areas accepted as immutable, the basic background relations in 
which some are denied access to the means to reproduce life and have nothing other 
than their wage labour to sell and, crucially, the veneer of choice that papers over this 
dispossession. It is in this way that the exploitative relations of capitalism, in their 
material content, are extra-legal facts. 
The question remains, then, as to the possibility of legal argument to effect this 
situation. There are two possible avenues where this could occur, at least in theory. One 
of which was touched on by Isaac Balbus, and also indirectly by Alan Stone, although 
both fail to develop an effective idea of revolutionary legal praxis in the sense 
developed in this thesis. In essence, any revolutionary approach to altering this 
relationship would involve challenging the background conditions that enable the 
exploitative relations of capitalism. Other forms of legal struggle could constitute 
interventions into the conditions under which labour may be sold, for example, which 
tinker with process of production but do not transform their capitalist nature. The 
gravity noted by Pashukanis threatens to overbear such interventions as discussed 
earlier. The most immediate way of challenging these background conditions through 
the law, and that mentioned by both Balbus and Stone, is through radically questioning 
the basis of property ownership and the contractual basis of exchange – both, in 
essence constituting a form of redistribution. Property may be transferred from one to 
a collective, or abolished in large part altogether; questioning contractual obligations, 
for example rendering debt obligations void, thereby dispossess the creditor and enacts 
another form of redistribution. 
This raises the most obvious and explicit way in which a progressively minded lawyer 
could engage in redistributive activities. In a straightforward way, a case could be 
constructed and put before a court with the aim of securing a ruling in favour of some 
kind of redistribution. This is something that will be dealt with in greater depth in 
Chapter Four on the New International Economic Order, which quite explicitly involved 
attempts to make exactly this kind of legal argument within international law. Suffice to 
say at this stage that it is an open question about whether this process can ever be 
enacted in a radical sense. Individual transfers of property or bankruptcy proceedings 
do not threaten the function of capitalism per se, but temporarily alter the balance of 
exchange relations in the vein of the administrative interventions discussed above. As 
to the capacity in law for individual moments of apparently egalitarian rulings that 
engage in minor victories for oppressed people, the possibility of such cases is not being 
questioned here. 
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This discussion highlights a crucial element of revolutionary praxis and the legal form. 
Revolutionary praxis demands the eventual overthrowing of the systemic oppressive 
function concerned – in this instance, capitalist relations. This specifically does not 
constitute an individual, isolated legal victory; in Kay and Mott’s terms: working class 
power ‘post festum’. The reason is simple. Such a legal victory does not challenge the 
broader relations of exploitative wage labour. It is simple to envisage analogous 
scenarios in other areas of law. For example, general bankruptcy laws may offer an 
individual the chance to escape some particularly odious debt. This issue will resurface 
in both Chapters Three and Four. However, what is essential to reiterate at this stage is 
the fact that the legal form is not inhospitable to the exceptional victory of a working 
class principle, say a higher minimum wage, or administrative interventions in the 
length of the working day; yet what it does appear to be inhospitable to, for example, 
would be a serious questioning of the validity of human labour power as a commodity 
and the property constellation that necessitates it.  
i) Beyond Disenchantment 
When it comes to more radically transformative efforts than exceptional interventions, 
it would appear that there is more at stake. However, much of the legal theory on this 
front has taken a common line with the previous discussion that aimed to delegitimate 
elements of the legal order. What pushes this in the direction of revolutionary activity is 
when that delegitimation is directed towards fundamentally questioning the system 
represented by the law under critique. Without this element, critique in this vein simply 
collapses into the act of drawing attention to the iniquitous content of the law; thereby 
suggesting some kind of palliative remedy to its function. As with regard to Pashukanis’s 
quote above, this is not revolutionary praxis; rather it is reformist. Balbus captured this 
effectively: 
Those who would argue that delegitimation can result from the failure of law to 
live up to its "promises" (i.e., from the gap between its promises and its 
performance) fail to understand that the legitimation of the legal order is not 
primarily a function of its ability to live up to its claims or "redeem its pledges" 
but rather of the fact that its claims or pledges are valued in the first place. As 
long as "formality," "generality," and "equality before the law" are seen as 
genuine human values, even gross and systematic departures from these norms 
in practice will not serve to delegitimate the legal order as a whole, but will at 
most tend to delegitimate specific laws and specific incumbents of political 
office who are responsible for these laws.249 
This formulation is particularly important, especially when we consider the insight of 
the commodity form theory of law and the fundamental root of the legal form in 
formal, abstract relations of equality. For Balbus, contra the legal sociologists of his day, 
this meant that a ‘"critical analysis of the relationship between claim and reality,”… 
[was] not, in "itself a source of possible change towards a more humane society," unless 
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and until this "critical analysis" also entail[ed] a critique of the legitimacy of the value 
underlying the claim itself.'250 Confronting this underlying value system ‘thus 
presupposes a fundamental break with the values and (formal) mode of rationality of 
the legal form itself, a break which presupposes, in turn, at least an embryonic 
articulation of a qualitatively different set of values and mode of rationality.'251 
This is not an easy process. Balbus noted that one of the consequences of legal 
fetishism, that accompanies commodity fetishism, was that the laws constructed by 
social groups to govern them became seen as sacrosanct creators of social life. The 
commodity, although a product of creative human labour designed to fulfil human 
needs, ‘possesses the peculiar capacity of concealing its own essence from the human 
beings who live with it and by it.’252 The commodities appear to take on a life and 
meaning of their own, most especially in the form of their universal equivalent, money. 
That which is contingent then appears necessary and determinative. For Balbus,  
[w]hen Society is held to be a result of the Law, rather than the Law to be a 
result of one particular kind of society, then the Law by definition is 
unproblematical. Or, to put it another way, the answer to the legitimation 
question – why do citizens support the legal order? – is, above all, the fact that 
the citizens of this order ordinarily do not and cannot ask this question.253 
It could then be a process of revolutionary legal praxis to work within the law to open 
up this kind of questioning, to reveal the nature of law (and commodities) as our social 
products and therefore changeable. Balbus tends towards a semiotic decoding of the 
legal form as a fillip toward this kind of development.  
Insofar as the delegitimation of the legal form and the capitalist mode of 
production to which it is tied presupposes precisely the capacity of individuals 
who are dominated by this mode of production to perform such a decoding 
operation, [their] effort to develop such a decoding purports to contribute to 
the delegitimation of both the legal form and the capitalist mode of production, 
a delegitimation which is a necessary condition for the creation of a less 
abstract, more concrete, i.e., more human, society.254 
There arises a difficulty, therefore, in this approach. Although Balbus began by seeking a 
deeper questioning of the legal order, he slipped back into a similar process of 
delegitimation to that he considered inadequate. There was no real exploration of what 
a deeper questioning might involve exactly as legal praxis, and thus his contribution 
does not offer sufficient insight into assessing the arena of law as a location for 
revolutionary praxis.  
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ii) Confronting Essential Legal Relations 
Alan Stone offers a further account of the possibility of the deeper destabilization of law 
that proves useful. Stone’s work takes a lot from Pashukanis, although along with 
various other critics of the commodity form theory he held that the independence of 
judges and the existence of administrative law posed fundamental problems for the 
commodity form theory.255 For Stone,  
[t]he great merits of Pashukanis' analysis [were], first, its attempt to draw 
important connections and parallels between the economic structure and the 
legal superstructure. One need not accept his commodity theory of law to 
accept its insights into the legal subject, individual responsibility, and the 
structure of the legal system generally. Second, the analysis allow[ed] for the 
domination of the legal system by the dominant classes but avoid[ed] a crude 
instrumentalism in which members of the dominant classes always prevail[ed]. 
Third, in drawing the distinction between legal and technical rules, Pashukanis' 
analysis help[ed] to differentiate in a rudimentary way between the rules that 
sustain and define social relationships and those that aid a society's functioning. 
All societies want their trains to run on time.256 
Without overly rehashing the previous arguments on administration, it is again worth 
noting that it does not invalidate the commodity form theory to recognise that the law 
also represents an arena of social struggle in which there exist ‘laws that operate to 
restrain capitalist interests’.257 At the very least private (and capitalist) rights clash, and 
it is the clash of these interests (inherent in exchange) that the law structures and 
mediates. 
Nevertheless, Stone’s own formulation actually remained remarkably close to that of 
Pashukanis, and to later developments of this theory in the line of Miéville and Knox 
mentioned above. He drew a distinction between ‘essential legal relations’ that were 
essential to the function of both law and capitalism, and derivative subrelations. For 
Stone essential legal relations were property and contract. This derivative relationship 
of all non-essential legal relations mirrors the ‘gravity’ Pashukanis saw as exerting itself 
on public law in general. For Stone,  
[c]ourts, confronted with particular matters, accept the essential legal relation, 
consider the functions and purposes of the derivative subrelation, and then 
seek to render a best decision consistent with the derivative subrelation's 
principal function.258 [T]he essential legal relations are at their core respected, 
and those aspects of the legal superstructure that are isomorphic with elements 
of the economic base remain to foster the accumulation of wealth under 
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capitalism even if the segment of the capitalist class that controls public utilities 
cannot take full advantage of the subrelations ordinarily derived from them.259 
Stone’s point was that large differences were possible within the general frame of legal 
decisions that did not question the underlying essential legal relations – those essential 
to capitalism and closest to the essence of Pahuskanis’s commodity form. The result 
was a causational link, from the essential legal relation, that was at once 'complex, 
flexible and yet constraining'. Thus in Stone’s formulation, the legal profession 
constituted a group of people working within certain structural constraints provided 
through their social setting, class interests, possibly inertia etc. who thereby develop a 
jurisprudence that is at once open and yet structurally defined. For Stone this 
represents no particular conspirational mindset or even conscious affiliation with any 
class or group.260 What is noteworthy is that the development of said structure, through 
a 'multitude of variously motivated human agents', occurred for Stone within a broad 
system open to mistakes, deviances, and subversion.261 Such subversion was inevitable, 
especially as this legal system was also reflective of a particular location for the struggle 
of interest, and thus marginal victories would be possible that had the result of being 
more or less 'efficient' for capital, but nonetheless entirely compatible with a broadly 
capitalist society. 
For Stone this process was almost always (but not exclusively) descendingly hierarchical. 
Stone's example is negotiable instruments, where each particular decision would not 
ordinarily challenge the subrelation of negotiability, nor even approach the essential 
relation of contract. It is in this way that the essential base relations were reinforced. 
What then emerged, for Stone, was the possibility of those essential legal relations 
being challenged. This would signal that the broader social system was under threat.262 
Thus the justice (and origin) of private property may be challenged, or the distributive 
consequences of freely agreed binding contracts. Of course the legal profession would 
rarely champion the challenge to essential social (legal) relations unless, as unlikely as it 
may seem, they were engaged in revolutionary praxis. 
Such a challenge occurs when the "justice" of the allocative biases inherent in 
essential legal relations is subject to question. The conception of contract, for 
example, includes the notions that people are "free" to enter into them and 
that, with only certain exceptions, the terms arranged by the parties must not 
be upset by courts. An alternative ethic which is [potentially] inimical to the 
capitalist system would have the state determine the "correct" terms for every 
bargain in the context of some theory of distributive justice.263 
This combines effectively with G. A. Cohen, who noted that the concept of property 
could equally be open to a far more fundamental challenge:  
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every actual piece of private property . .. either is or is made of something 
which was once the private property of no one. . . . We must ask, apart from 
how he in particular got it, how the thing came to be (anyone's) private 
property in the first place, and examine the justice of that transformation.264 
This offers a parallel with Balbus’ focus on delegitimation, which foregrounds the need 
for Stone’s formula to include further steps in order to carry revolutionary content. It 
also brings up an interesting parallel with international law discussed by Miéville. 
Miéville notes that ‘[d]omestically, lawyers may argue with the state that their client is 
not guilty of a particular crime, but it is virtually impossible for them to argue that the 
category of action itself is not in fact a crime. This, however, is not so for international 
law, where there is no monopoly even on that primary level of interpretation.’265 
Miéville goes on to discuss reprisals, but the immediate parallel with discussion here 
remains on a more abstract level. If, as Stone argued, the rarest and most fundamental, 
and therefore the most threatening, challenge to a legal system comes from 
questioning the most essential legal relations, then we are faced with a further situation 
in which international law may offer an exemplary point for legal theory more generally 
and a locus strangely more open to revolutionary praxis. 
This point of challenge also offers the possibility of encompassing both the 
‘overthrowing’ of the law and simultaneously its ‘delegitimation’. This would depend on 
the line of argument taken, and the more general approach to law. In terms of legal 
strategies, this also opens up the possibility of a legal praxis aimed at the eventual 
unravelling of legal argument. What is really at stake is the broader systemic function of 
the law, and the ability to challenge that in legal terms. Whether or not we really see 
this at the international level would seem to be a question of extensive historical work, 
which in part informs the Third and Fourth Chapters that follow. But this would miss the 
crucial elements of the commodity form theory that inform this thesis as a whole. It 
would not suffice to find moments in the international legal contestation where an 
exceptional moment of disruptive legal discourse occurred. This would have to strike 
deeper to the function of international law more broadly.  
Such revolutionary praxis would, in Stone’s language, involve overturning those 
essential legal relations – property and contract. Now it is evident that in setting the 
criteria thusly, there will be no historical cases that reach the bar. But in assessing the 
hospitability of the legal form to praxis that points in this direction (revolutionary 
praxis), it is not necessary to trace a historical example of the abolition of all property 
rights and contractual obligations – which in that instance would constitute the 
complete collapse of international law. Rather, it is necessary to see if, in those 
moments when the contestation of the broader functions of international law was most 
heated (the two examples in this thesis), the logic behind the legal arguments put 
forward had in it a tendency towards revolutionary outcomes. That is, would such 
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arguments serve to have overturned the system, based on their own logic? And 
crucially, in doing so did they remain comprehensible within the legal form.  
VII: Conclusion 
This Chapter has opened engagement with international law as a field of praxis, with 
the aim of understanding the potential limits it might hold for revolutionary praxis 
discussed in the previous chapter.  In order to ask this question the nature of 
international law, and more broadly law, is of central concern. It is for this reason that 
this chapter is immediately concerned with legal theory. The central framing thematic is 
such that progressive lawyers maintain a strong faith in the redemptive, emancipatory 
or even revolutionary potential of the law. They see no specific reason internal to the 
legal form to discount its ability to serve these kinds of ends. There is no reason ‘of 
principle’, why certain rights cannot trump others, and therefore it is simply a matter of 
privileging socially progressive rights to unlock the progressive potential of the law.  
This Chapter has argued that this has much in common with a view of law as a 
progressively developed social relation that can be gradually transformed from a 
legitimation of power to a restraint on the powerful and a shield for the weak. This is a 
perspective particularly apt to the international sphere, lacking the determining 
influence of an over-arching authority. This Chapter has presented the argument that 
this perceived openness of law to progressive lawyering and legislation is a product of 
legal ambiguity that, in this perspective, is gradually eroded in favour of a developed 
system of rules as the law evolves. For progressively minded lawyers, the immediate 
task is then to strengthen international legal rules and institutions. Although it is 
generally left implicit, this is modelled upon a conception of Western Liberal 
Democracies as a model of advanced legal systems, towards which international law 
may progress (and even surpass), given sufficient political will and progressively minded 
legal activism. 
Against this kind of vision, this chapter has summarized various critical strands in both 
legal and international legal theory. The most powerful of these critiques have tended 
to stress the inherent indeterminacy of legal discourse, and thereby disenchant the kind 
of vision of law articulated in the preceding paragraph. There are two kinds of 
consequences to this critical move. The first is to leave open the question of the law’s 
progressive potential, whilst noting that the indeterminacy of law enables it to serve a 
variety of ends. The second is to force an explanation for the general tendency of the 
law to serve more conservative ends than progressive ones. A variety of excellent 
critical moves have built upon this at the international legal level, aiming to explain 
international law’s complicity with systems of patriarchy, continued colonial 
exploitation, racism and imperialism. However, these critiques have much in common 
with legal sociology, in that their explanation for the conservative function of law is 
located externally to the legal form per se. In this sense, this work does not offer the 
most effective theoretical frame for assessing the potential limits that law as field of 
praxis might hold for revolutionary praxis. 
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In order to achieve this, this chapter has turned to an analysis of law that notes an 
essential identity between the legal form and the commodity form – that the legal form 
is simply the other side to the economic frame of the exchange relation. Although this 
could, in part, be read as a further turn to the ‘outside’ of law, this both misrepresents 
this theory of law (the economic relation and the legal relation are not separable), but 
also relies upon an entirely empty conception of law that is to be maintained as 
separable from all other considerations. As a result this chapter has argued that the 
commodity form theory of law offers the most effective theory for assessing the 
potential limits law holds for revolutionary praxis. This Chapter has then presented a 
summary of the commodity form theory, drawing on the work of scholars such as 
Miéville who first developed it at a more sophisticated level for international legal 
theory. However, it has noted that this particular development of the theory has a 
tendency to foreground force as a determining influence on the law, as especially at the 
international level the prevalence of a self-help system appears to privilege militarily 
powerful actors. The centrality of coercion, and its role in law, is undeniable. But the 
specific way in which this manifests in international law is not wholly served by the 
theory presented by Miéville – as a reduction to power balances between states.  
This chapter has argued that even a broader conception of ‘force’, encompassing 
economic and ideological elements, fails to entirely account for the specificity of law in 
these relations, and therefore that for the purposes of this thesis a slightly different 
angle is necessary. This is because of the unique way in which capitalist exploitation is 
constructed as an extra-legal fact. This does not mean that the initial conditions for 
exploitation were not constructed legally, but that once they are in place their 
acquisition is shifted within legal terms. For example, private property and contractual 
exchange are predicated on the extra-legal inequalities of bargaining position embodied 
in the opposition between capital and labour. It thus seems to be a logical implication 
that legal measures which radically altered that bargaining position such that the 
opposition between capital and labour could no longer function – entirely 
decommodified labour, for example – would severely threaten the broader system of 
legal relations. Stone notes that the more these ‘essential’ legal relations are 
challenged, the closer we approach a potentially radical upheaval. These debates can 
surface in the way Cohen notes with a challenge to the ownership of property or land, 
but also on the international plane with the debate over what constitutes legitimate 
coercion (reprisals, economic coercion, overt force) and under what conditions 
contractual obligations can be imposed. It therefore seems that a progressive, and 
potentially revolutionary legal praxis would aim to target and challenge these 
underlying structures, to fundamentally strike at the original ownership of property for 
example, or the very concept itself.  
One of the consequences of this would be that the successful legal measures would 
constantly walk the line between being rendered exceptional, and thus non-
revolutionary, and threatening the broader system of legal relations themselves. This 
particular element will resurface regarding the Soviet legal practice, as shall be clear in 
the following Chapter. Coupled with this, any ‘gains’ made by such legal measures 
would also undermine themselves through undermining the very legal structures in 
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which success has been achieved. Thus revolutionary legal praxis offers a strong 
countervailing tendency within its very approach. This again offers a further caution as 
to the depth of law’s ‘revolutionary potential’.  
Furthermore, with revolutionary praxis aimed at transforming capitalist relations and 
the commodity form theory revealing the inextricable relationship between exchange 
relations (and thereby capitalism) and legal relations there is an intuitive opposition 
between revolutionary praxis and legal praxis. It is clear that the huge amount of critical 
work that has been undertaken aimed at ‘disenchanting’ the positive liberal image of 
law has had a role in building some deeper appreciation of exploitation and the role of 
law in enabling and veiling it. But this is not revolutionary praxis, as Pashukanis made 
clear. The implications are that revolutionary praxis takes place elsewhere than law, but 
that simultaneously the necessity of law cannot be avoided. But it is still necessary to 
understand in what ways the legal form relates to revolutionary praxis, and how, if at 
all, such praxis might make an imprint on the law. The Soviet example in the Chapter 
that follows provides a case of explicitly revolutionary activity (at least in the early 
years) that engaged with international law out of necessity. Chapter Four addresses a 
moment where the activity was more explicitly directed at the law, yet was also less 
explicitly revolutionary in its intent. Both contain elements of a potentially revolutionary 
praxis, and combined offer a picture of the limits of law for those with revolutionary 
intent.  
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Chapter 3: The Soviet Relationship to International Law 
 
I: Introduction 
This chapter analyses the Soviet266 relationship to international law, aiming to 
understand if the legal form offered any limits to potential revolutionary legal praxis. 
Chapters One and Two inform this discussion in the following way. Primarily, the 
discussion of revolution and its inherent link to praxis and human agency draws 
attention specifically to the fact that Soviet actors considered themselves to be 
revolutionaries. It is indisputable that, rhetorically at the very least, Soviet legal 
theorists and foreign policy makers were working within a revolutionary praxis. 
Whether or not this was successful is beside the point. As Anderson’s discussion of 
agency highlights, it is the aims of the praxis at hand that are of importance.  
Although the target of this thesis is legal praxis, it is not easy to separate this from other 
areas of engagement. Particularly in relation to the Soviet Union, legal praxis simply 
existed on a continuum of revolutionary praxis. As we shall see in the ensuing 
discussions on Soviet legal theory, and already made clear in the discussion of 
Pashukanis in Chapter Two, the legal part of this continuum was not considered by 
Soviet revolutionaries to be the prime location of revolutionary activity. It was 
nevertheless a necessary one, and to answer the question at hand this Section will turn 
to the Soviet relationship to international law. This relationship has been characterised, 
by both early Soviet and Western writers, as the Soviet ‘approach’ to international law. 
This very idea of an ‘approach’ to international law contains a wealth of problematic 
assumptions, and will be addressed throughout this chapter. Yet the purpose of the 
following analysis is to assess the impact of legal practice from a period of time and by 
actors that were, indisputably, framing their engagement as revolutionary praxis. This 
cannot be done without understanding what is taken to constitute this Soviet approach, 
and to seek historical and theoretical explanations for this understanding. Therefore a 
large Section of this chapter will be devoted to this task.  
This will also be informed by the preceding discussion of international law as an arena 
of praxis. This draws attention to specific kinds of legal praxis as potentially indicative of 
a revolutionary intent: the delegitimation of existing legal norms, likely involving 
challenging the objectivity of the law; the explicit reference to the law’s function as 
serving capitalist interests; and in some way an ultimate objective of overthrowing the 
law. We see all these elements in early Soviet references to international law, in calls 
for world revolution, the rejection of certain existing international norms, and the 
constant attempt to expose the complicity between the function of international law 
and the imperialist activities of capitalist states. However, as will be made clear, 
although this discourse was present, it was also accompanied by both the use of 
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international law and the articulation of a series of theoretical understandings about 
both existing international law and its relationship to the new revolutionary body of the 
Soviet Union.  
As we shall see, this particular relationship between revolution and international law – 
between the revolutionary overthrow of the law and the immediate use of the law – 
feeds heavily into the construction of a Soviet ‘approach’  to international law that may 
be differentiated from an implied ‘standard’ approach.  Section III addresses this, 
discussing how the uniqueness of the Soviet approach has been characterised by 
scholars in three interrelated ways. In the first instance, the Soviet state was 
understood to have a general disregard for international law. In this view, the Soviet 
perspective of international law was as law made by capitalist states, to serve the 
interests of capitalism and imperialism. For analyses of the Soviet approach, an almost 
inevitable corollary of this disregard was the breach of the international obligations of 
the Russian state by the Bolshevik government. Secondly the Soviet approach to 
international law was seen to involve the subordination of law to policy. International 
law was simply a tool that all states used to pursue their own interests internationally, 
and as such offered no significant restriction on the actions of the Soviet state. Thirdly 
the Soviet approach was seen to be highly positivist in theoretical orientation.267 In this 
perspective the Soviet government rejected the customary norms of international law, 
focusing exclusively on those areas of international law that most unequivocally 
expressed state consent, namely treaties.268 Finally the three perspectives just outlined 
are qualified by the recognition of a certain level of later convergence between 
whatever characterised the initial Soviet approach, and international law more broadly 
conceived. As the number and nature of states participating in the creation of 
international law increased and diversified, both ‘general’ international law and the 
Soviet position are considered to have moderated into closer alignment. 
These characteristics of the Soviet approach sit uneasily with the critical perspectives on 
international law discussed in Chapter Two.  The indeterminacy thesis builds upon the 
idea that for every legal argument, there is a counter argument. As discussed this 
implies that any outcome for a particular case can be supported by a legal argument. As 
a theoretical statement about international legal argument in general, the insights of 
this approach hold valid for the Soviet engagement with international law. The 
indeterminacy thesis does not state that international law has become indeterminate as 
a result of some contemporary development; say for example the fragmentation of 
international law. But rather that international legal argument is fundamentally 
indeterminate.269 If we take this seriously, then the perception that the Soviet approach 
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to international law involved (at least rhetorical) disregard for its strictures, and breach 
of obligations in the eyes of its opponents, has to be qualified. At the very least we 
would have to assume that valid legal arguments were available to justify the Soviet 
position. Whether or not they were invoked would be a different matter; one which 
could then offer support for the rhetorical aspect of this perception of the Soviet 
approach. As this Chapter will demonstrate, those legal arguments were both available 
and utilized by the Soviet state. 
The second and third perceptions, of a Soviet subordination of law to policy, and a 
highly positivist Soviet approach, are in some sense direct opposites of one another. 
This should lead to a level of uneasiness in their being lumped together as effective 
descriptions of the same object. Legal positivism suspends the necessary conceptual 
connection between law and morality or ethics, as a more or less direct challenge to the 
theory of natural law.270 But positivism nevertheless maintains that law is concretely 
discernable (and reasonably determinate) through established mechanisms, be that the 
command of an overall sovereign body backed by force, accordance with a fundamental 
grundnorm, or as rules governing conduct created and altered in accordance with 
established secondary rules.271  
This is far from the same thing as seeing law as subordinated to policy; something most 
clearly expressed in McDougal and Lasswell’s New Haven Approach, which finds its 
intellectual heritage with the American legal realists.272 In this light it is somewhat 
problematic to describe the Soviet approach as simultaneously positivist in its focus on 
treaties, and yet subordinating international law to its policy concerns. This is not to say 
that such a confluence is impossible; clearly the Soviet state could sign and propose 
treaties that were somehow subordinate to the needs of its policy objectives, but this is 
not the same thing as the New Haven Schools’ subordination (and alignment) of 
international law with the social (or moral and ethical) goals of a postulated ideal 
society. Similarly, neither of these two perspectives sits easily with the Soviet approach 
being characterised as having a  disregard for international law – legal positivism clearly 
attaches importance to law, and even if law is subordinate to policy aims it nevertheless 
represents an important vehicle for enacting that policy. In addition, adopting either of 
these perspectives requires the maintenance of hermetic spheres of policy or law, 
leaving us with no way to understand the potentially mutually constitutive relationship 
between them.  
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There are a variety of explanatory possibilities for the above characterisations. Firstly 
that they are all distinct, articulated by different people at different times and that the 
object of their study – the Soviet ‘approach’ to international law – changed with them. 
Perhaps in the early years following the revolution the Soviet government disregarded 
international law; at a later date it was positivist and claimed international law was only 
what could be found in treaties, and that these bound only those expressly consenting 
to them; and subsequently, at an even later date, the Soviet Union subordinated all of 
international law to its policy considerations. One could even map this onto a possible 
historical narrative of the revolution – from War Communism, to the New Economic 
Programme, to Stalin’s particular rule. A second possibility is similar to that above, but 
differs in that one of the perceptions accurately described the Soviet approach to 
international law, whereas the others were somehow mistaken in their analyses. In this 
event, perhaps the Soviet approach was to continuously disregard, or espouse a 
disregard for, international law. As a consequence of its disregard for custom, some 
observers might then have detected a positivist focus on treaty; as a result of its generic 
disregard for restrictions posed by international law, perhaps others perceived the 
subordination of that law to policy.  
A third possibility would be that all of the above perceptions were accurate 
descriptions, to differing degrees at various times. This account creates space for 
contradictions within the Soviet approach, and within the state itself. It would also 
allow for variation over time; for each perspective to have a degree of accuracy rather 
than an absolute purchase. Finally this would draw attention to the concrete 
circumstances in every instance. In this event, different factions within the Soviet 
government may have wished to disregard international law, others to restrict 
obligation to treaties, and some to use international law as a vehicle for state interest. 
This is a more persuasive account, and as we shall see manages to incorporate some of 
the ways in which quite incompatible positions were forced together in the early years 
of the revolution as very divergent needs were catered for. These expressed themselves 
directly in early Soviet debates over the nature of law, and translated in interesting 
ways into Soviet international legal arguments and the foreign policy of the Soviet state. 
Section III of this chapter will be devoted to describing these processes, and how they 
feed into the characterisations of the Soviet approach described above. 
However this explanation is not particularly satisfying in theoretical terms. It 
incorporates and aligns perspectives that have important differences of inflection, and 
as a result will overlook the insights that stem from debates between those 
epistemologies.273 Furthermore there is no explanatory mechanism involved. Most 
particularly for the concerns of this thesis, this explanation does not offer any insights 
into the potential limits of the legal form for revolutionary praxis. In addition it also 
sidelines the issue of potential convergence. Without any broader frame linking 
elements of continuity, how are we to assess the claim of convergence, to understand 
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what sort of characteristics such convergence might have, or even to understand what 
elements have been ‘dropped’ to facilitate such alignment? This is where the 
methodology of revolutionary legal praxis becomes essential. By identifying a set of 
practices and theoretical approaches with what was ‘revolutionary’ in the early period 
we can begin to categorise those conflicting elements involved in the third explanation, 
along with characteristics of the Soviet approach incorporated therein. In addition we 
can begin to assess what ‘convergence’ might involve, by tracing continuities between 
early Soviet practice and the general practice of international law. We would then have 
a method of assessing how what was ‘revolutionary’ about the early Soviet approach 
interacted with international law more broadly, and whether or not these elements 
were included in any potential convergence.274 This will be the task of the final Section 
of this chapter.  
Before discussing the Soviet approach in detail, it is necessary to provide some of the 
context for both the concept of revolution in Europe at this time, and the ways in which 
this fed into the domestic legal debates within the Soviet Union. The international legal 
praxis of the Soviet Union did not spring from a vacuum, and it is essential to have some 
grasp of the background conditions in order to understand how something like the 
Soviet ‘approach’ to international law came into existence. This background will offer an 
examination of the tumultuous context of revolutionary struggle in Europe at the time, 
which offers an important context to the legal arguments that form the foundation of 
the Soviet ‘approach’. The second part of the background narrative will engage with 
some early domestic debates on law, as these have tended to be lost in translation 
when it comes to discussion in international legal theory. 
II: Background – Revolution, Foreign Policy and the Law  
i) Revolutionary Reality 
Much of Soviet international legal praxis is only understandable in the context of 
revolution across Europe itself. This is not to note successful instances of ‘revolution’, 
but rather the pervasive sense of revolution as discussed in Chapter One, leading to the 
consistent push for emancipation by the oppressed multitude against the European 
aristocracy, land-owners and capitalists. Politics became increasingly polarized while 
haunted by this spectre, and these divisions played a key role in the background of the 
early Soviet Union.275 It is not possible to consider the international law of the period as 
separate from the reality of this particular struggle, which again, in line with the 
discussion from Chapter One, is framed by the struggles of the nineteenth century.276 
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There are several key features to draw attention to, as they inform the following 
discussion on the Soviet relationship to international law. Firstly, the Bolshevik 
revolution occurred in the context of broader revolutionary struggles across Europe 
following the First World War. The revolution in Russia represented but one element of 
the broader European struggle, and served as a fillip to these movements. It was an 
accepted fact for the revolutionaries in Russia that their revolution was part of a 
broader movement, and many held doubts as to the likelihood of their survival if 
successful revolutionary struggles did not spread.277 
Soviet foreign policy, to which international law would be subordinated in many 
interpretations of the Soviet ‘approach’, was shaped around these early realities, and 
the reception of both the new Soviet state and reactions to these policies were similarly 
influenced by other European reactions to the possibility of revolutionary contagion. 
Early Soviet policy was oriented towards immediate survival, tactical manoeuvring 
within Europe, and the immediate propagation of socialist revolution. The perilous 
nature of the immediate situation meant that Soviet foreign and domestic policies were 
seen as part of a necessary whole.278 In Lenin’s view there existed divisions within the 
‘consorita of capitalist states’ that were to be targeted by this Soviet foreign policy.279 
They were to take advantage of the class divisions within capitalist states, the 
competing economic interests of these states, and more general inter-imperialist rivalry 
(the only thing in Lenin’s view that allowed the Soviet Union to survive the early 
years),280 alongside the divisions between the Great Powers and their colonies. His firm 
belief in the revolutionary capacity of the colonies also provides a background to early 
Soviet views on self-determination. It is important to note that this was also not simply 
a pragmatic exercise, but also connected with broader socialist principles of the time.281 
The context outside of the revolutionary state was also highly combustible. As Sandra 
Halperin notes,  
[f]ollowing World War I, Western states confronted, in addition to a Bolshevik 
revolution abroad, newly organized and more powerful labor (sic) movements 
at home. In 1919, a new revolutionary movement – the Third International – 
was formed under the auspices of Lenin and the Russian Bolsheviks; mass 
communist parties emerged in France, Germany, and Italy; and Hungary briefly 
became a communist country. In Britain, the red flag was raised on the town 
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hall in Glasgow, and the British War Cabinet feared that a Bolshevik revolution 
was being attempted.282 
In 1919 the UK Home Office conducted a ‘survey of revolutionary feeling’,283 in which 
the Russian revolution figured among the antagonising causes. Worker’s strikes 
occurred across Europe,284 taking on a hard political edge against anti-Soviet 
intervention. Halperin notes that when Poland invaded the Soviet Union in 1920 against 
the ‘menace of Bolshevism’, ‘the Allied powers supported them by sending shipments 
of munitions and numerous contingents of military advisers.’285 She goes on to note 
that  
Strikes in 1920 became decidedly political in nature as workers repeatedly came 
into conflict with the government over British support for Poland in the Polish-
Russian War… On May 10, dockers engaged in loading a freighter with 
munitions for Poland struck work with the support of their union and the coal-
trimmers refused to coal the vessel. A week later the Dockers’ Union put a 
general ban on the loading of munitions for use against Poland. On July 21, 
British troops broke a strike of dockers at Danzig against the landing of 
munitions for the Poles. On August 7, Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, sent a 
note threatening the Soviet government with war if the advance of the Red 
Army was not halted. The next day Labour Party headquarters telegraphed all 
local parties and trade union councils urging demonstrations against war with 
Russia. The result was nation-wide demonstrations.286 
The repression of the left across Europe in response to these events was extreme. 
Halperin notes explicitly that ‘[t]he rise of socialist radicalism, and in particular the 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, tended to drive all of Europe’s relatively 
privileged or well to-do groups and elements into one antirevolutionary coalition.'287 
Victor Serge also claimed that, during the ‘White Terror’, as many as a quarter of 
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Finland’s working class may have been massacred or imprisoned.288 Repression was 
Europe wide: 
In Britain, special laws were passed to repress strikers (1927) [in addition to the 
considered use of the Royal Air Force in 1920]; troops and police were sent to 
put down strikers in France (1919, 1920), Yugoslavia (1920), and Switzerland 
(1932). In Sweden and Norway, troops were used against strikers. In Germany, 
the government used the remnants of the army and right-wing veterans groups 
to crush revolutionary activity (1922, 1923, 1929, 1931–1932).289 
It is also noteworthy that these repressive measures occurred within the Soviet Union 
itself, thus this was not a picture simply of the repression of revolutionary forces, but of 
the violent clash of social forces including those of a revolutionary approach struggling 
to consolidate their position.290 It is within this context that Soviet foreign policy, and 
the closely linked Soviet ‘approach’ to international law, must be placed.  
Most accounts of Soviet foreign policy recognise firstly the perceived necessity of the 
spread of revolution abroad, coupled with immediate survival, which over time shifted 
as revolution abroad was crushed and the Soviet state withstood counter-revolutionary 
civil war.291 In the early years this position was articulated by Chicherin as a complete 
absence of foreign policy – the task was simply to publish all secret documents, make 
revolutionary calls abroad, and shut up shop.292 As such the actual foreign policy of the 
Soviet state, and its relationship to international law, was seen as inconsistent, 
comprising a dualism of normal diplomatic relations whilst simultaneously encouraging 
subversion and revolution whenever the moment seemed propitious.293 Those more 
positively inclined saw 'an amalgam of ideology and expediency, utopian expectation 
and realistic calculation, daring innovation and classical diplomacy.'294 
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Many also agreed that, 'in a sense [it was] the Soviet state [that] survived and the 
revolution [that] perished';295 that 'the very process of defense (sic) of the revolution, 
disbursed, disorganized, [and] destroyed much of the social base of the revolution'.296 
This element offers potential insight into the common perception of ‘convergence’ 
between the Soviet ‘approach’ to international law and more general practice – namely 
that the Soviet approach converged with dominant legal practice alongside the death of 
revolutionary ideals. More importantly for the discussion at hand it suggests an inability 
of revolutionary praxis to penetrate the realm of international law. 
ii) Revolutionary Legality 
This revolutionary context was accompanied by new articulations of legal theory. Soviet 
legal scholars noted that it was only in the wake of the Soviet revolution that the first 
Marxist theories of law were articulated.297 Much of this is covered in the previous 
Chapter under the discussion of Pashukanis who was a prominent figure in this new 
movement, but it is important to make some clarifications here. Pashukanis was not the 
only Soviet legal scholar, although he did rise to such pre-eminence at the Moscow 
Institute of Soviet Law that one observer noted that his ‘textbook was the key to the 
study of legal philosophy, and his attitude toward law's future shaped the 
curriculum.’298 Pashukanis’s mentor prior to his rise was Pyotr Ivanovich Stu ka, and the 
nuances between their two approaches are important to note. Primarily this is because 
it was actually Stu ka’s take on the law that meshed more closely with what was later to 
be understood as the Soviet ‘approach’ to international law. Again, this was an 
approach which was asserted by some Soviet scholars, but also read into Soviet foreign 
policy by Western commentators through their expectations and interpretations of 
what they saw as the Soviet approach.  
Although their approaches had a difference in nuance, Stu ka was highly supportive of 
Pashukanis. Pashukanis started out as Stu ka’s pupil, and Stu ka himself was considered 
part of the commodity exchange form of legal theory. Although as John Hazard noted 
this school enjoyed pre-eminence in the early years of the Soviet Union, it was an ill-
fated body of thought, coming into conflict with Stalin and Andrei Vyshinksky’s 
determination to expand the use of law in the late 1930s. As a result Stu ka, after his 
officially honoured death of natural causes in 1932, was ignored and vilified along with 
commodity exchange legal theory and theorists.299 Pashukanis himself disappeared in 
1936. Both Stu ka and Pashukanis were concerned with the immediate nature of law in 
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post-revolutionary Russia; with the practical necessities of legal control during the civil 
war, pitted against the potential anarchism of Decree No. 1 in 1917 that abolished the 
laws of Tsarist Russia.  
Their process of exposing the legal form to the scrutiny of revolutionary Marxism faced 
opposition from non-lawyers within the party. Such theory was seen to ‘smack of 
anarchism’, and to be ‘directed against [party] decrees’.300 In the end it was claimed: 
‘[w]hy touch this idyll of law... Who and how does it bother if a small amount of 
idealism remains…?’301 For early legal theorists in the Soviet Union like Stu ka, it was 
vital that this idealism be assaulted. For him the law and the form of the state were 
tools of class oppression and held a deep connection to imperialist rule and capitalist 
exploitation. For Stu ka, law was determined by the ruling class, through the state, and 
‘the state [was] a weapon in the hands of the ruling class for holding the suppressed 
classes in subordination’.302 It was here where Pashukanis and Stu ka diverged, 
respectively representing the radical and more moderate wings of the commodity 
exchange school, although they remained a united front against ‘foreign bourgeois 
jurists and their domestic allies.’303 As noted, despite Pashukanis’s pre-eminence at 
home, it was Stu ka’s perspective that saw all law as class law that achieved greater 
longevity – at least until the later rediscovery of the commodity form of law.304 This was 
summed up by Tumanov at the 1930 Georgian Conference on law, arguing that 
‘Marxists assert that law is carried out in practice by means of coercion and violence, 
because all law is class law, and the law of a class without coercion is not a law’. Added 
to this was the following cautionary note against academicism: ‘understand that in our 
country of proletarian dictatorship, in the epoch of an intensified class struggle… a calm 
academic presentation of the view of our enemies is unsuitable’.305  
Although Pashukanis would have shared elements of this view, it is clear from the 
earlier discussion in Chapter Two on the commodity form theory that this would only go 
so far. His theory of law held it to have an intimate relationship to capitalism, and 
therefore it was not simply a tool that served whichever class happened to be ruling. 
The legal form came with its own logic that operated independently of the interests of 
the ‘ruling class’. As has been mentioned repeatedly this has tended to be interpreted 
as a form of legal nihilism, but for Pashukanis this did not mean that law had to 
immediately disappear, nor that the legal form could be avoided or ignored. To do so 
would be another form of legal fetishism. However, for Pashukanis the presence and 
necessity of the legal form in social relations, especially its dominance of them, 
remained an indicator of the presence of capitalist relations of exchange and 
equivalence, and their important connection to the purchase of labour power. It was 
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this that set him apart from Stu ka in the later years of the revolution, and his 
adherence to this theory that likely aided his untimely end.  
For the discussion at hand, what it is important to highlight from Pashukanis is how his 
basic theory of law sat comfortably alongside the immediate task of defending the 
revolution and the relationship of this task to the law. Here Pashukanis relied heavily on 
the pragmatism of Lenin, demanding both the support of the law when it aided the 
revolutionary cause and the defensive use of the law against counter-revolutionary 
forces. Pashukanis noted that ‘Lenin brilliantly took into consideration the fact that the 
legality which our enemy imposes upon us is re-imposed on him by the logic of 
events.’306 Legal positions could also merge perfectly with victories forced by political 
and economic circumstance, as Pashukanis went on to note: ‘the German imperialists, 
whatever their subjective dislike of the Soviet revolution, were compelled by the force 
of the general international situation to conclude a treaty with the Soviet 
government.’307 The logic of this position stressed that there would be nothing to gain 
from denying the legal implications of the treaty, or the recognition of the Soviet Union, 
through some kind of moralistic distaste for law. 
Also Pashukanis took the class-rule element of the legal form to imply something 
particular in terms of legal strategy.  
[B]ourgeois legality is the consistent practice of class domination formed over 
decades and centuries. This standard "legal" form of domination can be 
destroyed or shaken by extraordinary events, but this still by no means signifies 
the necessary elimination of the organizational domination of the bourgeoisie 
itself… And if, as we know, bourgeois legality developed gradually – because of 
the work of a whole legion of parliamentarians, scholars, jurists, judges and civil 
servants – then it would be absurd to demand the same legal perfection and 
legality from proletarian power born yesterday and having to defend its very 
existence with weapons.308 
Pashukanis’s caution here was that to see ‘legality’ as simply a tool of class rule one 
would expect new and recognisably ‘legal’ measures to spring into place in the 
processes of a revolutionary shift. Against the standard of the previous class-
domination through law, proletarian rule would seem arbitrary and unlawful (or unlaw-
like). But Pashukanis stressed that the legal form was ‘not an empty sack that [could] be 
filled with a new class content.’309 It would take significant time to convert the apparent 
arbitrary nature of this rule into a recognisable (in the eyes of bourgeois legality) ‘legal’ 
tradition. Crucially, for Pashukanis, this would be a both counter-revolutionary and 
pointless exercise – without the social relations of exchange and capitalist production, 
the legal forms thrown up by these relations would cease to have relevance (and wither 
away). In this passage, Pashukanis was instead arguing for two moves in relation to the 
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law. Firstly to foreground the fact bourgeois rule remains at heart an arbitrary exercise 
of power, for all its legal justifications of rule and apparent due process. The second 
step is a defensive one – to justify the exigencies of the moment against liberal 
accusations of illegality.310 Challenging this process and yet also using legal rules where 
possible to maintain the gains of the revolution was a central process of Pashukanis’s 
approach to law. The defensive move was immediately necessary to defend the 
revolution, but this did not mean that revolutionary activity would be directed to 
building up a new legal tradition to match the standards of bourgeois law. 
Pashukanis’s vision on this front was informed by the following passage from Lenin, 
which drives home the hypocrisy involved in liberal claims against revolutionary 
uprisings: 
when in the course of centuries or decades all the bourgeois and the majority of 
the reactionary jurists of the capitalist countries developed detailed rules – 
wrote dozens and hundreds of volumes of laws and explanations of laws; 
oppressed the workers; enchained the poor; and placed thousands of cavils and 
obstructions in the path of any simple worker – then… the bourgeois liberals do 
not detect "arbitrariness" here! Here, there is "order" and "legality"… but when 
for the first time in history the working and exploited classes… created their 
own soviets, called to the task of political construction those classes that the 
bourgeoisie had subjugated, beaten and deadened; and began themselves to 
build a new proletarian state, standing amidst the dust of wild battle and in the 
fire of civil war, to outline the basic principles of a state without exploiters – 
then all the scoundrels of the bourgeoisie, the whole band of vampires… began 
to shout about "arbitrariness".311 
When it comes to revolutionary praxis and the law, the above considerations can serve 
as a form of blueprint, but only with the following caveat. Taking seriously the insights 
of the commodity form theory, and if we are talking about revolutionary praxis in the 
sense described in Chapter One, it is important to stress that, although a necessary tool 
in combating capitalist exploitation, legal struggle for the sake of law was not 
compatible with revolutionary aspirations. Therefore, for legal praxis to approximate 
revolutionary praxis it has to hold no investment in the law as ‘law’. 
III: The Soviet ‘Approach’ to International Law 
The above background picture is important for two reasons. Firstly it was the foreign 
policy of the Soviet state that was seen to dominate its international legal practice. 
Most accounts of the Soviet approach understand the theorizations of Soviet jurists as 
an attempt at after-the-fact justification of Soviet foreign policy. Therefore the notion 
that the Soviet state lacked a clear, coherent and ‘established’ foreign policy, due to its 
                                                          
310
 There are parallels here with Cohen’s discussion of property in law discussed in Chapter Two. 
All property, at some point and in an arbitrary manner, came to belong to someone, often in the 
form of violent expropriation or due to the absence of a pre-existing ‘legal’ claim. 
311
 V. I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky (Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1972), 63–4. Also in Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, 145. 
107 
 
nature as a transformed revolutionary state with different aims to Tsarist Russia feeds 
into the idea that its international legal practice was even further removed from 
‘standard’ practice of the time. It is important at the outset to challenge this idea that 
the Soviet state was uniquely incoherent. Although there were serious and changing 
circumstances that threatened the Soviet state in its early years, which offers some 
justification for a potentially inconsistent approach to its foreign policy, this remains 
unpersuasive as a general account. Early Soviet aims were relatively clear, and more or 
less consonant with general state foreign policy: survival of the state, and the 
promotion of the interests of the ruling groups abroad.312  
In this instance the ruling group of the Soviet state, although still struggling to maintain 
power against foreign invasion and domestic counter-revolution, happened to have an 
interest that they considered coincided with the working classes, or the oppressed and 
poorer peoples of the world – something which remains the exception in international 
politics. There is no real incoherence in this position, just different tactics that one 
might adopt to pursue these aims. Indeed, Lenin’s immediate claim to realpolitik for the 
proletariat made clear two things:313 firstly that in abstract terms the Soviet state was 
doing the same as all other states (in the immediately discussed sense); secondly that 
this was something generally denied to the position of the oppressed. Unquestioned 
cynical manipulation of others and the avid pursuit of self-interest were the privilege of 
secure capitalist states under the guise of normalcy – whereas the Soviet state, going 
about the same business, was read as an inconsistent and unruly international actor. 
However, in terms of assessing the Soviet approach and its contribution it is necessary 
to engage with the basic characterisation of difference, with the caveat that this was 
unpersuasive in light of the above. As will be made clear in the following discussion, 
there has been no persuasive attempt to provide a theoretical explanation for this 
approach of imposed difference in the face of what turns out to be evidence to the 
contrary. At the outset however, there are two categories that present themselves as 
possible explanations, although they do not operate with a rigorous theory of law. The 
first of these fits within a more general historical-cultural perspective, in which a Soviet 
‘approach’ to international law is conceptualised as part of an identifiable Russian 
tradition. This tradition is then constructed as distinct due to the unique Russian 
context, but depicted as holistically contributing to the development of a broader 
‘multicultural’ international law, alongside typical progressive narratives of the 
discipline’s flourishing following the Second World War and the later collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc. The antecedent move is then a simultaneous correction of dominant Euro-
centric conceptions of international law, especially in the context of claims that this 
European narrative dresses up the particular as universal, and a bolstering of that same 
narrative by re-writing it as one of inclusion and cooperation. Just as there are other 
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strong regional traditions of international law that have contributed to the formation of 
international law, so too is there a Russian tradition.314 
The second of these explanatory categories turns to Soviet practice and theory in 
international law in order to understand how this may have contributed to or hindered 
the development of general international law across the period of the Union’s 
existence. In this context the Soviet Union is again perceived as embodying a distinct 
approach to international law, a perspective from which one might extract progressive 
development of the law, or perceive intransigent practice that has hindered positive 
legal development pursued outside of the Soviet Bloc. These two perspectives can be 
seen manifest in the idea that the Soviet Union pushed for a unique (and progressive) 
concept of Self-Determination,315 and alternatively in the Soviet Union’s restrictive 
approach to international law – making too much of state sovereignty and consent 
within international law and thus hindering the progressive development of multilateral 
institutions and general customary norms that would be binding upon all states.316 
Both of these perspectives hold characteristics in common. Firstly, they both suppose a 
clear divide between norms of ‘international law’ in a general abstract sense, and the 
various state practices and perspectives which contribute to the formation of that 
general body. The second shared characteristic is the subsequent perception of the 
Soviet Union as embodying a particular form and type of state practice, from which it is 
possible to extract a culturally and historically specific ‘tradition’ that has in some way 
participated in the construction of general international law. For both these positions it 
is essential that Soviet State practice must be in some way distinct; there has to be 
something specific to the ‘Soviet’ approach for there to exist such conceptual 
‘approaches’ in general. In this sense both operate on the dichotomy that ‘international 
law is different in different places’ whilst having at the same time a notion that this 
diversity creates something holistic – a general idea of international law.317 
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The grounds for this contemporary discussion were laid by earlier discussions of law in 
the Soviet Union. Scholars both within the Soviet Union and those observing from the 
outside explored the ways in which Soviet Union represented something unique in its 
embrace of Marxist-Leninist theory, something which had specific consequences for 
law, both domestically and internationally.318 In this vein, scholarship within the Soviet 
Union, most especially in the decade following the Revolution in 1917, tended to 
explore the possibility of law’s absence, or its uniquely transformed nature in a 
proletarian state. Externally, commentators could contrast events and perspectives 
within the Soviet Union with their own, perhaps noting progressive development of 
areas of law which would be worth incorporating or from which their own jurisdictions 
might learn, or alternatively discerning a warning of the excesses of socialism.319 
Although both of these categories therefore collapse into an attempt to understand the 
formation of international law, neither of them offers a deep theoretical understanding 
of the form of law. Crucially, neither accounts for the fact that both of these 
engagements stress difference in the face of evidence to the contrary.320 As will be 
discussed when assessing the later interpretations of a ‘convergence’ between the 
Soviet approach and general practice, even those accounts that recognise the errors in 
this earlier scholarship fail to offer theoretical explanations for why this happened, and 
indeed replicate the same basic theoretical position of the scholarship they are 
critiquing. The theoretical frame of this thesis offers a different perspective. Firstly it 
highlights this over-differentiation as a component of the ideological struggle that 
inevitably surrounds the concept of revolution. Not only might a revolutionary state 
need to stress difference to demonstrate its pursuit of revolutionary aims (especially if 
the state is tacking away from such a course and the justification of elite power is 
rooted in the idea of socialist revolution), but counter-revolutionary forces may find it 
serves their interests to isolate the revolutionary position as different and threatening.  
A more important perspective stems from the consideration of the possibility of 
revolutionary praxis within international law. Taking international law as an open 
system of contestation, the expectation of radical difference in the Soviet approach has 
to be discarded. Instead focus is drawn towards the kind of practice the Soviet state 
engaged in, and how hospitable the form of law was to their more overtly revolutionary 
aims. This offers two simultaneous insights – firstly into the capacity of the legal form to 
serve revolutionary aims, and secondly into the revolutionary content of Soviet legal 
practice in the light of the considerations of Chapters One and Two. From this 
perspective the convergence of the Soviet ‘approach’ and general international practice 
                                                          
318
 See, for example, George Ginsburgs et al., “The View From Without,” Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting 62 (1968): 196–214. 
319
 For various examples in this vein see Harold J. Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R: An 
Interpretation of the Soviet Law, Revised (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); 
Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).; or 
alternatively the collection issued in honour of his work: William E. Butler, Peter B. Maggs, and J. 
B. Quigley, eds., Law after Revolution (New York: Oceana, 1988). 
320
 See later discussion in this chapter, and the general argument of William E. Butler, “American 
Research on Soviet Approaches to Public International Law,” Columbia Law Review 70 (1970): 
218–35.  
110 
 
can be read as simultaneously the abandonment of any revolutionary praxis by the 
Soviet state coupled with the alignment in practice between competing imperialist 
powers in an international environment made novel by nominally independent ex-
colonies. 
i) Early Soviet International Law – Transitional International Law 
With the above in mind, this subsection will examine the basis for the Soviet ‘approach’ 
to international law through some of the early Soviet legal scholars. These theorists 
contributed to the Soviet ‘approach’ alongside the general foreign policy of the state 
and the practice of its diplomats. The earliest systematic statements about international 
law from within the newly established Soviet state came from Eugene Korovin,321 
alongside selections from Pashukanis in later years, followed by Pashukanis’s rival 
Andrei Vyshinsky. Vyshinky’s position, and the actions and legal position of the Soviet 
state from the Stalinist purges of 1935-6 are of less interest for the purposes of this 
thesis for reasons that will become obvious. It is the initial legal praxis that bears both 
the closest resemblance to revolutionary praxis discussed in Chapter One and Two, and 
its early impact that is most interesting in assessing the relationship between this and 
the legal form. It is also important to note that various non-Marxist scholars remained 
within the Soviet Union producing work considering the impact of the revolution on 
international law.322 However, their perspectives were not considered externally to 
provide insight into the new Soviet perspective, remaining closely aligned to European 
conceptions of international law,323 and for the purposes of this thesis do not present 
any differing perspectives on potentially revolutionary legal praxis.  
For Korovin, the presence of the Soviet state in international law presented a unique 
challenge to its traditional formulation, one that impacted upon legal theory more 
broadly. For Korovin, the previously dominant theoretical frameworks of ‘natural law’ or 
the ‘idealist school’ were inadequate to the unique post-revolution milieu. The former 
relied on a unified conception of mankind, which was fundamentally challenged by the 
rise of a proletarian state which exemplified the class divisions that split any notion of a 
universal set of ‘naturally’ applicable norms. For Korovin it was ‘inconceivable to speak 
of the existence of any ideal law common to all mankind which stands above classes.’324 
His analysis found that the latter’s ethical variant, locating law in moral man, and its 
psychological variant, of man shaped by ‘intuitive legal experience’ were equally upset 
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by the new realities of socialism made manifest.  Irrespective of this, they also failed as 
sources of international law, which for Korovin was ‘the product of later stages of social 
development and an expression of a complex historical process in human society, 
organized on a collective basis.’325 Thus Korovin presented his third ‘historical’ lens, in 
which the international law of his time had entered a period of transition.  
The transition was characterised by the coexistence of Socialist international law with 
Capitalist international law, which was a process destined to lead to the victory of 
socialism and the transformation of international law into inter-socialist federalism. 
Within this framework Korovin noted that in ‘traditional’ international law, custom was 
the prime source, with treaties largely considered declaratory of customary practice, 
whereas in the transition period ‘treaty dominates unchallenged’.326 It is this aspect that 
fed into the depictions of the Soviet state as both dismissive of parts of international 
law – Korovin rejected the idea of a law common to all mankind – and also the 
positivism of the Soviet state in its exclusive reference to treaties. For Korovin, 
‘customary’ relations between capitalist and proletarian states would simply equate to 
inevitable descent into war. In relation to the domestic legal theory of the Soviet Union, 
it is important to point out that this places Korovin in much closer alignment with 
Stu ka than Pashukanis.327 
In contrast to Korovin, Pashukanis’ contribution to international legal theory is slightly 
more ambiguous. In many ways Pashukanis can be read as more accommodating, and 
indeed somewhat closer to the realities of early Soviet diplomatic practice. For 
Pashukanis what Korovin saw as a transition period was rather a point at which 
international law shifted from being reflective of the struggle of capitalistic states 
among themselves to that of a temporary compromise between fundamentally 
antagonistic camps.328 Although these descriptions are rather similar, Pashukanis noted 
that attributing to the Soviet Union a rejection of custom was to assign to it a ‘doctrine 
it has nowhere expressed’, and represented an attempt to deprive it of ‘those rights 
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which require no treaty formulation and derive from the fact that normal diplomatic 
relations exist.’329 Pashukanis also stressed the deeper conflictual nature of 
international law, noting that ‘modern international law is the legal form of the struggle 
of the capitalist states among themselves for domination over the rest of the world.’330 
Although Pashukanis foregrounded this struggle, and the force behind it, this was still 
articulated within the broader sense of his theory discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Two; force and conflict were always located in relations of exchange. Against those who 
focused on the ‘peaceful functions of international law’ Pashukanis stressed those 
elements that regulate conflict, thus assuming a state of struggle, yet also noted that 
‘[e]very struggle, including the struggle between imperialist states, must include an 
exchange as one of its components. And if exchanges are concluded then forms must 
also exist for their conclusion.’331  
Similarly to Korovin, Pashukanis rejected the idea that international law stemmed from 
some ideal vision of law relating to the common interests of mankind. In this vein he 
went some way towards characterising international law as class law, yet he maintained 
a key focus on the crucial elements of capitalist exchange relations – most importantly 
the sanctity of private property.332 However, as Pashukanis’s more detailed exposition 
of the commodity form theory of law was almost uniformly ignored in the context of 
international legal theory outside of the Soviet Union,333 his position was seen to align 
closely with both Korovin’s and Vyshinsky’s later position, which was the extreme 
subordination of law to state policy. ‘[T]he most urgent task of Soviet international law, 
according to Vyshinky… was to transform itself into a completely pliant and reliable tool 
of the Soviet Government's foreign policy.’334 Together these three theorists offer the 
basic academic material behind the construction of Soviet ‘approach’ containing 
elements of a focus on treaties, the subordination of law to the foreign policy 
requirements of the Soviet state, and the idea that these were reactive theories trailing 
behind the ad hoc actions of the state itself.   
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IV: The View From Without 
The first substantial text examining the Soviet position in international law in English 
was that of T. A. Taracouzio in 1935,335 a work that Kazimierz Grzybowski lauded as 
‘remain[ing] the only comprehensive treatment in this field’ for over three decades.336 
Grzybowski’s update to the work by Taracouzio was specifically situated in the context 
that some form of foundational change occurred in the intervening years; that ‘[i]n that 
period the position of the Soviet Union and its participation in the formulation of the 
principals and rules of the international legal order... changed fundamentally.’337 His 
perception in this regard aligns with many interpretations of the Soviet approach to 
international law, with the factual shifts in Soviet foreign policy understood to be trailed 
by theoretical development. Earl Snyder and Hans Bracht noted similarly that the 
‘Soviet theory of law [underwent] dramatic and far-reaching changes from the inception 
of the Soviet State’,338 in a process of ‘after the fact rationalisation of action taken or 
direction indicated.’339  
Before addressing this potential shift in direction, Taracouzio’s book offers further 
interest, due to the thematic tendency that emerges through the volume. It is a 
perspective that aligns with general descriptions of the Soviet ‘approach’. It also offers a 
useful summary of Soviet international legal practice. Firstly Soviet theory was uniquely 
(to the extent that Taracouzio repeatedly pointed it out) subordinate to and derivative 
of Soviet state practice. Coherent theoretical positions were understood to be late in 
coming, and when they did they were understood to serve the interests of the Soviet 
state. This also immediately attaches an elementary historical narrative to his work. As 
the concrete positions of the Soviet Union change, so too do the theoretical 
articulations of international law made by Soviet jurists. This lays the foundation for a 
narrative of convergence, penetrating into international legal discourse only after the 
Second World War and the move toward the concept of ‘peaceful coexistence’.340 Both 
theoretical frame and narrative demand that at the outset the Soviet state expressed a 
divergent approach to international law, and that over time various processes led to the 
abandonment of this position and the adoption of some kind of middle ground, crucially 
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at a period in which ideas about international law within European and American 
scholarship were shifting in a similar direction. 
Taracouzio’s perspective is complemented by others to create a picture of the early 
Soviet divergence as contradictorily both an extreme positivism and the subordination 
of international law to the policy purposes of the Soviet state.341 The positivism of the 
Soviet state is seen as evident in early Soviet focus on treaties, coupled with a rejection 
of customary international law as applicable to the Soviet state, attributed theoretically 
to Korovin as discussed in Section III i. The Soviet subordination of law to policy is 
repeated by a variety of observers. For example, Robert Slusser and Jan Triska, authors 
of the most comprehensive collection of Soviet Treaty material in the English language 
in the early 1950s, noted the ‘absolute dependence of Soviet theory on the practice of 
the Soviet state [as] a well-known fact’.342 Grzybowski summarised his own work as 
‘[examining] the actions of the Soviet Government... in order to give meaning to rules 
and institutions of international law as they were used to legitimate Soviet conduct in 
international relations.’343  
The result of these perspectives was that all Marxist Soviet legal theorists were read in 
the same light. They were seen to operate primarily pragmatically, inconsistently, and in 
reaction to state practice. John Hazard detected a ‘confusion’ because of the ‘attitude’ 
among some Soviet legal theorists that law was bourgeois, and therefore had to be 
rejected, but then these same theorists came up against the crucial difficulty that ‘[i]t 
was necessary to live in a world with other states.’344 Others also noted the supposedly 
beleaguered position of Soviet legal scholars: ‘[l]agging behind Soviet practice in time, 
theorists... had certain governmental practices to follow, to systematize, to analyze in 
terms of official ideology, and to justify and defend.’345 Thus it was that Korovin’s theory 
was seen to wrestle with the hostile world in which the neo-natal Soviet state found 
itself,346 turning to the idea of transition to bridge the gap between ideology and reality. 
Pashukanis, in turn, was seen to characterise international law as a ‘compromise’ 
between competing world systems, bourgeois and socialist, the former which had lost 
its exclusive domination, and the latter which had ‘not yet won it’.347 For Korovin, 
international law changed fundamentally with the appearance of the Soviet state; it was 
altered based on its usage by the Soviet Union. Pashukanis saw no change in the legal 
form following the Soviet Revolution, but equally was read by Hazard as articulating the 
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apparently controversial position that the Soviet state could use international law (prior 
to the withering away of all law) in support of its own goals.348 
The kinds of opening statements Western scholars felt the need to make when 
discussing the Soviet Union and international law are highly revealing in this regard. 
When introducing the Soviet Union, Hazard opened with the observation that 
it is clear that the Soviet Government places itself among those who recognize 
the existence of international law and espouse its principles. At the same time, 
the literature indicates that the Soviet government considers international law, 
like all law, to be an instrumentality of the state, to be utilized in pursuit of the 
politics of the state. It expects other states to call upon international law to 
further interests which they believe to be their own, and it will do the same.349 
The need for the opening clarification is an overt indication of the presumption that the 
Soviet Union could easily not recognize international law – it is very difficult to imagine 
any scholar opening discussion of American or European Governments by pointing out 
that they recognize international law and espouse its principles.350 As will be clear in 
Section V below, although the Soviet state certainly questioned the neutrality of 
international law it also deployed legal arguments almost immediately. Furthermore the 
expectation of the employment of legal argument to serve state interests is attributed 
by Hazard to the Soviet state as something apparently novel, eliding the uncontroversial 
possibility that this wasstandard legal practice for all states when constructing legal 
arguments. For scholars like Hazard, this position of overt differentiation was justified 
by the common perception that ‘Soviet leaders [were] not always… interested in 
international law’.351 The logic behind this perception was the immediately hostile 
international environment in which the Soviet state found itself being justified through 
international legal arguments: international law was the ‘weapon of the enemy,’352 
evinced through the various doctrines of recognition, succession and liability for debts, 
the expected compensation for expropriated property, and justifications for armed 
intervention. 
Although it would seem one would be very interested in a ‘weapon of the enemy’, and 
Soviet leaders clearly could not help but be concerned with international law (the Soviet 
state was embedded in legal relations from its inception) there is a further point against 
this vision of Soviet practice. Recognising the legal theory of Pashukanis based on his 
reading of Lenin discussed in the background Section II of this chapter, it is evident that 
the usage of international law by imperialist states opposing the Soviet Union would not 
preclude the revolutionary state from taking advantage of every legal argument and 
opportunity available. Thus although a perspective like Hazard’s was dependent upon a 
certain divide between the revolutionary state and international law, this did not play 
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out in practice nor was it supported by the most sophisticated articulations of that 
revolutionary theory. As was clear in many actual examinations of Soviet practice, the 
expected divergence was either absent or justified through legal argument. However, 
this external perspective could still fall back on describing these realities as the 
subordination of international law to the foreign policy requirements of the Soviet 
state. Again, the projection involved allowed this to serve as a descriptor of the Soviet 
state, not general international legal practice. It was the Soviet state that was seen to 
‘turn’ to ‘traditional international law’ in instantiating legal relations with those who 
recognized it.353  
V: Common International Legal Practice? 
The common ground that was present between Soviet practice and ‘standard’ practice 
was evident in contemporary accounts, yet due to the theoretical framework being 
deployed – one that expected to see difference – it seemed to remain impossible to 
recognise this fact.354 It is in this context that most common ground was acknowledged 
with an element of surprise, and explained analytically by a compromise between 
communist theory and the realities of international life, or the outright dominance of 
the latter. Taracouzio’s work proved exemplary in this regard. In practically every area 
of international law addressed in his expansive account, the Soviet Union was noted to 
follow closely traditional practices, to limit innovation, and to operate in a somewhat 
conservative manner.  
Addressing territory, Taracouzio noted that in general the ‘international practice of the 
Soviet Union’ shows a very close following of ‘generally adopted international 
practice’355. Soviet approaches to diplomacy were summed up as consisting of no real 
outstanding contribution or change, other than the abolition of ranks (in practice 
circumvented at a later date) and the special status of trade representatives356 who blur 
the traditional boundaries in international law between persons with diplomatic status 
(and immunity) and those engaged in trade. Interestingly ‘in most of these treaties the 
principle of reciprocity is followed, the same privileges being granted to the foreign 
trade agencies in the USSR when such agencies are established therein.’357  In 
conclusion, ‘innovations [in the diplomatic field] are not outstanding.358 With regard to 
nationality and international personality, ‘Soviets lay primary emphasis... upon political 
allegiance’359 (thus adopting a standard position in relation to nationality) and ‘the 
Soviet law and practice in regard to natural persons in international law are not much 
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different from those of non-communist states’360.  ‘[T]he Soviet law on diplomatic and 
consular service may well be called conservative’361 and in treaty making Soviets ‘follow 
in almost every detail general international practice’362. Such treaties as were concluded 
with the ‘West’ ‘do not correctly reflect communist ideas’363, whereas those with the 
Baltic and Eastern states display an element of a distinctive approach, but this occurs 
within a context where the spread of communist ideas was seen as expedient and 
therefore fails to represent a particularly divergent practice. In other words it could be 
read as simply the Soviet state subordinating international law to its needs. 
It is remarkable that in the face of this common ground Taracouzio managed to 
maintain a near devotional adherence to a particular notion of Marxist-Leninist theory 
manifest in international law from which the Soviet Government was forced to deviate 
through practical necessity.364 As was noted at the time, this recurrent, and ‘rather 
obvious’ point was interesting not because it revealed some revolutionary ‘communist 
theory’, but because it demonstrated the consistency evident in Soviet state practice 
with ‘traditional’ international law.365 As has been noted, Taracouzio was far from alone 
in looking for a unique and different engagement with international law by the 
revolutionary state, and he was also far from alone in maintaining that difference as 
extant in the face of a record that blatantly contradicted the proposition. 
This point can be made with greater strength by turning to some of the diplomatic 
records of the Soviet state. At the very least they demonstrate a clear rhetorical 
adherence to international legal principals, all the more so in the face of what was 
regarded (in the eyes of the Soviet Government) as action that clearly infringed upon 
the reciprocal expectations of diplomatic courtesy. Protesting its exclusion from the 
Washington Conference of Pacific Powers in July 1921 the Soviet Government noted 
that  
the right of Russia to participate in the conference... was fully admitted, but the 
above-mentioned powers [Great Britain, France, The United States of America, 
China and Japan] declared that they would themselves undertake to watch out 
for the interests of Russia without the latter's representation, and that they 
reserved to themselves the right subsequently to invite a new Russian 
Government which should replace the present one to submit to the decisions 
and agreements to be reached by themselves.366 
Not only did the Soviet Government see this as explicit ‘favouring [of a] Russian 
counter-revolution’ but as the further ‘demonstration of the system of intervention.’367 
Subsequently any elements of the agreement would be considered, in their opinion, to 
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be ‘ineffective and devoid of significance’ due to the absence and non-participation of 
‘one of the principal parties.’368  They concluded that ‘[t]he policy [of] tending to leave 
Russia outside the collective decisions of various powers on questions concerning it, not 
only cannot assist the settlement of the conflicts at present disturbing the world, but 
can only render them more acute and more complicated.'369 
The problems of exclusion were repeated in relation to the Paris Pact of 1928.370 The 
Soviet Union was invited to join the pact after the fact of its creation, conducted on a 
restrictive membership basis in the interests of ‘expediency’.371 The Pact itself famously 
prohibited war as an ‘instrument of national policy’, but the Soviet response decrying 
their continued pariah status also proved sadly prophetic. The Government 
communiqué pointed out that prior rejections of Soviet drafts on disarmament as an 
effective means toward peaceful international relations put before the Preparatory 
Disarmament Commission under the League of Nations were rejected by those same 
signatories to the Pact. Furthermore the series of potential exceptions to the Pact’s 
functioning were highlighted as problematic, most especially in relation to the mutual 
defence obligations of the League and their relationship to the Soviet Union at the time, 
and particularly the reservation of the British government retaining freedom of action in 
relation to ‘any “unfriendly” act or “interference”’, both terms that remained open to 
subsequent British definition.372 Despite these reservations and their exclusion from the 
drafting of the Pact, the Soviet government described the result as the imposition of 
‘some external obligations before public opinion’, on which basis the Soviet 
Government expressed its adherence.373  
As a final point, the Soviet Government was also keen to stress its adherence to legal 
obligations more generally, in the face of its above marginalisation. The Soviet 
memorandum to the Genoa Conference of 1922 noted that the ‘Soviet Government... 
has always fulfilled and intends always to fulfil all obligations undertaken by itself, and 
that, therefore, all its public and legal guarantees are no less solid than those of any 
other sovereign power’.374  
i) The View from Without Redux 
Without taking political rhetoric at face value, on either side of the debate, what we can 
state is that the Soviet Government consistently argued its position using legal 
terminology. Although part of the claim made in perceptions of the ‘Soviet approach’ 
was that this very process was a subordination of law to policy, the purpose of this 
Section is to qualify this in two ways. Firstly, that this subordination was not as 
complete as supposed at various points. Secondly that this ‘subordination’ was actually 
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far more of a recurrent practice than was being presented – not only did the ‘approach’ 
of the Soviet Union and ‘Western’ Powers converge at a later date in the standard 
narrative, but the initial divergence was entirely unpersuasive as a descriptor of actual 
events. What seems a far more persuasive explanation is that the form of law was 
sufficiently open for the Soviet Union to remain highly consistent with ‘traditional’ 
practice. Even its more ‘revolutionary’ espousals in regards to expropriation and 
diplomatic relations were articulated via traditional legal arguments. 
Over time these facts did filter through scholarship on Soviet international law. William 
Butler reflected in his 1970 review on American Research into Soviet Approaches to 
international law that  
in identifying the manipulative, opportunistic side of Soviet international law we 
tend to overlook larger, more important issues: how, if at all, does the Soviet 
use of international law differ from that of non-socialist states? Are there 
certain types of situations where the style of Soviet use of international law 
varies from ours and certain types where it is basically the same? In what 
situations does the Soviet use of international law appear to have been 
effective? Where not? How is effectiveness to be measured? How has Soviet 
use of international law changed over time, if at all? How does the USSR value 
and balance the normative, stabilizing aspects of international law with its 
dynamic policy dimensions?375 
It would have been admirable and highly useful if such work had been conducted with a 
mind to informing a theory of law. However, there are two points to make in relation to 
this shift in scholarly approach. Firstly, the timing of its occurrence is important. As 
noted the standard narrative includes a convergence in both policy and theoretical 
position. As Slussa and Triska noted in their own analysis of the Soviet approach, by the 
mid-twentieth century the previous primacy of custom now played a subordinate role 
due to the supposed ‘[a]cceleration of history, and above all [the] diminishing 
homogeneity in the moral and legal ideas that have long governed the formation of 
[international] law.’376 Grzybowski also noted a similar shift in Soviet approach to law. 
The weight of Butler’s account necessarily addresses the boom in Soviet-oriented 
scholarship in the late 1950s as a result of Cold War tensions and funding opportunities 
within the US, and therefore fails to attend to the reasons for the articulated divide in 
the interwar period that is addressed in this thesis. 
Secondly, although the problem that Butler rightly noted was that scholarship had been 
content with describing contemporary trends or controversies in Soviet writing ‘without 
systematically relating these insights to a larger analytical framework’,377 what Butler 
proposed was not a larger theoretical analytical framework, but a series of 
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methodological recommendations supporting further comparative research. The 
problem addressed was one of redressing the ‘retardation’ of American scholarship 
caused by the ‘conviction’ that studying Soviet approaches involved ‘investigating how 
the Soviets violate[d] international law’;378 further that ‘[t]here are innumerable other 
examples as well which suggest[ed] that the relationship between international law and 
foreign policy in the USSR may be as dynamic and complex as it [was] in the foreign 
offices of the other large powers.'379 These are accurate and essential observations, if 
rather late in coming. But this supposed generosity of perspective was translated into 
an attempt to (re)discover the ‘Russian Heritage’ and a call to cease ‘ignor[ing] the 
Russian contribution to international law.’380 The method suggested was one of 
comparative research, addressed through the development of regional expertise,381 as 
opposed to addressing the theoretical reasons for the original failings and any broader 
understanding of what common practice might tell us about the nature of law. In 
essence, this lays the groundwork for later scholarship noted at the opening of this 
Chapter that works from these assumptions of difference as part of a project of 
progressively developing a multi-cultural vision of international law, and in the process 
subsequently reinforces those differences.382 
To reiterate, then, even that scholarship that noted the problems in the construction of 
a divergent Soviet ‘approach’ to international law failed to attend to the reasons for 
this. In addition, it also failed to effectively challenge those assumptions within its 
recommendations. Furthermore this later scholarship did not adequately address the 
empirical evidence that weighed against any particularly uniform Soviet practice 
exhibiting the extreme positions described at the outset of this Section.383 In this thesis, 
by focusing on law as praxis, attention is drawn to how international legal doctrine is 
constituted by the kind of arguments deployed by and against the Soviet Union – they 
are not external to the law in this instance, but constitutive of it. 
For example, the early defensiveness of the Soviet Union could be read as indicative of 
its vulnerable position in the aftermath of the First World War, whereas its later 
embrace of broader international legal norms and its conservative posture 
demonstrates a potential expression of its growing status as a world power – this shift 
would also accommodate a transition from early revolutionary aspirations, to later 
more conservative intent. Take Edward McWhinney’s otherwise untheorised 
observation that ‘Soviet jurists are no longer defensive as to their own capacity 
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completely to re-write “classical” international law doctrines, if need be, and for that 
matter fully to make use of the “classical” international law hierarchy of sources, to suit 
the special needs and advantage of Soviet foreign policy’.384 This can instead be related 
to an effective theory of state strategy relating to developing a ‘great power status’ and 
engagement with legal argument from a position of strength. Importantly, recognising 
the indeterminacy of legal argument, such recognition would not constitute a simplistic 
notion that the powerful ignore international law when it operates against their 
interests, but instead foreground how the use and abuse of law in relation to political 
status becomes an effective ideological and politico-strategic tool.385 What remains 
noteworthy for the question at hand is that this same transition involved a shift away 
from the more radical assertions of the early Soviet state, as will be addressed in 
Section VII. 
ii) The absence of Pashukanis’s General Theory 
Even later scholarship in the line of Butler’s continued to be averse to addressing the 
Soviet example in the light of general legal theory. As mentioned earlier, Pashukanis’s 
General Theory made almost no impact on international legal scholars, perhaps 
representative of Pashukanis’ primary position as a domestic legal theorist.386 
Irrespective of the reasoning, there was a shared myopia by international legal scholars 
in their approach to Soviet scholarship. Their focus was on Korovin and selective texts of 
Pashukanis, supplemented with contributions by Hrabar, Sabanin, and Krylov, through 
to Kozhevnikov and Tunkin as Cold War representatives.387 This selection misses the 
domestic legal debates of the Soviet Union in the early 1920s and the theories of P. I. 
Stu ka and Pashukanis.388 Importantly, according to Pashukanis, international law 
differs from law more generally only by degree,389 a point which tended to be 
overlooked in discussions examined above. Approaching Soviet legal practice with 
Pashukanis’s general theory of law not only rehabilitates early Soviet state practice into 
a holistic view of international law, but it brings that law itself back into focus as an 
object of analysis, rather than attributing ‘divergent’ practice to the whims of state 
policy. Furthermore, we end up with a far more convincing account of the consistency 
and change of state practice in relation to legal argument across different periods of 
political, economic and military strength, in addition to broader and more nebulous 
ideological shifts. This will be the subject of Section VI. 
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There is one early counter example to the general oversight of Pashukanis’s general 
theory worth nothing. Rudolf Schlesinger paid some close attention to Pashukanis’s 
work, although as will be clear he shared fundamental ground with the common 
schematic that describes the Soviet ‘approach’. Schlesinger noted that ‘the negation of 
a continuous state personality never corresponded to the political practice of the 
Soviet.’390 He also observed that for the Soviet Union, Self Determination ‘form[ed] the 
standard of justice in international law.’391 This was qualified by the political opposition 
that characterised the position of the Soviets, such that the latter ‘regard[ed] her 
special influence on the colonial peoples as an important source of genuine political 
influence.’392 In general, Schlesinger’s work evidenced a greater focus on mutual legal 
arguments and less overt association of ‘illegality’ with the Soviet position. However, 
Schlesinger attributed the theory of international law as a ‘compromise’ to being first 
espoused by Korovin, rather than Pashukanis as is the case in mainstream international 
law literature.393 He furthermore noted Korovin as the dominant figure from 1925 to 
1935, rather than what seems more likely to be the dominance of Pashukanis from the 
late 1920s until his removal and execution in 1936, and before him Stu ka, in domestic 
academic circles.394 
However, like much scholarship understanding the Soviet ‘approach’ to international 
law, Schlesinger’s thematic was heavily influenced by his ideas of what proper Marxist 
engagement should be. He approached law from a theoretical perspective informed by 
a rather unrefined Marxism, namely that law in some sense stems from the social 
substratum, and thus feeds into the notion that the Soviet Government was 
representative of a fundamental change in that substratum transposed 
internationally.395 Schlesinger saw ‘Marxism [as] strictly historical, and [that it] rejects 
any generalisation which erects the categories of a certain historical stage of 
development onto general characteristics of social agencies working in various stages of 
that development.’396 The “real” relationship between people is the ‘social division of 
labour…’ and the commodity is therefore a ‘mere ideological reflection.’ 397 This was a 
problematic reading of Pashukanis, and further of Marx’s analysis of capital. This likely 
stemmed from Schlesinger’s theoretical commitments to law, rather than to a particular 
idea of what ‘Marxism’ entailed. Schlesinger’s theoretical starting point for legal study 
was avowedly positivist, and it is here that his problems with the commodity form 
theory took their most concrete form. His approach was fundamentally inimical to an 
abstract theoretical treatment of law, and it was this which then translated into what an 
‘authentic Marxism’ targeted at law would constitute. This is unjust both to Marx and 
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Pashukanis. Neither would have described the concrete abstractions Schlesinger 
dismisses as ‘mere’ ideological reflections. More importantly, neither would have 
argued that these had no effect upon ‘real’ social relationships, nor that such areas 
would constitute an inappropriate subject of critical investigation. 
VI: Understanding the Soviet ‘Approach’ 
There are a variety of ways to understand the Soviet ‘approach’. This thesis has 
addressed the very concept of an approach as framed by a particular set of prior 
conceptions. From both within and outside of the Soviet state, there were assumptions 
made about what the implications for international law would be of a legal praxis 
orientated around Marxist principles. In some ways this served to elide the 
commonalities between the Soviet ‘approach’ and more general international legal 
practice. In addition to this assumption about what revolution would entail, the Soviet 
‘approach’ was constructed through an assumption about how international law is 
formed, through the contribution of various cultural approaches building a broader 
international legal order. Both of these points deserve further consideration. 
Through the theoretical frame of this thesis, the concept of revolution offers insights 
into the function of this process. As discussed in Chapter One, there are a host of 
different ways in which the concept of revolution can be deployed that will 
predetermine all kinds of historical interpretation. Heavily involved in the very concept 
of the Soviet ‘approach’ is the idea that a ‘revolutionary state’ will behave in a certain 
way, and have certain characteristics that are defined in opposition to the non-
revolutionary norm.398 With this as an interpretive lens, attention is drawn excessively 
to the differences between the revolutionary and the norm. Those that work against 
this also buy into the ideological stakes involved in acquiring the label of revolution, 
with the correlative principle that common ground (shared values, forms, norms) 
betrays the conservative in the progressive or unveils the revolution as sham. In this 
sense the claim to revolutionary status also requires the shedding of all common 
ground in order to remain credible.399  
Atop this contestation, broader interpretations of revolutions as merely instances of 
particularly extreme political upheaval also influence the interpretation of Soviet 
international law. In line with the trend in contemporary discussions of revolution that 
overlook its conceptual history, these events are seen as temporary ruptures – 
disruptions of the normal functioning of social order – in the wake of which new 
ordered social structures will be erected. In this sense one can see the transition within 
the Soviet Union in this narrative light; from the chaotic early years to the consolidation 
of state power in opposition to Western capitalism, to the eventual collapse of an 
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aberrant economic system and the return to the fold of broader international society 
(and collaborative law-making).400 
The second interpretive lens applied to the narrative sketched above finds its roots in 
what has been termed at various points as the ‘turn to history’ in international legal 
scholarship.401 Part of this broader turn has involved a particular project that 
approaches historical study in order to elaborate a history of international law that is 
not exclusively European, or overly implicated in explicit colonial and imperial practice. 
Lauri Mälksoo notes this as forming the ‘emerging understanding that there is no single 
history of international law’.402 This scholarship can be seen to form a two pronged 
approach. The first move involves highlighting the colonial and imperial heritage of 
international law,403 thus complicating the equation of international law with neutral 
objectivity and the image of law as a restraint on power and state interest. The second 
move is to trace non-European contributions in the development of international law, in 
order to stress particular aspects of international legal doctrine and to challenge the 
opposition of ‘Western law’ to ‘Eastern culture’. Both of these approaches run the risk 
of collapsing into a project aimed at rehabilitating international law as a universal 
project by purging it of those uncomfortable origins in colonial exploitation.404  
These two interpretive perspectives blend into one another in the creation of a distinct 
‘Soviet’ approach to international law. This is at once both a ‘revolutionary’ approach, 
thus differentiated from mainstream practice, and a regionally or ‘culturally’ specific 
approach.405 Both rest upon their being something specifically different about the 
relationship between international law and the Soviet Union, either from the 
perspective of defining a revolutionary break, or that of a distinct, culturally rich 
contribution to the multicultural vision of intercivilisational international law. At this 
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stage we can note two somewhat contradictory projects or perspectives that appear in 
the literature. Firstly this attempt to trace a cultural or historical ‘other’ into a 
collaborative historical construction of international law, and secondly an attempt to 
write this ‘other’ as a specific challenge or alternative to that mainstream or unified 
construction. In the first story a variety of projects rear their heads: that of redemption 
or rescue of the international legal project; or simply a process of setting the record 
straight – writing a more ‘accurate’ history of international law that includes diverse 
contributions. In the second there is located the desire for some alternative – either a 
‘better’ perspective on international law, offering progressive reforms that should be 
incorporated, such as the Soviet espousal of Self-determination,406 or a demonstrably 
cynical appropriation of international law for the interests of the state, not only 
rejecting the common liberal dream of an international society ‘governed by law’ but 
potentially not even coherent or compatible with what this alternative might be 
‘supposed’ to stand for.407 The Socialist aspirations of the West were just as easily 
dreamt into the practice of the Soviet state as were expectations of cynicism.   
VII: Revolutionary Legal Praxis and the Soviet example  
Neither of these interpretations offers much insight into the nature of the legal form 
itself. Therefore, approaching the Soviet relationship to international law through the 
lens of potential revolutionary legal praxis provides a supplementary explanation of the 
Soviet ‘approach’ to international law. Crucially, it provides a possible way of assessing 
the potential for the legal form to accommodate revolutionary praxis.  It also 
accommodates the fact that the Soviet Union simultaneously challenged and utilized 
international law at various points. However, that very utilization clearly contained 
contradictory elements. Intuitively, it is not a simple task to challenge the legal order 
and yet stake claims within it. Either position threatens to undermine the other. With 
the Soviets, their early radicalism was swiftly tempered by both the realities of the 
environment that confronted them, and also the changing needs of the Soviet state as 
the new bureaucracy consolidated power and attempted to cement its position on the 
international stage. In part this leads to the contradictory depictions of the Soviet 
‘approach’ discussed in this chapter, but this also demonstrates a particular logic to 
legal argument that needs unpacking. 
This logic is revealed in those Soviet legal arguments that encountered the most 
sustained opposition internationally. In this regard, the most interesting challenge 
posed by the Soviets to the international legal order was their repudiation of debts. The 
other areas of Soviet legal practice, as will become clear, did not offer anything as close 
to the kind of revolutionary destabilising of legal argument discussed in Chapter Two as 
with debt. This struck to the heart of capitalist property and exchange, and therefore 
posed the greatest potential threat to the legal form as understood in this thesis. In 
discussing the diplomatic claims against the Soviets, Alexander Sack made the following 
revealing observation about the nature of international law:  
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Modern States are organic parts of the world's social and economic system 
which is based on the principle of free (even if regulated) and continuous 
international circulation and interchange of capital and goods, services and 
men. All states are intercommunicating and interconnected parts of a world-
wide economy, and, being interdependent, live together as members of a world 
polity. Modem States, therefore, necessarily have mutual "obligations of 
intercourse."408 
For Sack this had particular consequences for Soviet debt repudiation and refusal to 
compensate for expropriated property: 
if such expropriation would, by International Law, be permissible at the free 
discretion of the sovereign, the foundation of the modem system of 
international intercourse, which guarantees to foreigners and their property 
due process of law on the part of any sovereignty under whose dominion they 
may be found, would be destroyed.409 
Allowing for a certain hyperbole, this statement actually contains some interesting 
grains of truth that will resurface in the following Chapter on the New International 
Economic Order. At this stage, it is noteworthy how established relations of property 
preservation and compensation were seen as central to the function of international 
law. Initial Soviet statements regarding this process were seen as a serious threat to 
established order – particularly due to the method in which they were invoked. Sack 
went on to note that  
The public debt of Russia was "annulled," not because it was impossible to 
continue the full and timely payment of current obligations, but in order to deal 
a "first blow to the international financial capital."410 
Crucially, in terms of the legal argument Sack was making, the former reasoning behind 
the non-payment of debts was acceptable; it would constitute a form of default, and 
could be negotiated accordingly. However it was clearly beyond the legal pale to refuse 
to make payments specifically as an attack on the international financial system and 
capitalism as a whole. In this instance, the early position of the Soviets both aimed to 
delegitimise the international legal system, exposing it as serving the interests of 
capital, but also incidentally offered a position that if generalised was understood to 
threaten the function of international legal relations as they were understood at the 
time.  
This does not mean that the legal argument itself would undermine the system. But 
what is interesting in terms of the legal form is that the generalised principle of 
reneging on debts ran counter to the purposes of the existing international order. There 
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is therefore a mutual coincidence of both powerful opposition to the Soviet arguments, 
but also opposition within the logic of law. Ginsburgs observed that 
the initial period of doctrinal fervor (sic) which spawned most of the radical 
theorems on the nature of international politics and law coincided with the low 
point in Russia's exercise of global power and authority, so that the dreams 
could not be tested for lack of adequate physical strength to sustain them.411  
Yet it would seem that there is potentially more at work here than simply lack of 
sufficient power to make a particular position stick. Firstly it is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to imagine a capitalist system in which investment for profit faced such a 
generalised likelihood of expropriation. The ‘physical strength’ needed to assert this 
position as a general rule within broader capitalist relations would be monstrous. It 
would necessitate a vastly different social arrangement, one in which such 
expropriation would no longer make sense, making both the legal ‘rule’, and most likely 
the system as a whole, superfluous.  
The change in direction of the Soviet position in the following years yields further 
insights into the tenacity of property claims in international law, and the fate of 
attempted opposition to this system. The acceptance or otherwise of liability became a 
bargaining chip in Soviet diplomacy. It is important at the outset not to think of this as a 
non-legal position, but to recognise that the absolute non-recognition or repudiation 
was not a useful position in diplomatic terms, which were mutually constitutive of legal 
argument. There were various treaty arrangements in which Soviet liability was 
resurrected.412 For example, at Brest-Litovsk, the Soviets agreed, admittedly under 
significant duress, to six billion marks of compensation to Germany for the confiscation 
and nationalisation of the property of German citizens – under which the German state 
agreed to meet the claims of its nationals. Although this treaty was later annulled by 
both sides, the substantial initial Soviet payment in gold remained in German hands, 
and subsequently was taken by the Allies upon the defeat of Germany at the end of the 
war – justified as being in lieu of part-payment towards Soviet liabilities.413 
Soviet relations to former parts of Tsarist Russia also involved the recognition of claims, 
and in this way the Soviet approach to debt came into close alignment with its early 
approach of generosity to previously occupied territories.414 When it came to the 
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exploited former colonies of the Tsarist Empire the Soviet state recompensed them 
where possible for expropriated property, and claimed international responsibility for 
their foreign debt. Yet this was coupled with a simultaneous refusal to pay that debt to 
international creditors for the reasons mentioned above. Subsequently, at both Genoa 
and The Hague in 1921-2, the Soviets made any discussion of liability dependent on 
formal recognition,415 and further balanced all claims put to them against a series of 
counter claims for damages during the war stemming from foreign intervention during 
the Civil War following the revolution, and for the loss of Soviet assets abroad.416 Both 
of these conferences resulted in an impasse, with the Soviet position no longer so weak 
as to be dictated to as at Brest-Litovsk, with the debts at such a colossal amount that 
full payment was impossible in any case, and with the debtors split between 
themselves. Britain, for example, was keen to resume trade, France (by far the holders 
of the most securities) was set on recompense, while Germany signed a separate 
agreement at Rapallo in 1922.417 
Although the details of these claims makes for fascinating reading, not least of which 
was the final settlement of French claims with the Russian government in 1994, proving 
the tenacity of French bondholders and in general the claims against expropriation, they 
are not essential for the theoretical point under consideration here.418 What is worthy 
of note is that the revolutionary element of this position was side-lined relatively 
quickly. Whether or not this was due to the practicalities of the moment or the form of 
law is an impossible question to answer. This is primarily because to pose this question, 
a division has to be made between these two positions. This division is essential in 
much of the reading of the Soviet ‘approach’ discussed in this chapter, but it fails to 
reveal much about the form of law in theoretical terms. In addition it tends towards a 
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problematic assumption that some states ‘turn’ to international law, presumably for 
nefarious purposes, whilst others have their policy shaped by it and contribute to it as a 
natural expression of their identity. 
There is one further note on the issue of double standards. In discussion of the Soviet 
violation of the rights of other states, Sack pointed out that Soviet actions were  
doubly violative…[:] first, because they deprived foreign nationals of their 
property without due process of law; and second, because, taken partly with a 
view to undermine the foundations of the social and economic regime of 
foreign countries, they constituted an interference in the domestic affairs of 
those States.419  
In this reading, the Soviets violated the principle of non-interference, whereas the 
preceding invasion of the Soviet state and the aiding and assisting of counter-
revolutionary forces within presumably raised no legal questions. Indeed, the fact that 
the foreign backed White Armies promised to pay the debts the Soviets were 
repudiating consolidates the notion that the legal arguments themselves turned heavily 
on how legitimate identities were maintained within the legal frame. In other words, 
those entities vying for control of state which can make assurances to creditors at risk 
of losing their investments, find the legality of their claim bolstered by this position.420 
Whereas other areas of Soviet legal practice, including their position on self-
determination, the differential treatment of new states created from the former 
Russian Empire, particular policies regarding trade representatives, and the abolishing 
of diplomatic ranks all could be read as holding progressive potential, it is only really 
this position on debt that, taken to its logical conclusion, could not become generalised 
without serious systematic change. The other elements do not represent such a 
potentially fundamental challenge to the function of global capitalist exchange 
relations, and thereby the legal form as understood by Pashukanis and addressed in 
Chapter Two. The particularly evocative example of self-determination has, for all 
intents and purposes, been generalized in a formal sense. That this occurred without 
systematic change is an indictment. The absence of such systemic change should in part 
be self-evident, but this will also be the subject of the next Chapter addressing the 
attempt by those with newly acquired formal independence to alter the unchanged 
international economic order. 
VIII: Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the Soviet relationship to international law, in order to assess 
how explicitly revolutionary praxis translated into the international legal field. In order 
to do so it has presented a brief background to the early Soviet relationship to 
international law, highlighting the early Marxist theories of law that offered a potential 
frame to their legal engagement. It has then engaged with the standard Soviet 
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‘approach’ to international law, as a necessary window onto potential Soviet 
revolutionary legal praxis. It presented a consideration of the interpretation of this 
approach from outside of the Soviet Union, although necessarily these two perspectives 
blended into one another. Finally, it turned to some explanations for the nature of this 
scholarship on the Soviet ‘approach’, and considered what elements might offer insights 
for the potential of the legal form to accommodate revolutionary praxis. 
Until Butler’s summary of Soviet scholarship in American academia, there remained a 
consistent focus on the radical difference in the approach to international law taken by 
the Soviets. This chapter emphasized that this radical difference was maintained in the 
face of direct empirical contradiction. The Soviets continually utilized international legal 
arguments, even in the early years of the state. They decried their exclusion from 
international conferences, the lack of respect for their territorial integrity, non-
recognition of their government, the fostering of counter-revolutionary forces within, 
and battled claims for damages and past debt obligations with counter-claims of their 
own. Legal commentators may have disagreed with the basis of these claims, but these 
claims were nevertheless articulated within the normative standards of international 
law. The close factual alignment between Soviet practice and general practice was 
elided by an exclusive focus on the revolutionary rhetoric of the Soviet state, 
denouncing international law as capitalist and imperialist.421 To outside viewers, and 
some within the Soviet state, it was clearly impossible to both use and discredit 
international law. However this aligned closely with the pragmatic use of law described 
by Pashukanis, following the example of Lenin, and would compromise one central 
component of a potential revolutionary legal praxis – such praxis could not be 
concerned with consistency within the law, or the preservation of legal forms for their 
own sake. 
However, this brings to the fore the second component of revolutionary legal praxis 
discussed in Chapter Two. Namely, in addition to the disenchanting of law as serving 
particular interests, revolutionary praxis also should aim towards the overthrow of 
capitalist relations and the domination of social life by the market and the processes of 
exchange. This element was present in the rhetoric of the Soviet state, and in elements 
of its foreign policy, but in general these positions were not translated into active legal 
arguments. When shifting into legal contestation, the Soviet position relied on common 
legal positions, although often articulated in ways that seemed unfounded to 
conservative scholars of international law. But in these instances Lenin and Pashukanis’s 
insights into the arbitrary nature of bourgeois law are apt. Where they detected 
arbitrariness, revolutionary legality would stress the novelty of a legal argument taking 
the side of the oppressed classes. In any event, the presence of coherent legal 
arguments made by the Soviet Union, coupled with the indeterminacy of the legal form, 
and juxtaposed against the arbitrary assumptions made about international law that 
supported the Soviet’s opponents, leaves the dismissal of Soviet arguments as non-legal 
as highly unpersuasive.  
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The final Section of this chapter stressed that, when considering revolutionary legal 
praxis in the light of this thesis, the most destabilizing element of Soviet legal praxis was 
their position on property, broadly conceived. The Soviets repudiated Tsarist debt, and 
refused to compensate foreign owners of property expropriated after the revolution. 
Although these positions swiftly became nuanced in the complexities of European 
diplomacy, the general position articulated was one that offered both a radical break 
with traditional articulations in law and one that could not be generalised without 
radically transforming international capitalist relations. However, it is important to note 
that this position was also articulated as a balance of interests, or an exchange, in 
diplomatic practice. At Genoa and The Hague the Soviets posed counter-claims to those 
held against them, whilst still essentially refusing liability.  
Overall the picture presented by the Soviet relationship to international law is not one 
that, on the surface, appears so radically different to the traditional practice of 
international law. As a consequence, it does not appear as if Soviet revolutionary ideas 
translated into international law in the way that the rhetoric and scholarship of the 
Soviet ‘approach’ to international law suggests. However, the immediate consequence 
of this was not that there existed no element of revolutionary legal praxis. Rather that 
revolutionary legal praxis, by the nature of being legal praxis, could look much like 
traditional legal praxis – only accompanied by a sustained effort to challenge and 
collapse the system as a whole. As a consequence of this point, there is much reason to 
remain sceptical about the potential of ‘revolutionary’ legal praxis in this example. 
Especially as the Soviet relationship to international law shifted over time towards a 
more standard relationship between an aspiring imperialist power contesting space 
with its international competitors during which those more ‘revolutionary’ elements 
faded. In this light, their early radicalism appears less threatening.  
However, what does emerge from the consideration of Soviet legal praxis in its most 
revolutionary light is that certain positions when generalised seem highly incompatible 
with capitalist social relations. Simultaneously, these also seem unworkable as general 
legal principles. Of course the Soviet approach to international law was not to try and 
generalise these principles. At its most revolutionary, the expectation was that different 
forces, not legal ones, would propagate the collapse of capitalism and instigate an 
international socialist revolution. In the early years, the law was simply one tool among 
many to further the purposes of the revolution, and not one that was invested with any 
special meaning. In the later years, the law became an important part of the future 
vision of the Soviet state, alongside the (re)construction of an empire and the 
continuing pressure on labour to produce goods – a position that seemed to differ from 
its capitalist contemporaries only in kind. The next Chapter on the New International 
Economic Order offers an example where some similar aims in revolutionary terms 
were more explicitly directed at the system of international law as a possible means 
towards realising transformative ends, and therefore offers a complementary 
perspective on this problematic.  
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Chapter 4: The Third World and the New International 
Economic Order 
‘Poverty yesterday, famine today, revolution tomorrow’ 
Mohammed Bedjaoui, ‘Towards a  ew International Economic Order’ 1979 
I: Introduction 
This chapter addresses the relationship of the newly decolonized states to international 
law, which for the sake of this chapter will be referred to as the Third World 
engagement or relationship.422 In contrast to the Soviet example of the previous 
chapter, this relationship involved a more direct investment of transformative potential 
into the form of international law. For this reason, the chapter focuses on the idea of 
the New International Economic Order (NIEO) which embodied the collective vision of 
these states of a more just and equitable international system. As with the previous 
chapter on the Soviet relationship to international law, the aim of this chapter is to 
understand how potentially revolutionary legal praxis fared in relation to general 
international law. The theoretical frame of the thesis thus structures this engagement in 
a similar way to the Soviet ‘approach’ to international law. Once again, the concept of 
revolution and its inherent link to goal-orientated praxis draws attention to the attempt 
to transform the international order irrespective of the immediate outcome; although 
the outcome will have impacts upon the assessment of the possibility of revolutionary 
legal praxis. Unlike the Soviet example the legal theorists and policy makers involved in 
the institutions under consideration in this Chapter were not uniformly or explicitly 
Marxist in orientation and therefore they have a slightly different relationship to the 
concept of revolution as discussed in Chapter One. As will be made evident in the 
following analysis the NIEO was not a call for the overthrow of capitalist relations, at 
least not uniformly. However, there were many aspects both in aspiration and in logical 
consequence that would have entailed a very radical transformation of capitalist 
relations such that there was an inevitably revolutionary kernel to this position. It is in 
this sense that the NIEO and what was eventually considered the ‘Third World Approach 
to International Law’ (TWAIL) could be considered to have elements of revolutionary 
praxis. 
Much of the work of the early Third World engagement with international law and later 
TWAIL scholarship involved an attempt to delegitimize existing legal norms; in particular 
challenging their supposed objectivity. Central to the project of the Third World and 
later scholarship writing in its name was the complicity between international law and 
imperialism, and in particular the mechanisms by which colonialism was justified and 
maintained. The early Third World engagement also focused on the exploitative nature 
of the international economic system that was both formative of and enabled by that 
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same legal system. What is less clear is whether or not there was any specific intent to 
‘overthrow’ this system. Unlike the Soviet example, the Third World movement did not 
approach international law or capitalist social relations more generally with the aim of 
dismantling them. In most instances the claim was made that the system was unjust, 
and should be rendered fair and equitable through corrective measures, but not that 
global market relations, and capitalism as a mode of production, should be rejected. It is 
here that we come to the logical consequences of the various legal measures proposed 
to corrective the inequities of global capitalism, and whether or not they, if pursued to 
their ultimate conclusions, would enable the broader framework to remain intact. 
Although in general the above point holds true, there were times at which the rhetoric 
surrounding the NIEO took on an explicitly revolutionary character, and even couched 
itself as part of a broader historical thrust including that of the Soviet Union and 
thereby embracing the history of revolution. Describing the history of international law, 
Mohammed Bedjaoui noted that ‘after the October Revolution, decolonisation in turn 
made its contribution to the new look of international law’ via economic contestation 
with richer countries and their law.423 He further stated that '[decolonisation was] to 
the international order what the French and Russian revolutions were to the internal 
orders of France and Russia.'424 Bedjaoui was not alone in making these parallels, with 
comparisons made between the global elite’s blindness to suffering and the 
'complacency of the absolutists on the eve of the great social revolutions of the last two 
centuries.'425 Bedjaoui’s account is particularly useful because it also demonstrates the 
presence of law in the Third World account as both part-cause and potential remedy of 
their exploitation within the global system. There were parallels here with Soviet 
theories of law, even approaching that of the commodity form, with Bedjaoui describing 
‘[t]raditional international law [as] derived from the laws of the capitalist economy and 
the liberal political system.'426 
However, the adjective ‘traditional’ created space for a different kind of law to be born 
within the international system and it is here that the greater investment in the legal 
form than the Soviet case becomes apparent. Bedjaoui’s optimistic narrative history of 
international law described a transition from European, to oligarchic, to plutocratic, to a 
final stage as democratic and egalitarian. His account was not naïve; he recognised the 
requisite struggle in bringing about a progressive and fully participatory international 
system. In his eyes, for all the ‘progressive’ developments of international law, its 
‘conservative’ function served to preserve privilege, in addition to which transformation 
would face opposition from ‘other extremely influential powers which [would] strive to 
maintain the order’ against the Third World’s challenge.427 This basic ambivalence to the 
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nature of law structured all of the engagements with international law by the Third 
World in this period, and, as discussed in Chapter Two, underscores much of 
contemporary progressive visions of law. The Third World’s task was couched in legal 
terms, but the mechanisms were uncertain. Quoting a UNESCO working paper, Bedjaoui 
boldly stated that their ‘aim must be nothing less than to redefine international reality, 
to set out the law that governs it and to take account of the evolution of all the 
economic, social, legal and other factors that relate to its principals'; a 'great structural 
revolution'.428 Yet hanging over such a project was the awareness that 'the idea of law 
in the service of development presupposes that economic structures can be determined 
by legal ones.’429 The possibility of and mechanisms for this process were far from clear, 
even for legal progressives like Bedjaoui. 
Bearing this in mind, the Third World position still aimed to both disenchant 
international law and utilize it to achieve their objectives. There was a duality in this 
unmasking of the law’s complicity however. Bedjaoui noted that 'International law… 
caricatures, or rather magnifies, the defects of the present order, to such an extent as 
to make it even more unacceptable and precarious.'430 This could be read in two ways. 
The law’s exacerbation of the world’s ills could stem from the idea that the law should 
represent something else. This runs a similar line to the critical work undertaken by 
Trubek to expose the disparity between claim and reality that Balbus criticised as 
insufficient for radical practice.431 Alternatively, the law’s exacerbation could simply be 
the fact that it was an especially overt expression of those relations, and therefore 
inspired further revolutionary ire. It could easily have meant both things to Bedjaoui, 
both as the realities of decolonization made nonsense of ‘traditional’ international law’s 
formal legitimization of domination and as his own visions of justice were conflated 
with his idea of law. These tensions were never resolved in the work of jurists like 
Bedjaoui, however there are clear implications for revolutionary legal praxis that flow 
from these positions. The project to rehabilitate international law, to aid its transition 
from an exclusive ‘plutocratic’ law to a ‘democratic and egalitarian’ law, which was 
undeniably a part of Bedjaoui’s aspiration and representative of the broader demand 
for the NIEO, might serve to restore law to an ideal image, but without concurrent 
fundamental transformations in international relations this law would return to masking 
the defects of the present order. It would then serve the same function that Thompson 
saw it to require in order to function as an effective legitimating ideology: ‘that it 
[should] display an independence from gross manipulation and [should] seem to be 
just.’432 
Atop this uncertainty, the Third World relationship to international law recognised the 
basic Leninist position discussed in Chapter Two. Although the conservative reality of 
international law served dominant interests, it could also serve the interests of the new 
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states. Emphasising the basic indeterminacy of international legal argument, old states 
used the discourse of sovereignty to reject normative resolutions driven by the new 
states as having customary power, whilst new states could use the same argument to 
reject long-standing custom.433 To recall from Chapter Two, this kind of pragmatism was 
compatible with a revolutionary legal praxis in the sense that the revolutionary struggle 
should be fought by any means necessary, without investing the struggle in the ideal of 
law. Pashukanis noted that both idolizing law and demonizing its use as counter-
revolutionary were both forms of legal fetishism. What was important was the ultimate 
aim. To reiterate, despite elements of revolutionary rhetoric, the aim of the NIEO (in 
Anderson’s sense from Chapter One) was not explicitly radical transformation. 
However, this does not preclude there being revolutionary elements to their legal praxis 
through the necessary connection between certain kinds of legal argument and the 
disruption of capitalist exchange relations. Here the contrast with the Soviet example is 
direct. The NIEO represented the direct attempt to generalize norms that held this 
potentially revolutionary kernel, like the cancellation of debt and the right to nationalise 
property without compensation. Ironically, by pushing for these changes as principles, it 
is possible that this represented a more revolutionary legal praxis than the divestment 
from general principles of law that defined Soviet radicalism. 
To assess this possibility, this chapter will examine some of the legal principles of the 
NIEO, alongside contemporary criticisms. However, as with the Soviet example, it is 
impossible to consider the ‘legal’ struggle of this period without placing it in the context 
of broader confrontation that characterised the period. Section II provides a brief 
background in order to provide this context, focusing on both the formation of the Third 
World and the dominance of American Imperialism during this period. Although the 
Third World was far from a homogeneous bloc, the common experience of imperialist 
intervention served as a powerful unifier. Part i of this Section will examine this process 
through the highly representative struggle for Vietnamese independence. Part ii 
addresses the broad framework of the ‘Cold War’ that over-determines many accounts 
of this period. Although it captured the looming threat of nuclear apocalypse and 
should not be downplayed, the label of the ‘Cold War’ both elides American dominance 
and the vital place of the Third World in the struggles of the period. Overall the 
background emphasises the context for this period as the evident conflict between the 
first and Third Worlds – between the industrialised West and the undeveloped and 
underdeveloped rest.  
Section III will introduce the Third World relationship to international law, focusing on 
how the broader project of the NIEO was expected to impact on international law. The 
Third World’s engagement with international law formed two major and interrelated 
strands, through institutions and through declarations and resolutions. These will be 
addressed in Sections IV and VI respectively. Section V will deal separately with the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which although also part of the 
Third World institutional agenda presented something of a special case. In general the 
Third World project coincided with the strengthening and growth in numbers of 
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international institutions, and this was also a specific target of their transformative 
agenda. Section IV will examine the growth of Third World institutional bodies, from the 
prescient conference at Bandung, to the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). All of these 
either foreshadowed or embodied elements of the NIEO. 
OPEC’s special case derives from the particularly acute nature of the conflict between 
the ‘First’ and ‘Third’ Worlds during the oil crisis following the OPEC embargo of 1973, 
when Western commentators expressed virulent indignation at the audacity of Third 
World cartelism. OPEC’s actions emphasized the strengths and more importantly the 
weaknesses of the Third World institutional struggle. Section V addresses this directly 
and places this struggle in the important context of the general commodity boom of 
1973-4. Following this discussion of OPEC, Section VI will examine the United Nations 
General Assembly resolutions advanced and supported by the Third World movement, 
in addition to the relevant implications of the Lomé conventions and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Section VII will then take into account 
critical perspectives on the NIEO in general, and reflect upon the ideas present in order 
to trace the presence of revolutionary legal praxis. 
II: Background 
i) The Third World 
The divide between the developed and the newly ‘developing’ nations was a defining 
aspect of Third World legal struggle, and formed the entire basis for the formulation of 
the NIEO. However, this should not be seen to imply that either of these opposing 
‘camps’ were homogeneous. Just like in the Soviet example, although to a lesser 
degree, there were class solidarities across borders. Similarly, the formation of alliances 
was itself a political project, more than an aspect of geography.434 The very concept of 
the ‘Third World’ itself meant different things from different perspectives. First coined 
by Alfred Sauvy, it was argued to have direct links to the ‘Third Estate’ of revolutionary 
France, capturing both its economically and politically disenfranchised position and its 
revolutionary potential.435 Examining the Western perspective, Carl Pletsch argued that 
the term ‘arose from Western anxiety about the emergence of a 'second' world of 
socialist nations in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was a prior concern that governed 
Western thinking about the underdeveloped world from the start.’436 For others, the 
class characteristics of states complicated the issue. V. J. Prashad emphasising that 
'[t]he class character of Third World leadership constrained its horizon, even as it 
inflamed the possibilities in its societies. The Third World, then, [was] not just the voice 
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of the leaders or their political parties but also its opposition.'437 Coupled with this, 
some of the Western responses to the NIEO were also divided by socialist and trade 
union activity hoping for a more cooperative international system.438 
With this in mind, the broader background to the formation of the Third World bears 
some parallels with that of the Soviet revolution. In a similar way to that of the Soviet 
revolutionary dream, the failure of the Third World’s attempt to re-orchestrate the 
international order can downplay the scale of disruption and the sense of possibility 
present at the time of decolonization and the rise of the Third World movement. The 
revolutionary upheaval across Europe following the First World War required brutal 
repression from Europe’s ruling classes, and the Second World War was followed by 
similar revolutionary pressures and repressive interventions in the Third World.  
These revolutionary pressures took the form of independence struggles against 
Western colonialism. In 1945 the Arab League formed, specifically with a mind to 
speeding the processes of decolonization.439 In that same year, Ho Chi Minh ‘proclaimed 
Vietnam’s independence in the words of the American declaration of national 
sovereignty’, convinced that ‘the Allied nations which at Tehran and San Francisco [had] 
acknowledged the principle of self-determination and equality of nations, [would] not 
refuse to acknowledge the independence of Vietnam.’440 As Marylin Young noted 
acerbically, ‘the only people ready to recognize the freedom and independence of 
Vietnam were the Vietnamese themselves.’441 The British, then administering the 
Japanese surrender,  
rearmed French prisoners of war and, with a  few Indian Ghurka troops of their 
own, participated in a coup against the Viet Minh Executive Committee that had 
been administering Saigon in the name of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
Thus not only did one colonial power come to the aid of another in need, but it 
drew on the resources of the colonies to do so.442  
The Vietnamese example is particularly indicative. Following this British-led re-
imposition of French rule under the concept of a ‘trusteeship’, Minh wrote expectantly 
to US President Truman, reiterating the same claims he made to Woodrow Wilson 
following the First World War at Versailles for the Americans to fulfil their promise of 
self-determination for all peoples.443 His entreaties were met with silence. The callous 
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way in which the fate of what were to become Third World countries continued to be 
decided amongst Western imperial powers fanned the flames of nationalist 
revolutionary ire. Young highlighted the grim irony in the British coup when, finding 
themselves in need of extra military means, they rearmed Japanese troops, threatening 
to have them tried as war criminals if they refused. When some of the Japanese troops 
subsequently expressed their sympathy for the Viet Minh, in some cases actively, ‘they 
were condemned by their officers as “traitors to the Emperor”, which [Young noted] 
must have been confusing for everybody involved.’444  
This half-comical, wholly tragic abuse of a people, the colonial power’s own troops, the 
troops of other colonized peoples, and the troops of a freshly defeated rival empire, 
captures the essence of this period. In the face of imperial manoeuvring, it is impossible 
to capture the scale of rage and the sense of injustice that fed into the struggles for 
national liberation. But it does begin to portray the essence of what it would mean to 
organise around the concept of the Third World, and the stakes involved for the players. 
This is also particularly important to highlight, because so much of the later struggle 
would shift towards compromise and accommodation and the revolutionary fervour 
become easily overlooked. The long and hard fought struggle in Vietnam remains 
instructive for the concept of the Third World in a further sense. Pandit Nehru’s 
response to the British use of Ghurka’s captures both the rage and sense of solidarity: 
‘We have watched British intervention [in Indochina] with growing anger, shame and 
helplessness that Indian troops should be thus used for doing Britain’s dirty work 
against our friends, who are fighting the same fight as we.’445  
Nehru’s quote emphasises the way in which the struggle against imperial oppression in 
one location spoke deeply to the struggle elsewhere. When the Vietnamese finally dealt 
a conclusive blow to the re-established French rule at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, the 
Vietnamese victory was felt as a victory for people throughout Asia.446 For military 
historians, it was ‘the first time that a non-European colonial independence movement 
had evolved through all the stages from guerrilla bands to a conventionally organized 
and equipped army able to defeat a modern Western occupier in pitched battle.’447 The 
very idea of the Third World centred on the common cause of this experience. ‘The 
collapse of empires in Asia demonstrated to those nationalists in Africa that 
independence could be won, that some Europeans would change their minds 
                                                          
444
 Ibid. 
445
 Quoted in Ibid. 
446
 Tariq Ali, noting that for those growing up in India, '1954 was the year of the Battle of Điện 
Biên Phủ' – 'that was a postcolonial phase when hatred of colonial empires was very strong, and 
so large numbers of people throughout Asia, especially in countries that had once been 
colonized, felt that the Vietnamese victory was a victory for all of us.' In Sasha Lilley, ed., Capital 
and Its Discontents: Conversations with Radical Thinkers in a Time of Tumult (Oakland, CA: PM 
Press, 2010), 210. 
447
 Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam (London: 
Cassell Military, 2005), 42. 
139 
 
voluntarily while others could be defeated in guerrilla warfare if necessary, and that 
Third World unity against power and prejudice could help them all.’448 
ii) The not so Cold War – Super Power Imperialism  
In most narratives however, the rise of the Third World is overshadowed by the nuclear 
stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union. The context of the so called 
‘Cold War’ provides the other backdrop to the Third World relationship to international 
law. However, the standard picture of a period dominated by these two competing 
super-powers vastly overplays the strength of the Soviet Union, and elides American 
supremacy.449 The presence of the Soviet Union was evidently important, most 
especially as a marginally alternative development model,450 but the traditional focus of 
the ‘Cold War’ also marginalises the Third World.451 Common engagement described US 
policy as ‘continuing arms competition with the Soviet Union and periodic intervention 
in Third World conflicts.’452 The Third World thus remained marginal to accounts that 
focused on the Soviet threat, even in the face of the impact of the ‘periodic 
interventions’ in the Third World, both globally and on domestic politics in the US.453 
The focus on the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States also draws 
attention away from the deeper divide that structured the period and would prove 
central to Third World activism. Ever obliging in their honesty, military minds saw this 
clearly, stating in the same year as the declaration for the NIEO was made: ‘[a]s the 
leading affluent “have” power, [the United States] may expect to have to fight to 
protect our national valuables against envious “have-nots.”’454 
It would be more accurate to understand the framing of the Cold War as a narrative 
designed to legitimate American intervention in the Third World. Michael Cox compiled 
a significant amount of data demonstrating that American intelligence itself did not 
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consider the Soviet Union a threat immediately following the Second World War.455 
Following this line, Bruce Cummings described the faceoff between the United States 
and the Soviet Union as a ‘shadow conflict’: ‘[t]his ‘shadow conflict’ ‘shaded [analytic] 
vision, obscuring the hegemonic project and highlighting threats that could never stand 
the glare of realpolitik analysis.’456 Cummings argued in a similar vein that the US was 
the sole ‘superpower’ during this period, long before the traditional ‘unipolar’ system 
was seen to arise with the collapse of the Soviet Union.457 What his analysis highlighted 
was the American concern with their imperial and industrial rivals, Germany and Japan. 
For Cummings the Cold War was therefore much more about a containment project for 
America’s new (after their defeat and effective occupation) allies, rather than a life-or-
death struggle with the Soviet menace.  
This picture matches closely with descriptions of the Marshall Plan as designed 'to 
correct the massive structural disequilibrium in world trade by rebuilding the 
"workshop" economies of Europe and Japan and restoring their economic ties with 
primary producing areas in Asia, Africa, and Latin America,' and thereby to overcome 
'the economic crisis which would have faced American officials even in the absence of a 
Communist threat.'458 For theorists of imperialism, the US rise to supremacy presented 
a new phase: ‘America's strength lay in mass-production industries organized by 
bureaucratically managed multi-branch corporations and supplying a continental 
economy insulated from the other major centres of economic and political power by 
the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.’459 This ‘global hegemony’ without ‘formal territorial 
empire’460 comprised the new conditions of exploitation that the Third World would 
confront after securing nominal independence. 
This backdrop provides some basic context to the formation of the Third World 
position. Prashad summarised that formation in the following way: ‘The hope of the 
anticolonial era was translated into an agenda, a project that the new states struggled 
to enact. It was unique in world history for the majority of the world to agree on the 
broad outlines of a project for the creation of justice on earth.’461 Yet despite numerical 
superiority, the alliance of the Third World was a fragile one. Once formal 
independence was achieved, hard and often bloodily fought for, the way forward to 
both redress colonial exploitation and re-orientate a relationship to the international 
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environment that was non-subordinate was far from clear.462 The obstacles to achieving 
the kind of progressive vision present in the revolutionary rhetoric of the period, and in 
retrospectives like Prashad’s, were innumerable. Furthermore, all such retrospectives 
have to contend with the fact that not only did these projects mostly fail, but the gap 
between the richest and poorest nations has continued to widen at an ever increasing 
pace. Much of the Third World’s legal struggle to transform the system that exploited 
and impoverished them took institutional form, as will be addressed below, and yet 
these institutions faded into insignificance after the 1970s. The Third World’s central 
concerns of debt relief, compensation for past colonial wrongs, and the international 
trading system stacked against them were either ignored or intensified. The comments 
within the South Commission’s report of 1990 on debt apply to all areas of Third World 
struggle: ‘the vulnerability of individual developing countries vis-a-vis the North made it 
impossible for them to make an effective collective stand on the debt issue and to go 
beyond broad statements of policy.’463 
III: The Third World relationship to International Law 
The background sketched above provides the context of opposition that characterised 
this period. As with the Soviet example, there is an extent to which the ensuing struggle 
wasn’t primarily seen as a legal one. For most of the Third World’s leaders the prime 
concern was the issue of development, conceived as the transition from a heavily 
exploited colonial possession towards an independent nation integrated into an 
international system that aimed to coordinate its activities for the greater good of all 
peoples. Even jurists like Bedjaoui at times shifted law to the background – noting that 
the aim of his work was to provide lawyers with a focus for what was primarily an 
economic event.464 Bedjaoui’s doubt over the law’s epiphenomenal or causative role 
effectively replicated itself throughout the Third World’s engagement with international 
law. However, as with the Soviet case, there was no avoiding the law. Statehood itself 
was a legal category as well as the fact of formal self-rule, and the ‘new’ state would be 
immediately enmeshed in a series of legal relationships. The question for the Third 
World then became this: 
is the new State born into an organised and untouchable legal world and does it 
respect customary international law, whose historical formation has occurred in 
a manner totally independent of that State, and for the most part against it? Or 
does the State emerge into a legal framework in a constant state of flux, to 
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whose actions it of course submits, but on which it imprints its own reactions, 
thereby giving it the opportunity to sift through certain customary rules?465 
In addition to this, the Third World would then aim to shape that legal system in flux, to 
enable it to reflect their interests and their vision of a more just international society. 
Thus the Third World’s engagement with international law brought to the fore 
questions of how it was made, how international legal obligation came about, and 
crucially how these processes would be enforced. 
i) Legal Means, Revolutionary Ends? 
For some, whether political struggle ‘congeals into law or remains a mere statement of 
fluid politics depends upon several variables' in the end discernable by the ‘trained and 
sensitive eye’ of the international lawyer.466 One such trained and sensitive eye was 
Thomas Franck, who was astute enough to note the opposition between radical change 
and legal means. He noted the Third World as seeking revolutionary changes in the 
world economy, through normative political means, whereas in his opinion ‘revolutions 
[were] highly anti-normative, preferring fluid to congealed politics… Yet, here [was] a 
revolution that [was] seeking to proceed through the evolution of new sets of norms: a 
revolution of laws rather than of men.’467 Reminiscent of the Soviet opposition, the 
newly independent position of the Third World threatened the traditional (and 
imaginary) unity of international law, confronting it with apparently new problems of 
formation such as how to build an acceptable legal order ‘in the absence of a true 
universal community having similar political and social values and interests’.468 
This thesis has argued that law has to be understood in a different light. In the light of 
the critical insights discussed in Chapter Two, it is worth recalling that the very essence 
of law is born in the opposition of interests, not in some imagined community. The 
intimate relationship between law and exchange explicated by Pashukanis cautions 
against understanding international law as simply the cultural product of Europe, as was 
common in early descriptions.469 Amin again offers a succinct description of the 
dominating influence for those who might foreground law. ‘Capital knows only one 
“law”: the search for a maximum rate of surplus value, disguised by its immediate form 
– the pursuit of a maximum rate of profit. In this search, it confronts only one obstacle: 
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the resistance of the producers of this surplus value – proletarians and immediate 
producers formally subordinated to the exploitation of capital.’470 
ii) The One “Law” of Capital 
This offers a basic opposition to the hoped for ‘revolution of laws’. The need of capital 
to pursue profit, and the need of capitalists to hold on to their wealth, structured the 
fundamental opposition between the developed and the developing worlds. In desiring 
to transform this system for the benefit of the poorer and exploited nations, the Third 
World’s engagement with international law fundamentally called for significant 
transfers of wealth. In General Maxwell’s insouciant terms, the ‘haves’ faced a called 
from the ‘have-nots’ for some kind of redistribution. As a logical consequence 
therefore, the aims of the Third World’s struggle called for some form of revolutionary 
legal praxis as discussed in Chapter Two. Challenging privilege and exploitation on this 
scale necessarily questioned the basis of property in examining how it came to be 
owned by one rather than another, and the consequent basis for ‘equal exchange’ 
between parties. However, as mentioned, the Third World’s engagement with 
international law was not orientated in an explicitly anti-capitalist vein, but via 
contestation via establishing international mechanisms.  
IV: Bandung; Non-Aligned Movement and the G77; UNCTAD 
As mentioned the Third World’s engagement involved interaction with existing 
institutions, in addition to the establishment of new international bodies. This section 
covers the history of Third World institution building and the consolidation of Third 
World strength in the United Nations. The institutional precedent to the Third World 
fora that would later emerge in the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77, and UNCTAD, 
was the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung. This conference has achieved a 
somewhat iconic status in retrospectives, some noting that 'it would be a misreading of 
history to regard Bandung as though it was an isolated occurrence and not part of a 
great movement of human history.'471  
Perhaps these claims are made in part-eulogy for the demise of the Third World 
movement and the soul-crushing sweep of neo-liberal capitalist reforms across the 
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globe, alongside the rapidly widening gap between richest and poorest both across and 
within nations, the massive increase in indebtedness for the Third World, and the 
militaristic and exploitative posture adopted by those developing countries that 
successfully industrialised and escaped the so-called development trap.472 Hyperbole 
aside, the conference undoubtedly represented an important nodal point for the Third 
World’s collective engagement with international law. 
i) Bandung 
The Bandung Conference took place as part of a resurgent anti-colonial movement 
following independence for a host of territories: India and Pakistan in 1947, Indonesia 
and Vietnam in 1945 (although as discussed Vietnam’s anti-colonial struggle would go 
on),  
the Philippines in 1946, Burma, Ceylon, Korea and Malaysia in 1948, and China 
in 1949. In 1951, Ghana gained substantial independence (formally declared in 
1957), the same year that Libya gained freedom from Italy to join Liberia, 
Ethiopia, and Egypt as Africa's independent states, while in 1956 the Sudan 
broke from its Anglo-Egyptian bondage (just as Ethiopia absorbed Eritrea).473  
In total twenty-nine countries took part, including those just mentioned. Commentators 
at the time described the conference as a ‘unique and significant event’474, which 
indicated ‘that the end of five centuries of Western domination [was] rapidly 
approaching.'475 
United in political opposition to colonialism and imperialism and joined in ‘comparable 
experiences of Western domination’,476 the conference  
made manifest tendencies such as the relatively common social conditions of 
the colonized states and the nationalist movements that each of these states 
produced. The Bandung Conference was, for the leaders of these nationalist 
movements, also the culmination of a process that began at the 1927 Brussels 
gathering of the League against Imperialism.477  
However, this common opposition could neither smooth over the divisions within the 
nascent Third World, nor empower them to confront the West on its own terms. 
Sukarno’s opening speech made these facts clear: with its ‘economic strength… 
dispersed and slight’, without advanced Western weaponry and facing the machinations 
of power politics, the Third World could only offer to ‘inject the voice of reason into 
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world affairs. [They could] mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political 
strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace.’478  
The newly forming Third World collective also faced internal divisions from those ex-
colonies whose newly independent rulers remained in power with Western aid, and 
whose policy orientation remained close to Western interests. ‘Of the twenty-nine 
states at the Bandung Conference, six important delegates had recently made military-
economic arrangements with the United States and Britain.’479 Pakistan, the Philippines 
and Thailand had all joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and Iran, 
Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey joined with Britain and the US to create the Central Treaty 
Organisation. All of these states confronted popular left opposition at home, often 
crushed with Western support.480 This contextualised those statements that saw the 
conference as a vehicle for Nehru’s desire to expand the ‘neutralist’ group (prior to the 
non-aligned movement), and specifically intended to encourage Cambodia and Laos to 
'desist from forging closer links with either the South East Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) or the US'.481 It is less easy to read conferences like Bandung simply as vehicles 
for the personal projects of national leaders in the light of the Third World’s continued 
experience of intervention. Alongside the Vietnamese example discussed earlier that 
would drag the US into a protracted and bloody war, Sukarno himself would be deposed 
in US-backed coup in 1965. 
This also provides a certain context to Western reporting on the conference, which gave 
ample space to the speeches of Mohammed Ali of Pakistan, Carlos Romulo of the 
Philippines, and John Kotelawala of Ceylon, with the New York Times finding it 
‘gratifying to the West to hear a strong championship of liberty of thought and action,’ 
with the ‘right perspective’ on colonialism.482 As Prashad noted, this perspective was 
one that shifted the blame for colonialism from ‘European and US imperialism to 
communism.’483 The French press also wrung its hands over the impact of the 
conference, linking it to Egypt’s arms deal with Czechoslovakia, claiming increased 
tensions in the Middle East as the alliance of communism and Arab nationalism spread 
from Bandung.484 Guy Pauker saliently noted that this deal preceded the conference 
and stemmed from an understandable reluctance to take arms from the West (the US 
attached particularly onerous conditions to their offer), and in the light of the newly 
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formed Central Treaty Organisation.485 Yet the vitriolic claims in Western press 
emphasise the antagonism surrounding the early construction of the Third World’s anti-
imperialist solidarity. 
It emerged afterwards (although it would not have surprised any of the participants) 
that the West had heavily prepped its anti-communist axis before the conference,486 
and their political manoeuvrings clearly influenced the proceedings. Mohammed Ali 
arrived late and forced procedural changes, enabling speeches at the public sessions, 
seen by observers as an attempt to undermine the ‘leadership of Prime Minister 
Nehru.’487 The Iraqi delegate Dr. Mohammed Fadhil Jamali opened with a ‘vigorous 
attack on communism’,488 which was telling considering Iraq was then home to the 
largest Communist Party in Arab lands.489 Against this the Chinese representative, Zhou 
En-lai took a consistently conciliatory approach, claiming he had ‘come… to seek unity 
and not to quarrel’, not mentioning Taiwan (then Formosa) or revolutionary China’s 
unrecognised seat at the UN.490 Zhou En-lai’s diplomacy went down well even among 
Western leaning leaders at the conference.491 That said, in George Kahin’s account the 
conference was centrally concerned with the possible military threat from China and 
with that of communist forces across Asia.492 However, allowing that for the Western 
leaning sponsors of the conference, Ceylon and Pakistan, this might have been the case, 
this was not a shared perspective among observers or the attendees.493  
The Conference at Bandung was representative of a period of rapidly increasing Asian 
and African diplomacy as the decolonization movement built momentum. The Asian 
Socialist conference of 1953 and the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1955 were 
indicative of this shift, in addition to the Western leaning Manila Conference 
establishing SEATO. These fed into the variety of objectives present at Bandung: from 
the diplomatic introduction of revolutionary China to the World,494 to Nehru’s move to 
consolidate Asian leadership after the earlier Asian Relations Conference in 1947, which 
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had failed to lead to the formation of his hoped for Asiatic Relations Organisation.495 
Although follow up conferences were planned for Bandung, they were postponed 
indefinitely in 1956.496 Nehru put a positive spin on this in his report to the Indian 
Parliament in April 30, 1955, stating that the conference had 'wisely avoid[ed] any 
provision for setting up additional machinery of inter-nation co-operation', seeking 'to 
rely on existing international machinery in part', and for the rest on individual initiative 
and bilateral arrangements, thereby respecting 'sovereign governments'.497 
Retrospectives on the conference vary from claiming it as an achievement just to have 
met,498 and a polite and well run affair that settled nothing.499 Both of these hold true in 
a way. Although in terms of the declaration there were no concrete commitments, 
Nehru was probably right in his assessment of the potential cost in financial and 
diplomatic resources of further institutional establishments – especially considering the 
longer term effectiveness of those that would follow Bandung. Nehru’s own diplomacy 
at the conference was said to have gone somewhat awry; Romulos described him as 
'dogmatic, impatient, irascible, and unyielding', also as polemically anti-American and 
secretly enamoured of all things British.500 Anthony Reid claimed ‘Nehru came to the 
Bandung Conference as the leader of Asia, but left it as an outsider.'501 However, in the 
face of these differences, and a declaration clearly driven by the principle of the lowest 
common denominator, Bandung’s position as part of a broader narrative of Third World 
construction was important. It was indicative in terms of the divisions captured within 
the movement, but also in terms of the hopes for collective action. Importantly for the 
consideration of the Third World relationship to international law, the conference 
represented a nodal point within the  
Third World movement that sought to translate the de jure political sovereignty 
and rights previously colonised countries had attained through independence 
into effective capabilities that would enable them to bring about development 
and progress to their populations and, through that, to renew the bases of 
legitimacy for post-colonial governments.502 
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ii) The Non-Aligned Movement  
In terms of the institutional vehicles of the Third World, the first major non-regional 
organisation was the Non-Aligned Movement. The movement partly grew out of 
Bandung and preliminary discussions there between Gamal Abdel Nasser, Nehru and 
Sukarno. In Brijuni in the summer of 1956, Nasser and Nehru joined Josip Tito to discuss 
their common interests,503 leading eventually to the First Conference of the Non-
Aligned Heads of State in Belgrade in 1961.504 The impulse remained the same as 
Bandung; namely the need for some kind of solidarity outside of the sphere of the 
competing superpowers.505 Tito had made support of African and Asian resistance 
against imperialism a central component of his foreign policy in the decade preceding 
the Conference, touring India in 1954-5 and Egypt in 1955. ‘Yugoslavian arms went to 
Egypt and Burma, and its UN votes went to the Congo and Angola… In 1953-54, the 
Yugoslavian government made contact with the FLN in Cairo and began to funnel all 
kinds of assistance (including cover at the United Nations) from the inception of the FLN 
uprising in November 1954.’506 Their binding experience remained imperial oppression. 
During that first conference Sukarno noted: 
There was no prior consultation and agreement between us before we adopted 
our respective policies of non-alignment. We each arrived at this policy inspired 
by common ideals, prompted by similar circumstances, spurred on by like 
experiences.507 
In this sense the first Non-Aligned conference bore a strong similarity to the conference 
at Bandung, and shared a similar pattern of avoiding the need for compromise and the 
construction of a homogeneous position, in part presenting itself as simply an 
'inspirational' meeting of minds.508 However as with Bandung, particularly for the three 
major figures of the Non-Aligned Movement, there were significant tensions with 
Western powers that spurred their alliance. American diplomacy had turned away from 
a belligerent Nehru to Pakistan to achieve its intended encirclement of both the Soviet 
Union and revolutionary China, and in the Middle East the newly formed Baghdad pact 
isolated Egypt. The strenuous conditions attached to an American arms deal pushed 
Nasser to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia, further highlighting his opposition to 
Western interests.509 For the American Cold War mentality, non-alignment was the 
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same as neutralism. Echoing contemporary ‘anti-terrorist’ diplomacy interpreting non-
alignment with the US as equivalent to opposing it, the US cut funding the Aswan Dam 
project, prompting Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal. ‘When the Anglo-French-
Israeli force invaded Egypt in retaliation, Tito and Nehru came to Egypt's aid.’510 This 
incessant manoeuvring of Third World states against Western powers provides an 
important context to the otherwise pacific seeming process of international institution 
building.  
The downsides of the Non-Aligned Movement were evident from the outset, essentially 
mirroring those at Bandung. Unlike Bandung however, the Non-Aligned movement 
maintained a different kind of momentum beyond the early years in which its 
figureheads attempted to steer a course of state development between the ‘capitalism 
of the United States’ and ‘the communism of the Soviet Bloc’.511 Mark Berger describes 
this momentum as the ‘second generation of Bandung regimes’, comprising Chile under 
Allende (1970-73), Tanzania under Nyerere (1965-85), Jamaica under Michael Manley 
(1972-80) Libya under Gaddafi after 1969, and Nicaragua under the Sandanistas (1979-
90).512 Berger notes: 
In contrast to the first generation, the second generation of Bandung regimes 
reflected a more radical, explicitly socialist Third Worldist agenda, sometimes 
known as tricontinentalism, which emerged in the wake of the Tricontinental 
Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, that 
was held in Havana in January 1966.513 
The Non-Aligned movement was central to this momentum. The opening Non-Aligned 
conference ‘welcomed the representatives of twenty-two states from Africa, Asia, Latin 
America, and Europe to Belgrade… [creating] an institution that grew in strength from 
conference to conference, within and without the United Nations.’514 At the same time, 
‘[i]ts sheer political diversity made an ideologically coherent and unified stance by [the 
Non-Aligned Movement] almost impossible.’515 In the early years it adopted a staunch 
anti-nuclearism, and pushed for the democratization of the UN, ‘do[ing] so in the spirit 
of justice, not charity.’516 Once again however, despite these appeals to justice, the 
Non-Aligned Movement could lay claim to little beyond some ‘great moral force’.517 
Prashad noted that both ‘Moscow and Washington made empty promises in return [to 
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pleas for disarmament] provid[ing] a measure of the limited value of moral pleas in a 
nuclear age.’518  
=Through this lens the Non-Aligned Movement appears as a somewhat ineffective 
institution, something that haunts its contemporary existence. However, the early years 
of anti-imperialist struggle contained elements worthy of note. The Non-Aligned 
Movement’s early supplications to the great powers for peace and disarmament, 
heavily influenced by the proximity of global nuclear catastrophe,519 were nevertheless 
nuanced when it came to anti-imperialist warfare. The Non-Aligned Movement offered 
‘every type of support [to] the freedom fighters in territories under Portuguese 
colonialism,’ contemporary Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, recognising that freedom 
struggles still had to be fought whilst calling for the imperialists to cease their wars.520 
This more radical message of the Non-Aligned Movement was encapsulated by Che 
Guevara’s speech at the UN General Assembly – another target institution for Third 
world activism: 
Imperialism wants to convert this meeting into a useless oratorical tournament 
instead of solving the serious problems of the world. We must prevent them 
from doing this . . . . As Marxists we maintain that peaceful co-existence does 
not include co-existence between exploiters and exploited, between oppressors 
and oppressed.521 
This captured the dilemma of both the Non-Aligned Movement’s institutional face, as 
well as that of the General Assembly. Namely that these institutions might fail to offer 
much in the way of concrete moves towards eliminating the exploitation and 
oppression of the majority of the World’s population by a self-enriching minority. In 
terms of the Third World’s relationship to international law the threat of this possibility 
replicated itself in the marginalisation of the institutions where they held numerical 
strength, and the translation of their struggle into some kind of global moral conscience 
– for all intents and purposes, a useless oratorical tournament. 
iii) The UNCTAD and the G-77 
These same dilemmas would haunt the other major Third World institutional fora – the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the Group of 77 (G-77). 
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UNCTAD was first convened in 1964, in the context of the first United Nations 
Development Decade, and shortly afterwards the G-77 was formed.522 The G-77 
functioned primarily as a major bloc within the United Nations General Assembly, but 
also aimed to approach other international fora as a collective. Both of these appeared 
within the context of a sustained struggle by the nascent Third World to have their 
interests represented on the international stage. This was initially conducted in the 
preparatory conferences in Geneva and London prior to the UN Conference on Trade 
and Employment in Havana in 1948. 
The delegates from the Third World pointed out that the Geneva draft only 
represented the opinions of the imperial powers, that it "held out no hope" for 
the rest of the world. The aggrieved delegates proposed eight hundred 
amendments, of which two hundred would have entirely sunk the [proposed 
International Trade Organisation (ITO)]. These nations denounced the 1947 
creation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in Geneva 
because it was restricted to the advanced industrial states. They objected to 
GATT's oversight of the economic rules, and demanded that they have the right 
to use preferential systems when it suited them. The chorus fell on deaf ears, as 
GATT remained and an ITO to work for the benefit of the peasant nations failed 
to emerge.523 
The Third World development ethos at this point was firmly rooted in shifting the terms 
of trade; a position heavily influenced by the vision of Raúl Prebisch, the founding 
Secretary General of UNCTAD and a significant figure in the G-77.524 It was for this 
reason that the demand to use preferential trade systems was pushed, and the failure 
to achieve recognition for this in previous conferences led to the perceived need for an 
alternative ‘UN institution to implement their agenda.’525 A short decade after its 
creation UNCTAD was already interpreted as an attempt to ‘create a forum in which the 
more prosperous member countries [of the UN] would come under pressure to agree to 
measures benefiting the less-developed countries… [It was] a deliberate effort to use 
international bureaucracy and conference diplomacy to alter current norms affecting 
trade and development’.526  
Yet the early stages of UNCTAD faced a series of frustrations. According to Gamani 
Corea, Secretary General of UNCTAD from 1973 to 1984, it 'was not seen particularly as 
a forum in which specific agreements and arrangements were brought about through a 
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negotiating process.'527  Not only did this lead to frustrations for heads of delegations 
complaining that ‘nothing happen[ed] at UNCTAD’, but it further consolidated 
UNCTAD’s position as marginal to the location of the ‘concrete’ negotiations that 
remained situated at the GATT, and later the WTO. That this happened to also be the 
opinion of the developed countries was no coincidence. UNCTAD was hampered not 
only by its own conservative tendencies and institutional set up, but by the very act in 
which it intended to engage. Corea’s recognition of its marginal status for him implied 
that the immediate task was to render it credible as a negotiating house, but it was 
difficult to see how this could be achieved without mirroring (and therefore simply 
replicating) those institutions that already fulfilled that role. 
This was a crucial point. Although the Third World decried what they saw as consistent 
effort by the developed countries to undermine UNCTAD and to ignore their calls for 
reform, they confronted the fact that the developed countries dominated world trade – 
their material power outweighed the numerical strength of the developing world.528 The 
Third World repeatedly criticised the offerings from the developed countries as being 
clearly designed to ‘conceal’ their interest,529 and claimed the limited early successes of 
UNCTAD (an Integrated Programme on Commodities, and the Generalised System of 
Preferences) had been ‘sabotaged’ by the North.530 By the time of Corea’s reflections, 
the ‘sabotage’ of the industrialised North was being intensified and turned on both 
itself and the global South in  the ‘neo-liberal counter-revolution’ of Thatcher and 
Reagan.531  
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from this short discussion of the 
institutional side of the Third World’s relationship to international law. Firstly there is a 
common theme of divergent interests within the Third World group itself, be it those 
present at Bandung, the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the G-77 or those 
who approached UNCTAD with a hope towards counterbalancing GATT. The common 
experience of colonial oppression and a disadvantaged position in the world trading 
system brought diverse interests into some form of alliance, but this could not 
immediately overcome the differences within the broadly defined ‘developing’ world. It 
is necessary to stress this primarily because of the rhetoric in the developed world of a 
Third World offensive launched against them; predominately a product of the 
combination of Third World anti-imperialist rhetoric (entirely justified considering the 
historical record) and the pressure felt in the developed world by the commodity boom 
of 1973-4 coinciding with OPEC’s oil embargo and a global recession. This often 
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overplayed the unity of the Third World against the supposedly beleaguered Western 
nations.532  
In the face of this, the second evident conclusion is the nature of the opposition to the 
Third World’s aspirations. Often this took the form of direct and violent intervention, far 
in excess of the few cases mentioned in this Chapter. But outside of this the developed 
nations maintained strength in organisations in which the Third World could not 
develop an equal voice – be it the UN Security Council, GATT and the later World Trade 
Organisation, the IMF or in other regional organisations and bilateral agreements where 
dominant capitalist power could be brought to bear. This dominance was in no way 
immune to the occasional exception, as the following section will make clear. But those 
exceptions were heavily qualified and short lived. Neither was this a scenario in which 
the developed ‘nations’ felt no pain. The neo-liberal counterrevolution hit hard there 
too. But incorporating such common experiences of oppression brings back the essence 
of the Third World’s struggle as the ‘have-nots’, or perhaps more accurately the 
dispossessed (and exploited), seeking some restitution. Broadening that perspective to 
include the disenfranchised within the developed world does not alter the flow of battle 
in this period.533 
In some sense it is telling that all the institutions discussed here, if Bandung can be 
included in memorialized form,534 survive to the present day, but transformed in 
important ways. UNCTAD now resembles a ‘non-confrontational’ organisation,535 in 
which developing countries compete for Western capital and abandon solidarity in a 
‘malaise of the South’,536 seeking ‘acceptance’ rather than challenging or providing an 
alternative.537 As part of this transformation UNCTAD’s weaknesses noted by Corea in 
1980 became strengths for the Secretary General two decades later: in his view 
UNCTAD offered a location in which discussion could be free because ‘the organisation 
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… does not set rules on trade or investment, has no enforcement authority and does 
not resolve disputes involving the national interests of its members’.538 
 It is interesting that, even in the eyes of some of its critics, UNCTAD is seen to have a 
'legitimacy' that other international trade organisations lack.539 This redeeming quality 
combined with the requisite inclusion of ‘civil society’ apparently offers it as a potential 
forum for ‘counter-hegemonic struggle’.540 Once again, the absent consideration is 
‘negotiating authority’, with which we return to Corea’s concerns of the 1980s. 
Acquiring this authority meant abandoning the goal of redistribution. This should offer a 
serious question to the continued investment of hope and transformative potential in 
these institutions. Corea’s own unduly positive reflections on developing country 
engagement are apposite:  
Although it is useful politically and tactically for the developing countries to 
complain, and to complain loudly, they must not allow themselves to become 
convinced of the futility of the efforts to reorder international economic 
relations, and they must not undermine the efficacy and the credibility of the 
institutions and the forums in which these efforts are being undertaken.541 
The latter point is particularly contentious. It is difficult to imagine the founding 
members of the Third World movement envisaging their institutional success as limited 
to creating handmaidens to the efficient function of international capital. Of course, as 
discussed in Chapter Two this dilemma is at the heart of the attempt to engage in 
revolutionary legal praxis. Although on some level the diverse aims present within the 
Third World movement may leave some question as to whether it was engaging in such 
praxis, an absolutely essential aspect of attempting to advance revolutionary aims 
through recourse to legal means is precisely not fetishizing the legal form as sufficient in 
its own right. If a particular legal argument or international institution is manifestly 
failing to achieve the objectives for which it is being used, then it has to be discarded. 
One apparent pitfall of engaging in the institutional side of international law appears to 
be the fact that institutions seem to carry significant financial and emotional ‘sunk-
costs’, in addition to developing their own internal logic and bureaucratic will to survive. 
It then becomes difficult to abandon them as unfit for purpose. Whether or not it is 
possible to return to them and engage in revolutionary praxis is doubtful considering 
the historical lessons of the Third World’s engagement. 
V: OPEC: Commodities, commodity booms and Oil – the exception 
UNCTAD’s focus on trade foregrounds an issue that has to be addressed prior to the 
specific elements of the demand for a NIEO. This is the infamous OPEC oil embargo and 
the subsequent rapid rise in the price of oil. In many ways the OPEC embargo, and the 
formation of the organisation, are an integral part of the formation of the Third World 
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position and its relationship to international law. The apparent success of the 
organisation not only bolstered the position of the developing nations, but also served 
as an intended exemplar for the broader demands of the NIEO and those articulated in 
the trade negotiations preceding and during UNCTAD’s early years. It is important to 
consider here as it was understood to have provided a strengthening of the Third World 
position and a moment of hope that coincides with the declaration for an NIEO and a 
series of other agreements that will be addressed in the subsequent Section of this 
Chapter.  Importantly this was a strength that, as discussed above, was seen to be 
absent in and crucially undermining of other Third World institutional endeavours. In 
legal terms it is possible to consider this a moment when the Third World’s engagement 
with international law took on something more than ‘moral force’, and could perhaps 
begin to approach the force of law. 
The formation of OPEC and the role the trade in primary commodities played in the 
Third World’s relationship to international law can only be understood in light of the 
dependency of most of the Third World on primary commodity exports for their foreign 
trade.  By 1980 at least half of the one-hundred and fifteen developing countries 
defined as such by UNCTAD were ‘dependent on one commodity for over [fifty] percent 
of their export revenues.’542 As mentioned, this formed a central platform of the Third 
World’s activism in international fora, particularly at UNCTAD and within the Non-
Aligned movement discussed above. According to OPEC’s representative to the Non-
Aligned Movement, '[b]oth the First Meeting of the OPEC Conference in 1960 and the 
First Non-Aligned Summit held towards the end of the following year were expressions 
of the Third World's complete disenchantment with the international economic and 
political order.'543 Addressing the International Progress Organisation, a Non-
Governmental Organization with consultative status to the Economic and Social Council 
of the United Nations, OPEC’s representative went on to state:  
[t]he division of labour, as enshrined by centuries of foreign domination meant 
that even after full political independence had been achieved, control over the 
vital economic resources of the developing countries still remained, directly or 
indirectly, in the hands of the Western multinational companies and their 
banking and trade institutions.544 
This remained a central concern of the Third World and figured prominently in all their 
engagements in the international arena. By the time OPEC was established these issues 
were already being examined under the principle of self-determination, taking concrete 
form with the UN Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources which 
led to the General Assembly Resolution of the same title shortly after the formation of 
OPEC.545 The same concerns are reiterated in the Declaration of Friendly Relations, the 
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call for the NIEO, and the Convention on the Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(CERD) which will be addressed collectively in the section following this. The issues of 
effective self-determination in economic matters, of the role of private foreign 
investment, of the detrimental effects of large fluctuations in primary commodity prices 
and in the exclusion of the Third World from the effective decision making processes 
were not new. As discussed in the previous sections, they had been central concerns of 
the anti-imperialist movement for significant time and formed a central part of both 
imperialist foreign intervention and reactions to it.546 OPEC was understood to 
represent a shift in the balance of these relations, precipitating a change from rhetoric 
to muscle.  
Although OPEC was formed in 1961, it was the oil embargo of 1973 that manifested the 
potential strength of the organisation. The Arab oil boycott was seen to provide ‘the 
developing countries with the leverage to force the developed countries to consider 
seriously Third World proposals’ on the international economic order.547  
The crisis represented the first effective exercise of market power by a group of 
developing country exporters of primary products. It had a demonstration (sic) 
effect on other developing countries, while it produced a fear among industrial 
countries that such power might be exercised by associations of exporters of 
other primary products.548 
In the West, OPEC was seen to be representative of the ability of the Third World to 
‘harness the “powerful” multinational firms to actively promote their own national 
interests’, threatening both the security and economic prosperity of the developed 
world.549  
In some sense the effects of the embargo are undeniable. The price of oil did rise four-
hundred percent in the period from October 1973 to January 1974.550 In financial terms, 
it was said to represent ‘the most colossal commercial redistribution of income in 
history,’551 with the change in export earnings ‘resulting from higher commodity price 
levels’ dwarfing international aid, then running at around eight billion dollars a year.552 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) formed in response to the oil embargo and 
designed to explore energy alternatives posted dramatic looking statistics to 
demonstrate the impact on the West. According to their report pre-embargo GNP 
growth rate was at an average of 5% per year, dropping to 3.4% thereafter. Inflation 
rose from 4.3% to 8.1%, and unemployment from 3% to 5%. The emotive and rather 
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obscure sounding ‘misery index’ rose from 7.3% to 13% post embargo.553 The OPEC 
embargo raised a series of concerns for international lawyers of the day, primarily 
concerned with the legality of the embargo itself,554 but also prompted by the growth of 
a ‘sellers’ market in the production of raw materials555 alongside concern with the 
‘politically motivated exclusion of customers.’556 These will be addressed in more detail 
in Sections VI and VII assessing the Third World’s international resolutions. OPEC’s 
activity, however, reversed the positions of the developing and developed nations in 
this regard. It was the developing countries that had previously pushed hard for the 
recognition of ‘economic coercion’ in international law. Demonstrating the persistent 
indeterminacy of legal argument, but potentially also its occasional resistance to an 
immediate about turn, international legal commentary inclined to consider this example 
of Third World cartelism illegal remained with its ‘inevitable conclusion… that it will 
require a great deal of practice, of 'case-law', to give the concept of illegal economic 
coercion substance and definition.'557 
Alongside this more explicitly ‘legal’ consideration, ran the more general concern over 
the cartelism of OPEC’s actions, and the fear that this could spread. It is essential, 
therefore, to iterate the obvious fact that oil production on a global scale has never 
occurred under ‘free market’ conditions. Prior to OPEC there had existed two 
cooperative agreements. Firstly, the 'international corporate cartel', formed by the Red-
Line Agreement in 1914 and reinforced by the As-Is Agreement in 1928.558 Red-Line 
specified that all Middle Eastern reserves be developed through the Turkish Petroleum 
Company, formed of BP, Royal Dutch-Shell, and the French Compagnie Française des 
Petroles (CFP). As-Is divided the sale of oil on world markets between BP, Royal Dutch-
Shell and Exxon. Other major companies joined during the 1930s, and by the early 
1950s the corporate cartel consisted of CFP and the infamous 'Seven Sisters': Exxon, 
Mobil, Texaco, Socal, Gulf, Shell, and BP.559 The second cooperative arrangement was 
formed by a group of US based State Governments, who devised a quota and allocation 
scheme to affect supply and demand. This was a project sanctioned by the United 
States Federal Government in 1935, and was considered relatively effective at 
maintaining prices till 1970.560 Feeling the need to defend the ‘market’ in this instance, 
economists pointed out that  
pure competition has never existed in world oil markets and... there has never 
been a master plan or overall conspiracy... instead, the principal actors have 
always operated with limited information and in their own self-interest... 
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integrated companies are simply the survivors in markets which have 
periodically swung between the extremes of cooperation and competition.561 
This is a vital consideration, not only in assessing OPEC, but in contextualising the entire 
Third World approach to international law. These less explicitly ‘legal’ relations, absent 
a ‘master plan’ or ‘overall conspiracy’ constituted the international economic order that 
the Third World hoped to transform. Despite the rhetoric in the West, there are many 
aspects to OPEC that fit within the economic frame above, which reveal its weaknesses 
as a vehicle for the Third World’s transformative aspirations. OPEC consisted of 
principal actors operating ‘in their own self-interest’ that would equally threaten to 
oscillate between cooperation and competition.  
Just as divisions lurked within Bandung, so too the ‘extreme diversity’ that characterized 
the OPEC membership presented a ‘continual impediment to the achievement of 
cooperation in pricing and production policies.’562 The alliance was constantly 
threatened by economic sabotage, as evinced by President Eisenhower’s candid 
statement: ‘[t]he Middle East countries in the new organization were concerned anyone 
could break up the organization by offering five cents more per barrel for the oil of one 
of the countries.’563 As direct confirmation of this, the Seven Sisters undermined the 
early activities of OPEC, offering the Iranians and Saudis a price break in 1964. The 
United States followed suit, reducing its import quota to benefit Venezuela in 1967.564 
OPEC’s potential weaknesses are also evinced by placing the oil embargo of 1973 in the 
context of the more general boom in commodity prices of 1973-4. This is particularly 
important against accounts like those of Fred Bergsten and the IEA that attribute 
elements of the so-called ‘stagflation’ of the 1970s to Third World activism. As 
economists noted at the time, ‘[t]he Reuters Index on 28 December [1973] stood at 
1,390 against the 1972 average of approximately 600 and this index has been above 
1,100 since June, which should convince even the most sceptical that… price levels 
[were] not a short-term effect produced by the Arab-Israeli War and the oil cutbacks.’565 
OPEC’s embargo lagged the major commodity spikes, which adds further weight to their 
being alternative explanations for increasing prices.  
These explanations range from widespread crop failures in the preceding years, to 
Peru’s catastrophic drop in anchovy catch which had an effect in other food markets 
and a knock on effect as land use shifted from Cotton and Jute to take advantage of the 
spike in food prices.566 Cooper and Lawrence noted that ‘Australian sheep were 
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slaughtered in response to the steady rise in demand for meat and wheat (and weak 
demand for wool), with effects on the subsequent supply of wool. Supplies of metals 
were affected by the strikes and political unrest in Chile, the major exporter of copper; 
and Zambia halted its copper shipments through Rhodesia.’567 Importantly the 
commodity price spikes also followed a particularly ‘strong period of macroeconomic 
performance during 1972 and 1973’ in the developed world, where American, European 
and Japanese industrial cycles peaked.568 It is also worth considering that the volatility 
in currency values as the United States devalued the dollar in the early 1970s and 
precipitated a shift to floating exchange rates also drove investors to shift to 
commodities as a potentially more stable (or profitable) investment.569 
The ultimate causes of the 1973-4 commodity boom are of only marginal interest for 
the discussion at hand. What is notable is that, firstly the context of a broader 
commodity boom exemplified exactly the broader economic problem that beset the 
developing countries – primarily the extreme volatility of the primary commodity 
market. There had been an earlier commodity boom in 1950-1, generally considered to 
be caused by a massive inventory build-up in response to the Korean War.570 Following 
the 1973-4 boom, prices dropped again precipitously; although it is worth noting that 
here OPEC was able to maintain its higher oil prices. There are two points to take away 
from this. Firstly the economic system that produced such volatility was the same that 
enabled OPEC’s position of strength. OPEC simply represented a new constellation of 
economic players in the oil market that could at any point cooperate and compete.  
This has a further implication for the later proposals of the Third World articulated in 
the call for a NIEO. Without addressing the basic background driving motivator of profit 
– Amin’s one ‘law’ recognised by capital mentioned earlier – control of these markets 
has proven to be a difficult task even for wealthy countries. For example, ‘even sales in 
1973 from the U.S. strategic stockpile of lead and zinc of around one-fifth of U.S. 
consumption, and sales of tin of around one-third of consumption, did not prevent the 
sharp increase in prices’.571 Considering responses to the global financial crisis of 2007-8 
recommending ‘buffers’ for international financial institutions, it seems that the lesson 
of profit seeking investors and ‘cushions’ is a hard one to learn.572 The larger the buffer 
or the stock, the greater the potential opportunity for investors to make large profits, 
irrespective of the size or nature of the bubble they might generate in the process. 
Coupled with the financial difficulties of maintaining stockpiles of actual material 
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commodities in preparation for price fluctuations, not to mention those less-durable 
commodities, the hopes of some of the measures of the NIEO were clearly overly 
optimistic. 
The second point to bear in mind is the diversity of the Third World, and the differential 
impact of the OPEC embargo. Commentators at the time noted that although the rise in 
both oil and other commodity prices ‘benefited some developing countries massively’, it 
was likely to cause ‘correspondingly severe problems for others, who [were] large net 
importers of oil and a wide variety of raw materials and metals.’573 Although India was 
an exceptional case in terms of its dependence on imports, ‘[t]he losses to Indian 
foreign exchange reserves in 1973 [were] estimated at $400-600m for the purchase of 
foodgrains and oils alone.’574 Although OPEC established a development aid programme 
to counteract this problem, the problem required significant adjustments in terms of aid 
flows: concerned economists noted that 
many developing countries who [were] net oil importers with per caput 
national incomes of less than $500 [would] not be able to develop unless they 
receive[d] significant aid from the oil states, to counteract the effects of the 
price increases, and additional World Bank and OECD loans or grants, which… [it 
was suggested could] be diverted from the gainers with per caput incomes in 
excess of $800-1000 per annum.575  
The financial juggling required to maintain the global economic system’s “alms for the 
poor” also highlighted the fact that the developed world controlled these financial 
processes. As Andre Gunder Frank noted close to the time, ‘most of the effective cost of 
the rise in oil prices… [was] passed on to the non-oil producing countries of the Third 
World, while the industrial countries increased their exports to the OPEC countries 
and… recycled the remaining OPEC surplus through their banks.'576 Other contemporary 
accounts concurred, noting that the bulk of the resulting current account deficits in the 
developed world would ‘be covered by capital account movements of the oil producers’ 
surpluses into the investment and security markets of the USA, the EEC (led by London 
and Frankfurt), and Japan.’577 
VI: Resolutions 
The other side of the coin of the Third World’s currently rather beleaguered looking 
engagement with international law took the form of resolutions produced in the 
General Assembly of the UN, alongside Conventions, certain treaties, and the 
publications and actions of jurists such as Bedjaoui, particularly through the work of the 
International Law Commission. Although disparate, there was a common theme to 
engagement in all of these areas, in line with the foregoing discussions. Nearly all of 
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these themes are summed up and reiterated in the declaration for the NIEO, which was 
considered in many cases simply a restatement and call for action on all of these 
issues.578 Most particularly there are strong parallels between the declaration for the 
NIEO and the preceding declarations on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources,579 and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations.580  
i) The NIEO – GA Res 3201 and 3202 
The NIEO declaration itself came out of the sixth special session of the UN General 
Assembly of 1974 and was followed up in the seventh special session in 1975 with a 
declaration on Development and international economic co-operation.581 The Sixth 
Special Session was convened in order to ‘study for the first time the problems of raw 
materials and development.’582 It called for 
the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on equity, 
sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among 
all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems which shall correct 
inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the 
widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure 
steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice 
for present and future generations.583 
These declarations were based on the awareness that it had ‘proved impossible to 
achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the 
existing international economic order’.584 Given the foregoing discussions of the 
frustrated institutional efforts of the Third World this call for a NIEO represented the 
reassertion of the necessity of change at the highest point of Third World strength. 
Some Western responses brought into this bombast, claiming ‘the industrial world [to 
be] still stunned by the effectiveness of the OPEC oil price increases… [and that with the 
NIEO the] tables in the grand game of power seemed to have shifted irrevocably.’ 585 
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This aligned with the rhetoric of the declaration itself, which claimed that ‘[t]he 
developing world [had] become a powerful factor that [made] its influence felt in all 
fields of international activity.’586 
The declaration contained a host of provisions defining the founding principles of the 
envisioned NIEO. Repeating the context of equality and cooperation being the founding 
principles of international relations (in direct contrast to the reality of the current 
international economic order) the declaration reiterated specific calls for the right to 
nationalize property according to local legislation; called for just and equitable trade for 
developing countries; demanded an increase in aid and foreign direct investment; called 
for reform of the international monetary system; aid for capital light industry, which 
essentially referred to the need to protect primary commodities against synthetic 
alternatives (the rise in oil prices temporarily affected this process in favour of the 
developing world); and positive discrimination for the least developed countries (LDCs), 
alongside the transfer of finance and technology to those most disadvantaged within 
the present system. The declaration also called for a coalition of LDC primary producers 
and their right to form cartels. 
It is evident from this brief list that much of the NIEO’s basic principles were informed 
by the potential model offered by OPEC, combined with a hoped for increase in 
development aid and investment within a system that otherwise wasn’t radically 
different from the old economic order. The key provisions that were to face serious 
resistance, wherever they appeared, were the possibilities of cartel action by 
developing countries, their right to nationalize property without adequate 
compensation, and the meaningful transfer of technology or finance in forms other 
than tied-aid or loans that contributed to the unsustainable debt burden of most 
developing countries. In essence, all of these vigorously opposed provisions could 
effectively be translated as demanding the direct transfer for wealth, or its meaningful 
redistribution. It is for this reason that the NIEO has been interpreted as a kind of global 
Keynesianism, in which the welfare-state model of the post-war industrialised countries 
was transposed to the international plane ‘as the world community… accepted 
increasing responsibility for the welfare of its individual members.’587 Unfortunately this 
world community was currently busy bitterly competing as to who could exploit the 
most human and natural resources the fastest, and that same welfare state was ripe for 
the neoliberal chop.  
The declaration was followed by a programme of action to put this new order into 
place, which fell under the subheadings of raw materials, money and finance, 
industrialisation, the transfer of technology, the regulation of Transnational 
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Corporations, the finalization of the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of 
States (CERD), the promotion of cooperation among developing countries, mutual 
assistance in protecting and enabling permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
and strengthening the role of the UN’s more democratic organs. Much of this section 
maintained the same programmatic language of the declaration, with only sparse 
discussion of specific mechanisms. This section was followed by a series of special 
provisions to address the immediate concerns of the financial crisis of the seventies and 
its disproportionate impact on the most vulnerable developing countries.  
Even this section was striking in its lack of specific mechanisms, but it was the closest 
the resolution came to laying out a specific and immediate path to achieving some of its 
espoused aims. Here emphasis was placed on immediate commodity purchases and 
trade mechanisms – to keep vital goods flowing – and on financial arrangements in the 
form of aid, loans on concessionary terms, and the renegotiation of debt with a mind to 
its potential cancellation. Of course, this was a reiteration of the prior programme of 
action and founding principles, the only difference being its immediacy. This section 
also provided some potential for immediate action in the form of a ‘Special Fund’, with 
a possible link to the UN Capital Development Fund to address financing, coupled with 
further requests for accelerated action and advisory aid from the IMF and the World 
Bank Group. 
ii) CERD: 
The Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States consolidated many of the 
provisions of the NIEO, reiterating them in most provisions. The Charter declared its 
‘fundamental purpose’ was to ‘promote the establishment of the new international 
economic order.’588 Article 2(c) stated the right of each state to ‘nationalize, expropriate 
or transfer ownership of foreign property’, for which ‘appropriate compensation should 
be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account all its relevant laws 
and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent.’589 More 
importantly, disputes were to be settled ‘under the domestic law of the nationalizing 
State… unless agreed upon by all States concerned’.590 Article 5 reiterated the right to 
form ‘organizations of primary commodity producers’, and that ‘[c]orrespondingly, all 
States have the duty to respect that right by refraining from applying economic and 
political measures that would limit it.’ Other key controversial provisions occur in Article 
14: economic measures should be taken ‘to achieve a substantial increase’ in the 
foreign exchange earnings and the diversification of exports of developing States; 
Article 16(1): noting the right and duty to eliminate ‘colonialism, apartheid, racial 
discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and 
domination, and the economic and social consequences thereof’. Crucially Article 16(1) 
further stated that ‘States which practice such coercive policies are economically 
responsible to the countries, territories and peoples effected for the restitution and full 
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compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural and all 
other resources of those countries, territories and peoples.’591 
This Resolution was adopted by a vote of 120 in favour to six against, with ten 
abstentions. The casters of these sixteen votes were telling, if unsurprising. The 
abstentions were: Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Spain; voting against were: Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the United States.592 France’s declared 
reasons for abstaining were ‘primarily in relation to the taking of foreign property,’ 
declaring that ‘in view of the wide number of provisions and commitments in this 
programme, [they did] not consider [themselves] bound’.593 The Federal Republic of 
Germany objected to the possible disruption of free trade, noting those provisions as 
‘liable to suspend the market mechanism which is indispensable for the functioning of 
the world economy’.594 The Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the UK all made 
reference to the repetition of rights already ‘vested in international law’, and the need 
for these rights to be enacted with ‘due regard for international law’ for the UK, or ‘in 
accordance with international law’ for Japan.595 The US more explicitly stressed the link 
to existing obligations to compensate for nationalization as a necessary component of 
any right to do so.596 The UK also objected to cartels, and the US condemned ‘[a]rtifical 
attempts to manage markets which ignore economic realities and the legitimate 
interests of consumers’.597 
No investor countries were in favour of the charter. Not only were the aforementioned 
oppositions made, placing CERD in opposition to existing norms, but the claim was also 
put forward that CERD would provoke ‘insecurity in the minds of investors’; that the 
‘untraditional’ approach to international law could offer no way of maintaining the 
confidence of financial markets.598 However, even in the light of these considerations 
scholars reflecting on the Charter have claimed that ‘[i]n so far as the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States is concerned, certain of its controversial provisions 
should not belittle its majority of noncontroversial provisions which [were] being 
followed by a large number of States directly or indirectly.'599 This is an important note 
to bear in mind when considering potentially revolutionary legal praxis. Many of the 
provisions articulated in CERD, which are essential components of the broader NIEO, 
may be said to contain ‘revolutionary’ potential in that they threatened property 
ownership, and prompted severe concerns about the effective functioning of global 
capitalism were they to be enforced. These provisions were then rejected, whilst 
maintaining that the more traditional provisions simply restate current practice. 
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Retrospective statements like the one above that certain ‘controversial provisions’ 
should not reflect badly on the ‘non-controversial’ ones that reflect common practice 
serve to empty the Charter of radical content. It is also a position highly reminiscent of 
Corea’s reflection on international organisations like UNCTAD, in which it was claimed 
that the lack of any progress for radical Third World aims should not disenchant them 
with either the institution or the process as a whole. 
iii) Lomé I and II, UNCLOS 
These same problems haunted the Third World’s demands in other international 
conventions and treaties. Their presence and their potential strength had an effect but 
it was always severely limited by the structural conditions of global capitalism that 
disadvantaged them. For example the negotiations of seventy one African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries with the European Union in 1975 that led to the first Lomé 
Convention represented a ‘successful’ negotiating example at the height of power for 
the post-formal-colonial states.  In the wake of the NIEO, CERD, OPEC’s oil embargo and 
the commodity boom, the EU was also confronted with the alliance of larger 
Anglophone countries with greater negotiating power than the expected Francophone 
group.600 Christopher Clapham noted the generous terms secured in relation to aid 
packages, so called ‘Stabex’ funds to cushion falls in primary produce prices, and an 
ability to impose tariffs without jeopardising their access to EU markets.601 
Unfortunately this ‘success’ resulted in no measurable increase in ACP development, or 
even in effecting a reverse in their declining living standards across this period. In 
addition to this, the terms were reversed during the second Lomé negotiations from 
1978-9 onwards, with a real terms drop in aid of twenty percent.602 Compared to a 
resolution like CERD, in which the more radical provisions were rejected and the rest 
were considered simply declaratory of current practice, this instance of actually 
effecting an agreement to secure marginally generous terms demonstrates both the 
ways in which these efforts failed to significantly advance the position of the Third 
World in concrete terms, whilst simultaneously securing a merely tenuous legal 
advantage that was swiftly renegotiated.  
The other major Convention negotiated over the course of this same period, the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), replicated the same themes. The Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea opened in New York in 1973 and the 
substantive sessions were held between 1974 and 1982. The Conference adopted the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea at the 11th session held in New York between 8 
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March and 30 April 1982.603 OPEC’s embargo also impacted on these negotiations, 604 
and commentators claimed that ‘what [was] happening at sea [was] a continuation of 
the struggle begun on land between the rich and poor countries.’605 Although UNCLOS is 
an extensive declaration, there are two elements of particular significance for the NIEO 
and the discussion at hand: the expansion of coastal state jurisdiction in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and the potential exploitation of the “common heritage of 
mankind” in the seabed beyond.606  
The idea of a common heritage from which the profits would be distributed in some 
way among developing countries fit well within the Third World’s aspiration for some 
kind of redistribution of wealth and a shift in trade terms – although importantly one 
targeted towards future revenues rather than the rectification of any previous 
exploitation, or any immediate redistribution. Yet in this particular instance the politics 
of geography and those of the negating process neutered the Third World position. 
Despite elaborate arguments by landlocked states about their claim to the oceans,607 
which are revealing of the primacy of property-based arguments within the law if 
nothing else, the newly negotiated EEZ incorporated over eighty percent of known sea 
resources, leaving only the hoped for mining of Manganese modules as a potential 
contributor to the common heritage funds.608  
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) established under the 1982 Convention to 
administer ‘the Area’ designated as the common heritage of mankind609 had no 
independent capacity to explore or exploit these resources, and served essentially as a 
contractor for private enterprise. Negotiations over this area were heavily structured by 
the fact that only the advanced industrialised economies had the technology to even 
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consider exploiting these resources, and that the corporate bodies with the capability 
were profit seeking. This particular issue has resurfaced as the price of minerals rises 
and exploitation becomes potentially profitable, with the ISA experiencing renewed 
interest in its activities.610 In this vein UNCLOS simply replicated the dilemma of the 
Third World position: without the technology to exploit resources for profit and without 
the consequent negotiating power to stake a realistic claim, they were forced to settle 
with high-sounding moral claims about the common heritage of mankind with no way 
of actualizing the idea, in addition to the real terms negotiated leaving almost nothing 
available for that purpose. 
VII: Revolutionary Legal Praxis and the Third World – An Assessment  
From the perspective of an advocate for the Third World position the foregoing 
discussion will appear bleak. It should appear even more so considering that the 
declaration for a NIEO came at the height of Third World strength. The about turn in 
this position as the international economy downturned from 1975 to 1977 was evident 
to the industrial powers, and the drop in developing countries’ bargaining power all but 
brought a halt to initiatives for the NIEO.611 Assessments of CERD noted that ’[i]t [was] 
obvious that any attempt to invoke its provisions by a developing State against a 
developed State would not succeed.'612 Third World debt escalated massively in the 
1980s, and negotiations of write-downs continue with no serious debate over 
challenging the structural conditions for that indebtedness in a way that would prevent 
its re-emergence. To date no funds have resulted from the common heritage of 
mankind. OPEC’s increased wealth continues to cycle through Western financial 
institutions, in addition to its American-allied members constructing havens for 
transnational capitalists using highly exploited migrant labour. No wealth has been 
effectively redistributed, although the intervening years have seen a rapid growth in the 
gap between the richest and poorest across the globe. The Third World’s project of a 
more egalitarian society brought about through the intervention of international law 
has manifestly failed.  
On first appraisal this failure does not offer any specific insights into the form of law. 
This is because of the fact that the failure in this instance seems to stem too clearly 
from the structurally disadvantaged position of the Third World vis-à-vis the 
industrialized countries. In Maxwell’s stark terms, the ‘haves’ defended their privilege 
against the demands of the ‘have-nots’. Bearing in mind the problems of national 
boundaries and the class divisions within them that would nuance such a statement, in 
the terms in which the Third World conducted the struggle that peaked in the 1970s 
this statement captures a deep truth. However, it is important to recall that the struggle 
of the Third World was very explicitly channelled into the international legal form.  To 
                                                          
610
 Suzanne Goldenberg, “Marine Mining: Underwater Gold Rush Sparks Fears of Ocean 
Catastrophe,” The Guardian, March 2, 2014, sec. Environment, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/02/underwater-gold-rush-marine-
mining-fears-ocean-threat. 
611
 Meagher, An International Redistribution of Wealth and Power, 127. 
612
 Chatterjee, “The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,” 675. 
168 
 
recall Franck’s eloquent phrase, this was in one sense an attempted ‘revolution of laws, 
not of men’. Rephrasing this slightly (and necessarily) as an attempted revolution by 
men using legal means, the failed international legal advocacy of the Third World should 
offer something by way of insight into the nature of the legal form and the possible 
limits it might offer to revolutionary praxis. 
The first response to this from the preceding discussion of the Third World’s 
relationship to international law is to deny the legal status of that struggle. After all, the 
NIEO declarations were only General Assembly Resolutions; UNCTAD simply attempted 
to serve as an alternative forum in which to discuss trade issues from a perspective 
favourable to the developing world; CERD was also a General Assembly Resolution, and 
importantly received no support from any developed nations, a supposedly clear 
indicator of its non-acceptance as law; none of these declarations expressed concrete 
measures for enacting them, or demanded specific actions from the states involved, or 
even provided novel means of resolving disputes. The repeated examinations of the 
legal status of General Assembly Resolutions demonstrate the intractability of this 
position; ICJ case law would seem to imply either that they do not have status as law,613 
or that significant evidence of general practice is required, whereas ICJ advisory 
opinions offer some inclination towards their acceptance.614 Most commentators accept 
some form of ‘moral force’ emanating from them, read as some kind of contrast to 
more concrete international legal provisions.615 
This of course overlooks the nature of the formation of international law. From 
perspectives like Franck’s, some politics ‘congeals’ into law and some fails to do so. It 
then becomes a matter of time and practice; of contestation and the ability to translate 
this into law. Bedjaoui noted that the lack of specific mechanisms and provisions in 
General Assembly resolutions were no reason for dismissing them: despite their 
formally binding nature (in contrast to General Assembly resolutions) ‘treaties do not 
always contain precise norms, and even when they do, they do not always provide 
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reliable machinery for their effective application.'616 In addition, 'some resolutions have 
normative content which is quite elaborate, and include precise undertakings, even 
when these are not recognized as having binding value.'617 The argument of this thesis, 
however, is that the indeterminacy of the law encapsulates both this understanding of 
the ‘fluid’ nature of international law, and the arguments both for and against the 
‘legal’ status of General Assembly resolutions. The theoretical implications are that the 
Third World’s engagement with international law cannot be dismissed as ‘non-law’. 
Rather, these are legal arguments that failed in some way.  
What is noteworthy for this investigation is the ways in which much of the Third World’s 
productive work within international law could be accepted as more or less evident of 
general practice, but that the more radical provisions either prompted serious 
opposition, denial of legal status, represented temporary victories that were later 
undone through renegotiation, or were simply ignored. Among those provisions most 
fiercely opposed were the right to nationalize without compensation (according to 
domestic law – which meant the same thing), debt forgiveness, and the right to 
compensation for past colonial exploitation. Now although the case law and the 
resolutions themselves demonstrate that these legal claims did not achieve much 
‘force’ of law, it is important to consider whether or not this was their only failing, most 
particularly in order to understand the potential limits of the legal form on 
revolutionary praxis. 
To recall from Chapter Two, there are two important elements to potentially 
revolutionary legal praxis. The first is the disenchanting of the current legal system, 
exposing it as serving particular interests and the second is the ultimate aim of 
overthrowing that legal system – or at least the revolutionary upheaval of the social 
relations that created and were in turn shaped by it. Like the Soviet Union, the Third 
World’s approach to international law involved an attempt to utilize its provisions, 
whilst at the same time challenging their broader basis. In this sense, there was clearly a 
significant and consistent element within the Third World’s engagement with 
international law that decried the law and the broader economic system as unjust and 
serving the interests of the developed countries. Evidently the Third World did not 
overthrow international capitalism, and most accounts agree that this was not even 
part of the agenda.618 Articulating so much of their cause within international legal 
argument also implied that the Third World did not have the overthrow of international 
law in mind either. However, it was evident to some, even jurists like Bedjaoui, that the 
legal change being demanded amounted to 'saying that we should change the capitalist 
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nature’ of the system under consideration.619 It was also clear in some of the 
oppositions to Third World Conventions like CERD that certain provisions threatened 
the smooth functioning of the global capitalist economy. This was because the 
redistributions of wealth, sought either through the right to nationalize without 
compensation or direct transfers, both threatened two vital bases for international 
capitalism – the safety of investments and the legitimate ownership of property. In 
essence by asking the questions of how some particular wealth came to be in the hands 
of one state rather than another, especially when it was previously extracted from 
another state, the basis of legal ownership was brought into question. And by 
threatening to enshrine a principle of legitimate expropriation of international capital 
investments the sanctity of contract was threatened. 
In Alan Stone’s terms from Chapter Two, these provisions offered a potential threat to 
‘essential legal relations’, and thereby were indicative of a radical challenge to the 
functioning of the system. However, in this instance the extent of the threat is unclear. 
It is understandable that developed states would argue against interventions in a “free” 
market system that was broadly serving the interests of their ruling classes. However, it 
is far from clear how exactly the NIEO provisions would have played out. The two most 
prominent cases, nationalization without compensation and debt cancellation provide 
illustrative examples. Both take the form of a transfer of wealth, in importantly 
different ways. Both could serve as momentary and unfortunate disruptions of capitalist 
profit making. Losing the capital invested in a particular plant and the expected future 
revenue might prove a setback for a particular multinational company. Similarly a loss 
on government bonds might hurt some investors. However, without changing the 
background conditions that lead to either large corporate exploitation of natural 
resources and profit making, or the conditions in which states find it necessary to 
borrow regularly from financial markets to finance the function of government, there is 
no reason in particular why instances of nationalisation or debt cancellation would 
prove unduly onerous. Particularly once account is given to the fact that increasing 
instances of nationalisation led to higher insurance premiums, and that market 
structures allow extra costs to be passed on to the consumer. Similarly, defaulting on 
loans leads to higher premiums on government borrowing. In fact, confidence in this 
market has proved to be a particularly effective control mechanism of the political 
process not only within the developing world, but within the margins of Europe with 
Greece, Italy and Spain being the most prominent examples.  
However, if we consider this as a legal ‘right’, or ‘norm’ to cancel debt, and similarly to 
nationalize property, a particular problem arises. That same one “law” of capitalism 
noted by Amin at the beginning of this chapter dictates that in this environment capital 
will go elsewhere rather than face the risk of a loss of investment under an international 
system that normalizes this loss. But if the loss were to be a general principle then there 
would be nowhere for the capital to go, and no way for the system to function. Capital 
would have to be distributed on a different basis than the highest rate of profit. In fact, 
the system as a whole would have to be radically different. Perhaps this kind of 
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acknowledgement lay behind statements like Bedjaoui’s that recognised the ways in 
which the more radical proposals of the Third World, if pursued as general principles, 
would be incompatible with the capitalist system.  It is important at this point to 
reiterate that this is not what the NIEO was calling for, at least in explicit terms. 
However, it is the logical consequence of certain provisions.  
In terms of revolutionary Praxis, the Soviet example differs from that of the Third World 
precisely in this area. Early Soviet practice was orientated towards the overthrow of the 
global capitalist system. The tactical use of the legal form in pursuit of that aim was 
entirely compatible with the ultimate objective, as long as the form of law did not 
become the coordinating principle of the struggle. In Pashukanis’s terms this meant as 
long as the same logic of bourgeois legality was not sought as a justificatory principle for 
the struggle. Soviet international legal praxis then bore revolutionary elements in that it 
both attempted to unveil the law as arbitrary and serving the interests of a particular 
class, but also in that the ultimate aim was to transform the social relations that 
produced the law. For the Third World’s engagement with international law, bourgeois 
standards of justice were held up (among others) as the motivating principles for the 
struggle. The aim was to correct an unjust system through the law, although this came 
with the general caveat that the shift in power relations brought about by 
independence struggles would also force this change. Both struggles encountered the 
form of law as hostile to their radical aims, and neither struggle succeeded in 
transforming the relations of exploitation with which that legal form was entwined. 
VIII: Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the Third World’s engagement with international law, in 
order to assess how explicitly legal praxis could have had revolutionary content. In 
order to do so it has presented a brief background to the rise of the Third World, paying 
particular attention to the hegemonic position of the United States coinciding with the 
rise in Third World calls for a transformed international system. It then considered the 
different institutional attempts by the Third World to advance their cause with their 
consistent focus on the international trading system as the most appropriate locus of 
intervention. It then examined the declarations and conventions proposed by the Third 
World, leading up to the declaration for a NIEO in 1974. The final section aimed to 
assess the potential revolutionary content of these legal measures.  
Most of the movements discussed in this chapter are ongoing. There are still calls for a 
‘new’ New International Economic order;620 the ‘spirit of Bandung’ still lives in meetings 
commemorating the original conference; OPEC continues to function and in particular 
oil producing states in the Gulf with small official populations have accrued vast per-
capita GDPs; the Non-Aligned movement still meet regularly, and India recently 
considered the policy implications of ‘non-alignment 2.0’;621 UNCTAD continues to 
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convene and generally attempt to offer ways in which the Third World could compete 
more effectively to provide profitable opportunities for international capital; it is 
possible that under the provisions of UNCLOS, the common heritage of mankind will 
eventually be exploited by large corporations and that some small sum may thereby 
drift in the direction of otherwise impoverished states.  These facts do not speak well 
for the ‘revolutionary’ content of the Third World engagement with international law. 
However, it would be unjust to reduce the movement to its surviving international legal 
elements. It is clear that there were many strands within the Third World movement 
that recognised that their objectives might not be compatible with international 
capitalism, and that the system as a whole would have to change. Therefore the idea of 
revolutionary intent cannot be completely side-lined. Even conservative critics of the 
NIEO as a kind of capitalism for everybody have to account for the fact that the form of 
the struggle happened to be the nation state and that within this structure it made 
sense for the oppressed to align themselves with local nationalist bourgeois elements. 
In this vein perhaps strengthening nationalist centres offered a potential path to 
revolutionary transformation. Fortunately, counter-historical speculation is not the aim 
of this thesis. Socialist leaning states did not fare well under American hegemony and 
the neo-liberal counter revolution, and those that have ‘successfully’ navigated their 
way to some kind of regional prominence, the so-called BRICS, have done so by 
embracing this counter-revolution.  
What remains, however, is the juxtaposition of a rather less coherent revolutionary 
intent than the early Soviet Union with a more explicitly legal focus. Similarly to the 
Soviet example, the most radical of these proposals revolved around questioning the 
basis of wealth (property) and threatening its appropriation and redistribution. Contrary 
to the Soviet approach, it was the aim of the Third World to generalize these principles 
– at least by implication if not explicitly. However, as with the Soviet case, over time (in 
this instance a very short period of time) these radical legal elements were dropped and 
the ‘contribution’ of declarations, resolutions and conventions sponsored by the Third 
World began to look a lot like standard international legal practice, with perhaps a 
greater rhetorical encomium to principles of justice and equity. Interestingly by painting 
international law with this veneer, the idea that law and power have somehow been 
separated on the international stage has acquired some purchase.622  
In order for this vision to gain traction, both legal indeterminacy and the broader 
function of what has been termed ‘private’ international law have to be elided. In fact, 
the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ international law is entirely unproductive 
in relation to effectively assessing the revolutionary potential of the legal form, and has 
served, as it has for bourgeois legal theorists since the advent of liberalism, to seduce 
and confound progressively minded lawyers.  The consequence for the Third World’s 
engagement with international law appears to be a paradoxical one: either all 
revolutionary content was purged in the transition to the legal form as a site of struggle, 
or the project was serving only to reverse the ‘gap’ between international law and 
                                                          
622
 The illustrative example, as ever, is Sands, Lawless World. 
173 
 
reality that incensed jurists like Bedjaoui. The latter would suggest that from the most 
naïve of legal perspectives it appears that the horrendous and exploitative world of late 
neo-liberal capitalism stands opposed to a weakened and enervated international law 
that would otherwise regulate the globe into an egalitarian paradise. Perhaps this 
serves to magnify the defects of the present arrangement, but it would seem that those 
defects are doing the job rather well on their own. The potentially revolutionary legal 
praxis of the Third World then fails not only the test of aiming to overthrow the order, 
but also on the task of disenchanting potential revolutionaries of the legal fetishism that 
accompanies advanced capitalism. 
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Conclusion 
Counter-revolutionary times 
Phillip Allot has described us as living in ‘revolutionary times’.623 He is far from alone in 
using such language. Since he made that statement we have witnessed ‘revolutions’ in 
Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Syria and most recently the Ukraine. Some scholars have 
encouraged us to see that ‘[t]iny revolutions are everywhere, every day’.624  Both Allot 
and those who line up alongside him to sing encomiums to revolution are not 
particularly precise about what it is we should be celebrating, beyond some kind of 
amorphous potentiality somehow present in otherwise abstract academic work, or the 
existence of pockets of resistance to rampant corporate exploitation. To return to the 
opening words of this thesis, these are strange times indeed. This idea of revolution 
that seems so rampant finds among its acolytes critical international lawyers, European 
and American politicians, and right-wing conservative commentators. It is a revolution 
that has, in Egypt, culminated in military rule and planned legal massacre,625 in Libya 
involved racially motivated killings and the threat of civil war,626 has left Syria in ruins,627 
and Yemen wracked by violence associated with Al-Qaida.628 Tunisia offers the Western 
press a glimmer of hope with a recently written constitution as a bulwark against two 
years of ‘unemployment, protests, terrorist attacks [and] political assassinations’.629 
If these are our revolutionary times, then there seems little reason to celebrate their 
coming, or hope to see tiny versions of them all over the place. This thesis has argued 
that such a picture rests on a serious misreading of the concept of revolution. However, 
this misreading does not account for the nature of our current conjecture. Poignantly, 
Daniel Bensaïd’s published memoirs are titled ‘an impatient life’; described in an 
insightful review as a ‘sober reflection on the “art of waiting” impatiently in non-
                                                          
623
 Philip Allott, “Review Essay Symposium: Philip Allot’s Eunomia and The Health of Nations - 
Thinking Another World: ‘This Cannot Be How the World Was Meant to Be,’” European Journal 
of International Law 16, no. 2 (2005): 257. 
624
 Eslava and Pahuja, “Beyond the (Post) Colonial,” 129. 
625
 Patrick Kingsley and Manu Abdo, “Anger in Egypt as 529 Morsi Supporters Sentenced to 
Death,” The Guardian, March 24, 2014, sec. World news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/egypt-morsi-supporters-death-sentence. 
626
 Richard Seymour, “Libya’s Spectacular Revolution Has Been Disgraced by Racism,” The 
Guardian, August 30, 2011, sec. Comment is free, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/30/libya-spectacular-revolution-
disgraced-racism; Owen Jones, “Libya Is a Disaster We Helped Create. The West Must Take 
Responsibility,” The Guardian, March 24, 2014, sec. Comment is free, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/24/libya-disaster-shames-western-
interventionists. 
627
 Martin Chulov, “Syria’s Heritage in Ruins,” The Guardian, January 26, 2014, sec. World news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/26/syria-heritage-in-ruins-before-and-after-
pictures. 
628
 Associated Press, “Yemen Bus Bomb Kills Two,” The Guardian, February 4, 2014, sec. World 
news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/yemen-bus-bomb-kills-two. 
629
 Associated Press, “Tunisia Signs New Constitution,” The Guardian, January 27, 2014, sec. 
World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/tunisia-signs-new-constitution-
progressive. 
175 
 
revolutionary times’.630 Maybe it is an inability to contain a similar impatience that leads 
the more progressively inclined to make strange bedfellows with the Angela Merkels of 
this world. Whatever the reason, the idea that Bensaïd’s life spanned non-revolutionary 
times gives cause for reflection. The concept of revolution argued for in this thesis 
refers to a political programme aimed at bringing to pass a dream of emancipated 
human life, free from the particular oppressions and exploitations that are the heart of 
capitalism. Further it has argued that this was a political programme that tied 
theoretical reflection to political practice in the unity of praxis. A necessary component 
of such praxis is the constant critical assessment of the world around us with a mind to 
finding a way of advancing that revolutionary cause. In this frame, conceiving of a 
moment or a period as non-revolutionary is less a descriptor of some empty historical 
pause, but a rather a recognition that revolutionary success is beyond the horizon. A 
more accurate description of such times that captures the struggle involved would be 
‘counter-revolutionary times’. In the frame of this thesis these are the times we face.  
The importance of reclaiming revolution 
It is a sign of the strength of the counter-revolution that the very concept of revolution 
itself has to be rescued from its grasp. In part, this has been a necessary task of this 
thesis. Chapter One devoted itself to the ‘reclaiming’ of revolution for this purpose. It 
argued that not only was there a greater historical fidelity in this interpretation of 
revolution, but that it was also politically necessary and enabling to reclaim the concept 
from its amorphous contemporary role as a catch-all for social upheaval. By reclaiming 
revolution’s socialist heritage the possibility of aspiring to do more than resist the 
oppressive onslaught of social and environmental destruction re-enters the frame. 
However, it also serves a crucial further purpose for this thesis. It offers a way of 
assessing the possibility of international law to serve this goal. In this sense this thesis 
situates itself in dialogue with those critical international legal scholars with left politics 
who present valuable critical accounts of international law yet tend towards an 
unqualified assumption in the law’s emancipatory potential when it comes to their 
prognosis. By stressing the concrete nature of revolutionary goals, it is possible to 
assess with greater depth the compatibility between legal means and revolutionary 
ends.  
Chapter One also described the necessary connections between historical agency, 
empirical analysis and theoretical work. The concept of revolution deployed in this 
thesis captures the unity of all of these elements in revolutionary praxis. A significant 
component of this move is to recognise that historical and conceptual interpretation is 
not a neutral process. Just as theory is always for something and for someone so too 
historical interpretation is itself situated within a political struggle and a historical 
moment. This work can open up political horizons and imaginative possibilities as well 
as reclaiming concepts from politically disabling trajectories. This process itself is 
equally a terrain of struggle. In a cautionary note, as far as academic work is concerned 
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it should never be conflated with more serious challenges to oppressive systems, but in 
counter-revolutionary times it becomes increasingly necessary. The essential 
companion to this move is empirical work that attempts to trace historical possibility 
with a mind to informing the tactics of contemporary political engagement. Chapter 
One stressed that the birth of capitalism and the modern era were accompanied by 
both the critical analysis of the capitalist system and the dream of transcending it. The 
concept and practice of revolution referred precisely to this analytical and practical 
programme. 
The possibility of revolutionary praxis as legal praxis 
Chapter Two coupled this vision of revolutionary praxis with international legal praxis. 
This Chapter assessed the lure of legal struggle through the apparent lack of necessity 
behind law’s regressive moments. The ambiguity in the law’s function between the 
ideal of justice and equality and the reality of power and inequity create space for a 
vision of law’s emancipatory and revolutionary potential. International law seems open 
to the praxis of progressive and critical international legal academics, and thus it 
appears to be a critical move to imagine international law as praxis. Entertaining the 
belief that it is an act of imagination that makes international law a form of praxis 
suggests that without such imaginative intervention the international law had no 
existing connection to conscious group activity tied to a political vision; in other words, 
that there is a disconnect between political (ruling) class projects and the law. It also 
has a further critical consequence. It serves to elide the connection between lawyers 
and legal academics and their day to day participation in said praxis.  
At times ‘imagining’ the international law is practice serves to render as neutral the 
majority of the time in which the hypothetical legal academic is participating in the 
construction and maintenance of this praxis. This does not mean that your average 
lawyer, or even legal academic, directly theorises their position, but that beginning to 
do so does not as a consequence open up that terrain to previously incompatible 
revolutionary praxis. This connects quite directly to the main impulse behind the 
question this thesis seeks to answer. Progressive international lawyers hold out 
significant hope for the transformative potential of their legal praxis, once awareness is 
shifted to accommodate the fact of its existence as praxis. Yet as Chapter Two makes 
clear, there is a relative absence of a critical understanding for why international law in 
its ‘active’ moments tends to operate in manner consonant with oppression and 
exploitation despite their being no apparent ‘reason of principle’ for this to be so. 
Chapter Two also offered a summary of the critical work that has been done in 
international legal theory that has highlighted the indeterminate nature of international 
law, and argued that it is this persistent indeterminacy that leaves the legal form 
apparently open to the emancipatory content progressive legal academics are so keen 
to pour into it. This chapter offered a brief summary of complementary work that has 
located the determining influence upon international law in its imperialist, gendered 
and racist underpinnings. As valuable as this critical work is, it does not provide us with 
a direct understanding of why the legal form itself functions in this way. The 
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indeterminacy of the legal form still appears to offer moments when the international 
law can serve emancipatory or revolutionary purposes. Crucially this thesis is not 
arguing that this can never be the case, but that such victories are both exceptional and 
temporary. In assessing how open the legal form is to revolutionary praxis, this is 
inadequate. In order to move beyond such an impasse, this Chapter offered a 
presentation of Pashukanis’s commodity form theory, substantially influenced by 
Miéville’s comprehensive application of this theory to international law. The theory 
notes the heart of the legal form in the ‘private’ relations of exchange; the law being 
simply the other side of this ‘economic’ relation. Crucially Pashukanis notes the ‘gravity’ 
of this central nature of law. Although temporary measures that serve emancipatory 
ends may ‘congeal’ into law at various points, this runs against the grain of the dull 
compulsion of the law. This theoretical frame leads to the expectation of law serving 
revolutionary purposes to be rare and always open to renegotiation and reversal. Such 
a position gives significant cause to reject legal struggle as a primary location for 
advancing revolutionary aims. 
Fundamental legal relations 
Chapter Two concluded that such a position did not mean that there was no space for 
legal praxis as part of a revolutionary strategy. The pervasive nature of law under 
capitalism means that it would be yet a further form of fetishism to eschew legal 
struggle out of some kind of revolutionary moralism. Pashukanis reiterated Lenin’s 
pragmatic approach to legal struggle in this instance, prescribing the revolutionary to 
take advantage of every legal opportunity yet resist investing the revolutionary struggle 
in the form of law – a principled but opportunistic approach. This seems relatively 
straightforward, but it within the actual frame of legal argument there is little to 
distinguish such practice from standard legal practice that happens to be arguing for a 
‘revolutionary’ position. Such work may prove invaluable at certain points, but it 
importantly fails to address two aspects of legal struggle: the investment of time, 
energy and effort in that arena that could be spent more productively elsewhere; and 
the inevitable consequence of legitimising legal structures via their engagement.  
Legal praxis with a revolutionary orientation must then be defined by walking the line 
between the tactical use of the law to advance immediate causes, the de-legitimation of 
the law as complicit in oppression, and the aimed overthrow of the system alongside 
the law that is a constituent part. Chapter Two noted that certain legal theorists have 
touched on this, particularly in that most critical work has served to de-legitimate or 
‘disenchant’ the law. However, the ‘overthrow’ of the law continues to appear to have 
little to do with legal practice itself, which would imply that in its own terms legal praxis 
could not be revolutionary. However, this Chapter discussed the possibility of a 
challenge made within legal argument to those relations most central to the law, 
especially given the insights of the commodity form theory. Those ‘essential’ legal 
relations, in both the commodity form theory and other critical engagements, are at 
heart property and contract. This gives rise to the possibility of advancing as ‘norms’ 
principles which are inimical to the operating of capitalism: in essence those that 
challenge the basis of exchange relations (property and contract) and the availability of 
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human labour as a commodity. Setting the bar somewhat lower, legal principles that 
had the logical consequence of tending in this direction might have some potential to 
serve a similar purpose. 
Soviet legal practice: between pragmatism and revolution 
Chapter Three then aimed to assess the engagement of the early Soviet Union with 
international law in the light of this consideration. The Soviet example provided some 
interesting confirmations of the above theoretical frame. Firstly it was undeniable that 
early Soviet international legal practice and theory had an explicit connection to 
revolutionary aims as presented in this thesis. One consequence of this has been a 
persistent interpretation of the Soviet ‘approach’ to international law as being distinct 
from ‘standard’ engagements. This Chapter discussed various reasons for this, 
highlighting their proximity to attempts to rehabilitate international law as a universal 
project by constructing it as some kind of multi-cultural enterprise. However, the 
central point for this thesis is that this scholarly approach elided the persistent 
invocation of rather traditional legal arguments by the Soviet state. The Soviet state 
decried its early diplomatic isolation, the violation of its territorial integrity and the 
fostering of counter-revolution within its borders. Pashukanis noted explicitly that to 
claim the Soviets disregarded customary international law was to attribute to it a 
doctrine it had not expressed. The Soviets made counter-claims to those held against 
them in regard to expropriated property, as well as arguing for particular and unique 
circumstances behind the appropriation. These claims were also settled in various 
bilateral treaties over the course of the following years – persisting long after the Soviet 
state itself, as noted with regard to the claims of French bond-holders.  
However, this did not mean that there was no revolutionary content to Soviet legal 
praxis. Following the discussion above we would expect revolutionary legal praxis to 
look rather like standard legal practice – it is, after all, legal praxis. The question would 
remain if there was any truly destabilizing content to the legal positions adopted by the 
Soviet state, and whether or not this was accompanied by a move to de-legitimate 
international law. Chapter Three demonstrated that the latter was clearly the case. 
Common to both the radical and more conservative elements in the commodity form 
school was the perception that international law was law made by and between 
capitalist states. Soviet legal practice continually pointed to this fact. However it also 
relied on legal arguments to defend its position vis-à-vis intervention and political 
exclusion. The closest Soviet international legal practice came to destabilizing the 
international legal and capitalist system was in the large scale renunciation of debt and 
refusal to compensate for expropriated property. Yet the legal arguments made by the 
Soviet state in this instance were couched in terms of Soviet exceptionalism. This made 
them more plausible as legal arguments at the time, yet removed their revolutionary 
potential. As discussed above, exceptions offer no threat to the general rule. 
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Third World legal practice: between idealism and revolution 
The Third World’s engagement with international law offered more potential in this 
regard. Chapter Three stressed that the Third World’s call for a New International 
Economic Order was, in the words of Thomas Franck, an attempted ‘revolution of laws 
rather than of men’.  Against this rather anodyne interpretation, this Chapter stressed 
the bloody and protracted nature of the Third World’s struggle against repeated 
colonial intervention. The Third World’s engagement with international law was 
simultaneously a struggle for independence, formal recognition and recompense for the 
centuries of exploitation they had endured. The Third World’s approach to international 
law focused on institutional engagement and construction, coupled with a 
complementary push for international declarations and resolutions that expressed their 
objectives. Yet this engagement was also an attempt to construct relationships between 
newly liberated states that would challenge and oppose the dominance of their 
exploiters. This Chapter stressed that, above everything else, the rise of the Third World 
and its engagement with international law was dominated by the push for the 
redistribution of wealth – of the need for the ‘haves’ to defend their position against 
the ‘have-nots’.  
Atop this basic antagonism the Third World’s approach involved important differences 
to the Soviet engagement that foregrounded the legal aspect of the Third World’s 
struggle. They made similar claims to the right to nationalize property and renege on 
debt, but their struggle attempted to formalize these as principles in international 
declarations and resolutions. Chapter Three charted the evolution of this approach 
through the institutional initiatives of the Third World, from Bandung in 1955 to the 
subsequent foundation of the Non-aligned Movement, the G-77 and UNCTAD, and in 
particular the formation of OPEC and its (in)famous 1973 oil embargo. The declaration 
for the NIEO in 1974 came at the apparent highpoint of the Third World’s strength on 
the international stage. The NIEO and the Convention on the Economic Rights and 
Duties of States contained a series of radical provisions demanding the right to 
nationalize without compensation, the need to cancel debt, and the liability of 
imperialist states for their colonial deprivations.  
However, none of these declarations were ever paired with concrete mechanisms for 
implementation; they were resolutely opposed by developed countries, and over time 
the more radical elements were dropped and the remaining provisions seen accurately 
as largely declaratory of existing practice. The institutional efforts of the Third World 
either failed to acquire sufficient weight on the international stage, or shifted focus to 
accommodate the interests of international financial capital. Although the success of 
OPEC demonstrated the insatiable international demand for oil, it also demonstrated 
the structurally disadvantaged position of the Third World as a whole in which 
temporary trade gains did not fundamentally alter the international economic order. 
Financial surpluses were recycled through Western financial institutions, rising 
commodity prices disproportionately affected the Third World, and many members of 
OPEC had closely aligned interests with the West leaving the cartel vulnerable. The 
Chapter argued that OPEC is better understood in the general context of the dramatic 
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rise and fall in commodity prices that continued to plague Third World economies. 
Overall Chapter Three concluded that the radical provisions of the Third World’s 
international legal engagement failed to have any impact and were later dropped, and 
that their institutional initiatives suffered a similar fate. In addition to this, the frame 
through which the Third World viewed the potential legal order served to re-enchant 
the form of law after their initial work of unveiling it as capitalist and imperialist. 
The vulnerable heart of law: property and contract 
Together the two examples of the Soviet and the Third World’s engagement with 
international law imply that the form of law offers limits to revolutionary praxis. 
Although both engagements contained radical provisions and possibilities these gained 
no purchase as legal principles. In nearly all other respects the legal practice of both the 
Soviets and the Third World movement mirrored that of their contemporaries. Soviet 
international legal practice shed its more radical elements relatively swiftly. In addition 
to which, the Soviet repudiation of debt and expropriation of property were based on 
an exceptionalism that neutered the destabilizing potential of these positions. The Third 
World’s approach to international law lost much of the confrontational style of the 
1970s in the subsequent decades, and the more radical elements of the NIEO, CERD and 
their institutional bodies never achieved much force on the international stage. The 
problematic international economic order identified by the NIEO remains firmly in 
place. In addition to which the Third World’s approach invested significant reformist 
hope in the form of law, thus failing the first step of revolutionary praxis suggested in 
Chapter Two. 
However, the combination of the two provides a window onto what revolutionary 
praxis on the international stage might look like, based on the considerations of Chapter 
Two. Legal initiatives that challenged the essential legal relations of property and 
contract were those that met the most opposition internationally, but also those that 
encountered a legal system that seemed to find them inimical to its function. The 
response from the developed world demonstrated both a reluctance to have positions 
of power altered within the system as it was, yet also their doubts as to the functioning 
of capitalism if such redistributive behaviour was normalized. As was recognised at the 
time, at their heart both of these moves represented a method of redistributing wealth. 
There are then two ways of approaching this issue. Firstly as an exceptional case. In this 
instance, there is certainly no problem within international law or in capitalist relations 
for one person to lose their wealth to another. But as discussed in Chapter Four, it is 
unclear how this would function as a general legal principle. If debt is risky, the value of 
the premium goes up, along with the expected returns to the lender. Similarly, capital 
investment in areas liable to expropriation will face higher risk premiums and investors 
will expect greater returns to lure them in. These are relatively straightforward market 
mechanisms for preserving the rate of return on capital, but they also serve to stymie 
the transfer of wealth.  
Like law, the ‘market’ isn’t uniform in this sense (or really separate from law). But it 
doesn’t need to be uniform in order to follow a basic pattern. The logic and function of 
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capitalism as a system is simply evident in the world around us, and although the 
process might be uneven it nevertheless combines to present a coherent picture. 
Somehow, such coherence hasn’t prevented the location of hope in the fact that it does 
not have to be this way. Crucially, progressive economists mirror legal progressives in 
their expectation that there is no ‘reason of principle’ for the ‘market’ to operate in 
such a manner.  
One might think the system would shift money from rich countries, where 
capital is in abundance, to those where it is scarce, whilst transferring risk from 
poor countries to rich ones, which are most able to bear it… Through an orderly 
bankruptcy procedure, a well-functioning financial system would grant a fresh 
start to those who cannot meet their debt obligations, giving creditors an 
incentive to pursue good lending practices while ensuring that borrowers able 
to repay loans do so. The current global financial system does none of these 
things.631 
One might indeed think that the ‘system’ might do other than what it does, but this 
seems an extension of the expectation that the function of law will align with a 
particular vision of ‘justice’. The argument of this thesis is that there is no reason of 
theory or past experience to continue to entertain such fantasies. Historical studies, like 
Piketty’s extensive and highly popularized study, demonstrate that historically the rate 
of return on capital has remained relatively steady.632 In addition to this, Piketty cites 
several occasions where successful redistributions of wealth within states have been 
undone at a later date – the most poignant being the émigré’s billion in 1825 that 
compensated returning French aristocracy and landowners for losses during the 
revolution. Claiming that there is no reason of principle for such a record seems dubious 
to say the least.  When we add to this the Russian payment of Tsarist debt to French 
debtors in 1994, the persistence and strength of such property claims is startling. All it 
takes is a shift in political power to make vast payment from the public purse to private 
hands. For some reason, the revolutionary reversal of such a move remains absent from 
public debate, despite the prevalence of its occurrence in the interests of private 
wealth. 
It does seem that the legal form’s root in exchange relations and the essential nature of 
property and contract mean that the law structures the same tendencies towards 
accumulation and dispossession that we see in the history of capitalism. However, there 
is one possible crack in this edifice that might point towards the possibility of legally 
structured struggle; the vulnerable heart of law in property and contract. Pashukanis’s 
insightful recognition that law spreads with capitalist relations, and that property 
‘ceases to be weak, unstable and purely factual’ offers a need for the law to develop 
capitalist relations beyond the incessant necessity for defence vi et armis. At the very 
least, forcing that battle to be fought would present some significant disruptive 
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potential. There is still small potential in the law to question how and what came to be 
owned by who and where. 
This doesn’t leave much by way of a role for the legal theorist – other than perhaps to 
drive home the problematic nature of the legal form. But such activity looks very much 
like an attempt to disenchant, with all its attendant problems of potential re-
enchantment. It also comes very close to conscience salving work for Harvey’s bleeding 
heart liberal. If the law’s conservative nature is recognised, what then? We face once 
more the nightmare of the structurally determining conditions that envelop us. It is a 
difficult task of theory and practice to even begin to conceive of horizons beyond those 
that loom before us in the shape of continued capitalist exploitation and environmental 
degradation. In general, the lawyer or the legal academic is already a step removed 
from the impulse to conceive of such horizons. 
Althusser described a similar process for the revolutionary intellectual. Whereas those 
on the frontline of exploitation encountered conditions that foregrounded their struggle 
as wage labourers, intellectuals generally existed in conditions that fostered a different 
kind of consciousness. Their class-instinct would be influenced continually by the 
apparent gap between intellectual labour and manual labour, and by their 
comparatively more comfortable social position. As such it would take constant and 
incessant effort to maintain a consciousness that stayed both critical and committed to 
acting on that critical insight, against the daily realities of relative social privilege. 
Althusser noted that in order to serve the working class or the proletariat,  
intellectuals have to carry out a radical revolution in their ideas: a long, painful 
and difficult re-education. An endless external and internal struggle... 
Intellectuals, [contrary to the proletariat], have a petty-bourgeois class instinct 
which fiercely resists this transition.633  
This does not mean that legal scholars and members of the legal profession are 
necessarily reactionary, especially considering the ways in which neo-liberal 
restructuring has changed the labour conditions of those more socially minded 
members of the profession. But revolutionary praxis may well be opposed to the 
investment in the identity of the lawyer. Although Lenin saw no problem in making use 
of the law for revolutionary ends, he did so with a very particular image of the legal 
profession itself – this is something to bear in mind when investing legal struggle with 
revolutionary potential. 
As to lawyers. Lawyers should be kept well in hand and made to toe the line, for 
there is no telling what dirty tricks this intellectualist scum will be up to. 
They should be warned in advance: Look here, you confounded rascal, if you 
permit yourself the slightest impropriety or political opportunism (if you speak 
of socialism as something immature or wrong-headed, or as an infatuation, or if 
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you say that the Social-Democrats*reject the use of force, speak of their 
teachings and their movement as peaceful, etc., or anything of the sort), then I, 
the defendant, will pull you up publicly, right then and there, call you a 
scoundrel, declare that I reject such a defence, etc. 
The lawyers, as Bebel, I believe, said, are the most reactionary of people.634 
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